Theories about the human soul. About spirit, soul and body

from the scholarship report of Archimandrite Pimen "Christian teaching about the spirit, soul and body according to the works of Bishop Feofan and Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov" (1957)

The essence of the Christian doctrine of the spirit, soul and body, or, as they say, the doctrine of trichotomy in the composition of human nature, lies in the recognition in human nature of not only two basic substances - soul and body - but also a third, highly spiritual principle - the spirit ...

In Holy Scripture, we do not find a special and sufficiently detailed interpretation of the question of the tripartite nature of human nature. In the sacred books there are only, as it were, "accidental" (of course, not in the literal sense of the word) indications of trichotomy, because in the Holy Scriptures direct coverage is directed to the moral side of this or that psychological subject, which in the matter of salvation is certainly of paramount importance. Nevertheless, those indications of the Word of God to trichotomy, which nevertheless occur, are quite sufficient to see that the Holy Scripture not only does not contradict the doctrine of trichotomy, but gives the latter a certain validity and persuasiveness (See, for example, Prem 15:11; 20:24; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12; 1 Cor. 15:44; 2:14-15; Jude 19; Luke 1:46-47, etc.).

In the works of the holy fathers and teachers of the Church, the doctrine of the spirit, soul and body receives broader coverage, however, most church authors limit themselves to only a more or less brief mention, speaking of the composition of a person from the spirit, soul and body, as something taken for granted. . Since trichotomy among the holy fathers and teachers of the Church most often did not have the nature of a detailed teaching, this circumstance made it possible for some of the church writers to speak out against trichotomy and insist on strict duality in the structure of a human being, in connection with which they interpreted the corresponding passages of Holy Scripture in side of simple terminological instability, believing that in the Word of God the concepts "spirit", "soul" are unambiguous. These disputes, in turn, did not go beyond simple remarks or brief objections, and therefore in such disputes “truth was not born”, there was no detailed, in-depth study on the anthropology of man from the point of view of trichotomy ... Nevertheless, it must be said that some holy fathers of the Church in some individual cases clearly and convincingly affirmed the tripartite nature of man, so that if this teaching did not receive detailed development, then it was not rejected, it was not forgotten, on the contrary, it was often supported and widely used in the teaching on Christian morality. improvement.

In the first centuries of Christianity, the trichotomous view of human nature was dominant, and the dichotomous view (that is, recognizing only the soul and body as part of a human being) was very rare. More or less trichotomous views were held by Saint Ignatius the God-bearer, Saint Justin Martyr, Saint Irenaeus of Lyon, Clement of Alexandria, Saint Ephraim the Syrian, Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Nile of Sinai, Saint John Cassian, Saint Hesychius of Jerusalem, Saint John of the Ladder, Saint Isaac the Syrian, saint Dimitry of Rostov, Rev. Seraphim of Sarov and others...

Such views were expressed in their writings by Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Philo, Fichte, Schubert, Schelling, Du Prel, Jacob Boehme, prof. Lopatin, the famous Russian doctor N.I. Pirogov and more...

The statement of the Metropolitan of Moscow Filaret (Drozdov) regarding the doctrine of the tripartite composition of human nature is very interesting. Here is what he writes to Archbishop Alexy of Tver, who asked Metropolitan Filaret to prove the inconsistency of trichotomy: “I can’t, Father Rector, help you in your battle with the thought of the tripartite composition of man. fight against opinions that are not hostile to any true dogma? In the monthly menaion of June 25, in the canon you will find the following words: wash the body, cleanse the spirit, and sanctify my soul. Would you like to fight with this church book? For the word spirit is placed here like this that it cannot be understood in the sense of a gift of grace in order to evade the concept of the composition of a person. I think that the solution to this dispute lies in the depths to which the disputants do not penetrate. February 26. 1848. Filaret M.M. "...

Usually one has to deal with the two main most pronounced theories. The first theory is that the human soul is by its nature completely immaterial, completely spiritual and is, as it were, the lowest manifestation of the spirit, and therefore only the human body is unconditionally recognized as material. The second theory recognizes the human soul as either directly material, or "involved" in materiality, and therefore the body and soul are to some extent united into something one, one - material (sometimes denoted by the biblical term "flesh"), while the spirit is considered exclusively non-material and the only spiritual part of human nature. Let us agree to call the first theory the non-material-spiritual theory, and the second theory we will call the material-spiritual theory...

In connection with the importance and special position of the question of the tripartite nature of man, the works of our compatriot church writers - the ascetics of Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov) and especially Bishop Theophan (Govorov) attract great attention, in whose works a large place was devoted to consideration of the life of the spirit, soul and human body. His Grace Bishop Theophan was a supporter of the non-material-spiritual theory, Bishop Ignatius was a supporter of the material-spiritual theory, and, moreover, he was close to the opinion of the "subtle" materiality not only of the soul, but also of the human spirit. Both authors (especially Bishop Feofan) worked hard to study this most complex problem. They used in abundance to confirm their opinions both passages from the Holy Scriptures, and passages from the works of the holy fathers and teachers of the Church and from the writings of other thinkers. In addition, they themselves, by their highly moral life, testified to the truth of many of their theoretical propositions. The present work will be devoted to the study of the statements of these two authors ...

It is necessary immediately to clarify that Bishop Ignatius, like many trichotomists, does not consider the mind-spirit to be a completely independent "third" substance of human nature. In his opinion, the mind-spirit is only the highest manifestation of the soul, its highest "part", which invariably remains the soul in its essence. That is why Bishop Ignatius often speaks in his writings about the body and the soul as only about the two main components of a person. For example: "Death painfully cuts and tears a person into two parts, his components, and after death there is no longer a person: his soul exists separately and his body exists separately."

Only in one place at ep. Ignatius, one can find a more or less clear answer on the question of his view of trichotomy. Thus, in the "Addendum to the Word on Death" Bishop Ignatius says: "The teaching that a person has a soul and spirit is found both in Holy Scripture (Heb. 4:12) and in the Holy Fathers. For the most part, both of these words are used to refer to the entire invisible part of the human being, then both words have the same meaning (Luke 23:46; John 10:15,18).The soul is distinguished from the spirit when this is required to explain the invisible, deep, mysterious ascetic feat. called the verbal power of the human soul, in which the image of God is imprinted, and by which the human soul differs from the soul of animals ... ". In support of this thought, Bishop Ignatius immediately cites the words of St. Macarius the Great, who, in response to the question: "Is the mind (spirit) different, and the soul different?" replies: “Just as the members of the body, many being, are called one person, so the members of the soul are many, mind, will, conscience, judgmental thoughts, however, all this is united in one language, and the members are spiritual, but there is one soul - the inner man …" .

On the basis of all the above, one can draw a very definite conclusion: Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov) cannot be called a trichotomist in the literal sense. He only agrees with some views on trichotomy, which he shares with "trichotomists in the literal sense." Hence, the present work will consider all the works of Bishop Ignatius only from the point of view of those places that are either common to him with Bishop Theophan, or, conversely, are in clear contradiction with the concept of Bishop Theophan.

But even if, to some extent, Bishop Ignatius could be ranked among the trichotomists, then it should be noted that his trichotomy is special. If Bishop Theophan considers the human spirit to be the highest manifestation of the soul, or "the soul of the soul", which definitely refers both the spirit and the soul to the spiritual, non-material area, then Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov) quite definitely and firmly adheres to the opinion that the human soul is material , corporeal, real .

This view creates the main disagreement between the two venerable authors. Therefore, if one ranks Bishop Ignatius among the trichotomists, then among the "spiritual-material" trichotomists, in contrast to the "mentally-non-material" Trichotomist Bishop Feofan. Moreover, in the writings of Bishop Ignatius there is a view that the spirit itself (human and angelic) is to some extent material ...

In his well-known large work "The Word of Death" (published in 1863 as a special book, and then included in the collection of his works), Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov), unexpectedly for the Russian Orthodox world, expressed very bold thoughts about the essence of human and angelic spiritual nature.

"The soul," said Bishop Ignatius, "is an ethereal, very subtle, volatile body, having the whole appearance of our gross body, all its members, even hair, its character of the face, in a word, complete resemblance to it ...". Referring to places from the biblical narratives and to places from the works of the Holy Fathers, Bishop Ignatius also argued that human souls, like angels, although very subtle in their essence, they are material, bodily, material, despite the fact that "substance they are incomparably thinner than the substance of earthly objects that we see ... ". Regarding the appearance of an angelic being, Bishop Ignatius stated the same thing as with regard to human souls: “Angels are like a soul: they have members, a head, eyes, mouths, persi, hands, feet, hair, in a word, a complete likeness of a visible person in his body ... " .

According to Bishop Ignatius, only God is spiritual and immaterial; everything else, be it a soul or an angel, is material, gross. If a soul or an angel is called incorporeal, it is only because they do not have a coarse, visible to all "our" flesh. And Bishop Ignatius also reinforced these last arguments with abundant references to passages from the Holy Fathers.

Naturally, many readers of the "Word of Death" were surprised by the boldness and originality of the new teaching. Various articles began to appear in the press, drawing attention to the danger of such views. For example, in the September issue of the magazine "Wanderer" for 1863, a bibliographic article by Fr. P. Matveevsky about "The Teachings of Ignatius, Bishop of the Former Caucasus and Black Sea", where the author wrote the following about the "Sermon on Death": "Despite the fact that the dissertation was compiled on the basis of ascetic traditions, there is much in it that we would not otherwise we can regard, from a theological point of view, as negative. To the opinions that the author hastened to raise in vain to the degree of positivity, we include: 1) the doctrine of the corporeality of the soul and spirits ... ". “We cannot but admit,” the author continues, “that not a single eschatology has yet ... been included in such a detailed solution of these issues ... Theology, as a science, did not assume the obligation to resolve these issues in the way that the compiler of the “Word on Death” resolved them "because, referring such and similar questions to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bhuman inquisitiveness, which wants to stretch even beyond the limits of human limitations, it has always reported indisputable information about the soul, heaven, hell and evil spirits, based on Holy Scripture and the consistent teaching of the universal Church ... ".

Less than a year later, as Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov), apparently prompted by the text of the articles that appeared, wrote his new work "Addendum to the Word on Death." In this work, Bishop Ignatius tried to give a new argument in defense of his opinion about the corporeality of the nature of the angel and the soul.

A few years later, both of the above-mentioned writings of Bishop Ignatius were subjected to crushing criticism by His Grace Bishop Feofan (Govorov) in his book Soul and Angel - Not a Body, but a Spirit. In this small but deep theological work, Bishop Theophan analyzed in detail the main provisions of the "new" teaching, considering for this the testimony of the Word of God and the Holy Fathers, as well as analyzing the considerations of the mind on the question of the nature of the soul and angels. On the basis of all the testimonies taken together, Bishop Theophan tried to prove the non-church, falsity and harmfulness of the doctrine of the corporeality of the nature of the soul and angel. Bishop Theophan finished his work with the wish that the new teaching, defeated by many weighty proofs of its inconsistency, "disappeared", as wandering lights disappear in the distance, leaving no noticeable trace ... ".

Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov), as can be seen from his various works, not only "held" his special, private opinion on the essence of the soul, as a material, bodily thing, but he persistently tried to refute the opposite opinion (i.e., the opinion about the unconditional spirituality of the soul ), which he calls almost heretical, which appeared among "Western" Christians. In the "Addendum to the Word on Death" he writes: "The Westerners, who have recently adopted many teachings that are alien and contrary to the Orthodox Church, have recently adopted an alien and contrary doctrine about the perfect immateriality of created spirits, attributed to them spirituality to the extent that they have her God. They put God, the Creator of everyone and everything, in the same category of beings with created spirits, recognize their independence from space, deny in them the ability to move like bodies ... ". Then Bishop Ignatius, unfortunately, remarks that the "westerners" are thinking of basing their teaching on Holy Scripture, and promises to present a "satisfactory refutation" of this teaching. Further, Bishop Ignatius cites several testimonies from Holy Scripture, which, in his opinion, should prove the materiality, the materiality of the human soul and the angelic being.

For example, quoting the words of Jesus Christ "The spirit of flesh and bone must not be, as you see me possessions" (Luke 24:39), Bishop Ignatius deduces from this the idea that the spirit here is called incorporeal only in comparison with our earthly flesh or in comparison with the earthly flesh of the God-Man Himself. But in this case, Bishop Ignatius forgets that Jesus Christ uttered these words already after His glorious Resurrection, that is, being not in ordinary human flesh, but having glorified, deified, changed flesh, radically different in its properties from the things of the visible world. This means that if the Lord spoke of the spirit that the spirit does not even have such a “special” flesh, then by this he emphasized precisely the complete immateriality of the spirit (in this case, the “soul”, for the apostles thought that they were seeing the spirit of Jesus, i.e. that side of His human being, which is not amenable to sensory perception).

In the same work, Bishop Ignatius tries to confirm the idea of ​​the materiality of the spirit - the soul by the consideration that many biblical books speak of the appearances of angels or deceased people to living people, and in all cases the appearance of the person who appeared was similar to the appearance of a person. Examples are given of the appearance of angels to the myrrh-bearing women who came to the Holy Sepulcher (Mark 16:5; Matt. 28:2-6), the appearance of an angel to Cornelius (Acts 10:3). However, there is absolutely no reason to deduce the carnality of an entity that appears under one form or another. Any spiritual entity can, by the will of God, either remain incorporeal or temporarily put on a visible form. God Himself, invisible, absolutely spiritual, immaterial and immaterial, appeared to Abraham and other biblical persons. However, from here it is impossible to conclude about some kind of involvement of the Divine being in something material, material.

In the "Sermon on Death", Bishop Ignatius, on the basis of the words of the Gospel "No one can see God anywhere" (John 1:18), concludes that only God, as an infinite Being, does not obey any form, cannot have any form. While fully agreeing with the absence of any kind or form in God, it is absolutely not necessary, following Bishop Ignatius, to believe that, therefore, everything that is outside of God must have a form and form. Here is a logical error of inferences that coincide in some parts of their volume, but do not coincide in other parts. And consequently, the Church can conceive of existence besides God and other beings, invisible, formless and immaterial, for immateriality and invisibility do not necessarily have to be exclusive properties of one Divinity.

Let us consider what His Grace Bishop Theophan says about the testimonies of the Word of God about the nature of the soul and spirits. First of all, arguing with the "new" teaching, he emphasizes that, while citing some texts of Holy Scripture that he likes, he completely bypasses in silence those passages that are usually cited by supporters of the immateriality of souls and angels. Bishop Theophan calls these places "sedes doctrinae".

The first such place, says Bishop Theophan, is the image of the creation of man in the image of God: “This image is not in the body, but in the soul, for God is not corporeal. In the soul, what exactly is the image of God? Or in the nature of the soul, or in its aspirations ", or in both. But whatever you do not stop from this, you must recognize the soul as spiritual. If the image of God is in the nature of the soul, then it is spiritual, because God is spirit. If the image of God is in the highest spiritual aspirations, then, as spiritual manifestations and actions cannot proceed from a corporeal being, but must proceed from a spiritual being, the soul must again be recognized as spiritual, so that spiritual actions can be produced from it ... ". Bishop Theophan adds that this thought was universal and in the human race, the expression of which is the words of Ecclesiastes: "Dust will return to the earth, as if, and the spirit will return to God, Who and his giver" (Eccl. 12: 7). Citing words from the New Testament, Bishop Theophan sees the immateriality of the soul in the commandment of the Lord not to be afraid of "those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul" (Matt. 10:28) and in the instruction of Jesus Christ to worship the Spirit - God "in spirit and in truth" (Jn. 4:24). The following reasoning of Bishop Theophan is remarkable.

“Little attention is paid to the last place, meanwhile it is very decisive in the dispute that occupies us. In order to bow to God in spirit, one must be a spirit. but on spiritual actions emanating from it, like the truth; then in this case the conclusion will be the same, that the soul must be a spirit, for spiritual actions, so necessarily imposed by the Lord on the soul, cannot proceed from the body, no matter how "subtle. To interpret this word in any other way does not allow the combination in which it stands here. It is applied here both to God and to the soul. If in relation to God it means a spirit pure, immaterial and incorporeal, then by what right, in relation to to the soul, to give it another meaning?" …

The above reasoning of Bishop Theophan, imbued with the spirit of the patristic understanding and interpretation of the Word of God, explains his idea of ​​the incorporeality of the spirit much more clearly and simply than the evidence of Bishop Ignatius cited above in favor of his opinion about the materiality of the soul.

It should be noted that Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov) repeatedly says that the very term "spirit, soul" both in Holy Scripture and in patristic writings is allegedly used more often in the sense of "wind, breath, steam, air, gas". According to the just remark of Bishop Theophan, such an explanation is unsuccessful. If the words spirit or soul are used in this or a similar meaning (sometimes figuratively), then such meanings are secondary, not their own. The direct meaning of these words in Holy Scripture is "a spirit, a rational being, immaterial and incorporeal". Bishop Theophan considers the strongest example of this to be the words from the book of Genesis: "And he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Bishop Theophan also gives a corresponding explanation of this text according to the interpretation of St. Gregory the Theologian: "Behold, from what minute the soul became known." St. Gregory the Theologian says that "the soul is the breath of life" (vol. 4, p. 240) and that "the life God has given to man is known under the name of the soul" (ibid., p. 158). This is the true Christian production of the word soul and behind it the spirit!" ...

Indeed, if one deeply penetrates into the text and meaning of all those passages of Holy Scripture that speak about the nature of the soul, then it is much easier to accept the concept of Bishop Theophan about the perfect immateriality of the soul than the reverse theology of Bishop Ignatius about its "subtle" materiality. It is enough to recall such testimonies that speak of the immortality of the soul. Everything material has an end, a limit to its existence. If the Word of God teaches about the immortality of the soul, then this essence is not material to any degree, in any part of it. No matter how thin the matter is, no matter how “refined”, “light”, etc., it will always remain matter, and therefore there can be no question of its immortality. And this consideration also speaks more in favor of the teachings of Bishop Theophan than Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov).

The teaching of Bishop Ignatius is not devoid of strong exaggerations in other places, when he presents the meaning of passages from Holy Scripture in a broader sense than is actually the case. For example, in the "Word on Death" the author says: "The Holy Scriptures and the Holy Fathers constantly call them (created spirits) incorporeal and immaterial; but they are called so only relatively: relatively to the gross human bodies and to the gross material world ... ". In this case, Bishop Ignatius, as it were, admits that the Bible is everywhere, constantly talking about the immateriality of spirits, however, true to his peculiar concept, he tries to convince his readers that all such passages from the Word of God say just the opposite of what is perceived by the mind. reciting sacred lines. This assertion is at least unsubstantiated. According to the critic, St. P. Matveevsky, it is dangerous, because it leads to an arbitrary interpretation of the meaning of Holy Scripture, which is reminiscent of the examples of ancient heretics who tried to base their errors on Holy Scripture with the help of peculiar methods of interpretation. Quite rightly, St. P. Matveevsky says: "Having allowed such arbitrariness in the interpretation of Holy Scripture, we could evade any evidence taken from the Bible ... and confirm any thoughts with the provisions of the Word of God, interpreted in our own way ...".

Indeed, if we cite several texts of Holy Scripture, which speak of the soul - spirit as opposed to the body - flesh, we will see that the Word of God did not allow any "relativity", but directly taught that the spiritual world is, as it were, the complete opposite of matter, substance, flesh, and therefore contained no hint of the need to understand all such passages "relatively". This is what the New Testament Scriptures say: "...Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul..." (Mt.10:28)... "...The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak..." (Mk.14:38) "...For the spirit of the flesh and has no bones…” (Luke 24:39)… “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, but that which is born of the Spirit is spirit…” (John 3:6)… “The Spirit gives life, the flesh profits nothing…” (Jn. 6:63)… “His soul was not left in hell, and His flesh did not see corruption…” (Acts 2:31)… “For as a body without a spirit is dead…” (James 2:26)… “So that they, having undergone judgment according to man in the flesh, lived according to God in the spirit…” (1 Pet. 4:6)… “The body is dead to sin, but the spirit is alive to righteousness…” (Rom. 8:10)… “The mindset of the flesh is death, but the mindset of the spirit - life and peace…” (Rom. 8:6)… “But I, being absent in body, but present with you in spirit…” (1 Corinthians 5:3). "... An unmarried woman takes care of the Lord's things, how to please the Lord, in order to be holy both in body and spirit ..." (1 Cor. 7:34) ... "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, and corruption does not inherit incorruption ..." (1 Cor. 15: 50) ... "Walk in the Spirit, and you will not fulfill the lusts of the flesh, for the flesh desires what is contrary to the spirit, and the spirit what is contrary to the flesh ..." (Gal.5:16-17) ... whoever sows to the Spirit from the Spirit will reap eternal life…” (Gal. 6:8)… “Our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against… spirits…” (Eph. 6:12)… etc.

So, the meaning of all the passages of Holy Scripture that speak of the soul-spirit is such that in the concept of the created spirit, no degree of materiality, no participation in matter can in any way be conceived, and therefore it must be recognized that, from the point of view of the Word of God, in the dispute two saints, the truth was on the side of His Grace Bishop Theophan.

This truth was also imprinted in the general church consciousness. The Seventh Ecumenical Council at its fourth meeting, on the basis of the testimony of the Word of God and the God-wise reasoning of the Holy Fathers, proclaimed the insubstantiality of angels, and consequently of the soul, indicating that they are "alien to any bodily shell." The "Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Catholic and Apostolic Church" says: "Finally, God created man, who is composed of an immaterial and rational soul and a material body, so that ... it could be seen that He is the Creator of both worlds, both immaterial and material ...". "... The human body comes from the seed of Adam, and the soul is given from God, as the Scripture says: "Lord, open sky, and foundation the earth, and build the spirit of man in it ..." (Zech.12: 1).

Both eminent authors, in support of their views, abundantly cite numerous extracts from the writings of the Holy Fathers. One - in favor of the materiality of the soul, spirit, angels; the other - in favor of their insubstantiality, immateriality. There are a lot of these quotes. Let us first dwell on those places that are the most "sharp", the cornerstones of both views.

Bishop Ignatius in his "Sermon on Death" cites the following words of St. Macarius the Great: "Just as angels have an image and a sight (appearance), and just as an external person has an image, so an internal one has an image similar to an angel, and a vision similar to an external person..." . Another place is given in some paraphrase: "Every creature - and an angel, and a soul, and a demon, by its own nature is a body; because, although they are refined, however, in their essence, in their distinctive features and in their image, respectively the subtleties of its nature, are subtle bodies, while this body of ours is debauched in its essence.So also the soul, being refined, was clothed with an eye with which it looks, and an ear with which it hears, and likewise with a tongue with which it speaks, and with a hand; in a word, having put on the whole body and its members, the soul merges with the body, as a result of which all vital functions are performed ... ".

Paraphrasing these passages somewhat, Bishop Ignatius writes in the same "Sermon on Death": "The gross human body serves as clothing for the subtle body - the soul. Similar members of the body are put on the eyes, ears, hands, feet that belong to the soul ..." And then the bishop Ignatius cites his own thought: "When the soul is separated from the body by means of death, it is taken off as if by a garment...".

Bishop Ignatius also refers to the following words of St. John of Damascus: “An angel is an incorporeal being… An angel is called incorporeal and immaterial in comparison with us. immaterial and incorporeal…”

Bishop Ignatius adds at the same time: “By nature,” says the same Saint, “only God is incorporeal; angels, demons, and souls are incorporeal by grace and in comparison with gross matter.” (Ibid., chapter 12; About a man...) .

It will be more convenient to begin the analysis of the testimonies of the patristic writings with St. John of Damascus, and then analyze the teachings of St. Macarius the Great and then the rest of the holy Fathers of the Church. And Bishop Theophan, in his polemical work Soul and Angel is not a Body, but a Spirit, writes thus: his hand. The testimonies of other Holy Fathers, cited by him, say not at all what he wants ... ".

The teaching of St. John of Damascus on souls and angels (in the volume that interests us) is found mainly in chapters III and XII of his second book and in chapter XII of the first book of the Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. At the beginning of Chapter III of the second book, Saint John of Damascus says: “He Himself is the Creator and Creator of angels, who brought them into being from the non-existent, in His own image created them, an incorporeal nature, as if a spirit and an immaterial fire, as the divine David says: “Create angels, Your spirits and servants, Your fire is scorching…” “So, an angel is a mental entity, always moving, having free will (autocratic), incorporeal, serving God, by grace received immortality in its nature, of which essence only knows the form and limit one Creator. It is called incorporeal and immaterial in comparison with us; for everything compared with God, the only incomparable, turns out to be both gross and material, because only the Deity is really immaterial and incorporeal "... Angels are the second lights, mental (thinkable, comprehended only by the mind), having enlightenment from the first and beginningless Light; not needing language and hearing, but without a spoken (language) word, conveying their thoughts and desires to each other ... ". “Like minds, they dwell in mental places, not being described like bodies, because by their nature, they do not have a form (image) like bodies, do not even have three dimensions, but mentally they are inherent and act where they are commanded, and cannot be and act both here and there at the same time…” (So far from chapter III of the second book)… “…So, the soul is a living entity, simple and incorporeal, by its nature invisible to bodily eyes, immortal endowed with both mind and mind, having no form, using a body equipped with organs ... ". “The incorporeal and the invisible and the formless are understood in two ways. One is incorporeal in essence, and the other is in grace; and one is in nature, the other is in comparison with the grossness of matter. In relation to God - in nature, in relation to angels , demons and souls - by grace and in accordance with the roughness of matter ... "(So far from chapter XII of the second book). "... There is also a mental place where (mentally) is contemplated and where the mental and incorporeal nature is located, where it is inherent and acts and is not embraced in a bodily way, but mentally. For it does not have an (external) appearance to be embraced bodily ..." (So ​​far from the XIII chapter of the first book).

Having before our eyes the context of those thoughts of St. John of Damascus, on the basis of which Bishop Ignatius developed his peculiar teaching, one can see that the Holy Father did not at all intend to say and really did not say what Bishop Ignatius "read". On the basis of the proposed passages from the Exact Statement of Faith, one can understand the following thought of St. John of Damascus:

Almighty God, possessing an immaterial nature, created in His own image, that is, immaterial, the spirits He created. The very essence of the spirit can neither be seen nor felt. It can only be thought. How to think? As a certain spirit, as an immaterial fire, as a dream-moving entity, and moving according to its own free will, but with the goal of serving the Creator. By the grace of God, the spirit becomes immortal. The spirit needs neither hearing nor language, it has no three dimensions, resides in a special "thinkable" place, has no form, no form, no limit. True, if we compare the created spirit with the Spirit of God, then between them there is an immeasurable abyss: even the most perfect of the created spirits is very far from the perfections of the Spirit of God, and therefore one can speak of the created spirit almost as non-spiritual, almost as a material entity. And yet the spirit, by the grace of God, is incorporeal and immaterial. How to understand it? The form and limit of this essence is known only by the Creator, Who alone is truly incorporeal and immaterial. Man has no such knowledge. A kind of spirit - the human soul - in earthly conditions uses a material body, equipped with special organs of perception.

Nowhere in St. John of Damascus is there even a shadow of thought about "subtle" materiality, about the materiality of the spirit or soul.

But what about the testimony of St. Macarius the Great? At first glance, it contains a very clear teaching about the corporeality of spiritual beings (except God), about the appearance of souls and angels, attributing to them the presence of hands, feet, eyes, mouths, etc. In the “Sermon on Death,” Bishop Ignatius also cites the following testimony of St. Macarius: “Below wisdom with your wisdom, below understanding with your mind, you could understand the subtlety of the soul, or tell how it exists, except for those to whom, through the Holy Spirit, comprehension and accurate souls are revealed. But you here think, judge and listen, and hear what she is? He is God, and she is not God; That is the Lord, and she is a servant; similarity between the nature of Him and the sow ... "(Conversation 49, chapter 4). Is it possible to consider that St. Macarius the Great actually contained such a peculiar dogma about spiritual beings?

To clarify the meaning of the sayings of St. Macarius, we will quote in full the entire 9th chapter from his 4th conversation. Here's what it says:

“I intend, to the best of my ability, to utter some subtle and thoughtful word. Therefore, listen wisely. The boundless, impregnable and uncreated God, in His boundless and thoughtless goodness, fructified Himself and, so to speak, as if diminished in impregnable glory, so that you can He had to enter into union with His visible creatures, I mean the souls of the Saints and Angels, and they could be partakers of the life of the Divine. and they are refined, but in their essence, according to their distinctive features and according to the image, according to the refinement of their nature, they are subtle bodies, while this body of ours in its essence is plump. and with the ear with which it hears, and likewise with the tongue with which it speaks, and with the hand; and in a word, having put on the whole body and its members, the soul merges with the body, as a result of which all vital functions are performed ... " .

First of all, attention should be paid to the opening words, in which St. Macarius warns that he wants to utter a "subtle, thoughtful word" and invites readers to listen to him "reasonably." This warning alone suggests that a doctrine will be presented that is unusual for the entire Church, and therefore, perhaps not necessary for its acceptance on faith by all members of the Church. On the other hand, this warning speaks of the extreme complexity, "subtlety" of the issue, in which many of the provisions may bewilder readers. St. Macarius seems to say this: “It seems to me that one can think of spirits in this way. But you, readers, do not rush to object, listen to me to the end. Perhaps you will agree with my opinion.” With what opinion? Apparently, with an opinion about the corporality of the spirit and the angel. But what is "subtle" in this teaching? This teaching can rather be called "rough", almost materialistic. Where is the "deep thinking" here? Obviously, the subtlety of the teaching does not lie in the fact that this, at first glance, a simple saying should be given a slightly different meaning, and, in all likelihood, the same meaning as we saw in St. John of Damascus, namely, that the created spirits, although and are incorporeal, although immaterial, but in comparison with the Spirit of God they turn out to be gross and "almost corporeal", or they have, as it were, a "lower degree of spirituality", while God has a higher and incomparably pure spirituality.

But let us even assume that Saint Macarius here wanted to show his conviction in the corporeality of spirits and angels. In this case, the opinion of the Reverend can be considered only a private opinion, and not the belief of the entire Church of Christ. The Monk Macarius did not even lay claim to this, he did not force all his readers to accept precisely his point of view, as Bishop Ignatius does.

What is the opinion of the Church in this case? This question will be answered by a small note of the publisher in the collections of conversations of St. Macarius, placed at the 9th chapter of his 4th conversation after the words: "... and the angel, and the soul, and the demon, by their own nature, is a body." Here is the note of the Moscow Theological Academy:

"This should be understood in a sense not detached, but relative. John of Damascus (see the exact presentation of the Orthodox faith, book 2, ch. 3) says: "An angel is an incorporeal being ... An angel is called incorporeal and immaterial in comparison with us ..." and and so on... The dictum of St. John of Damascus we have already mentioned is quoted. Here is the voice of the Church! Here is a theological indication of how these words should be read: "Understand not in a detached sense, but in a relative one! "And the very testimony of St. John plays here the role of proving that the corporeality of spirits cannot in any way be understood in the literal sense!It should not be forgotten that such a note is made in all publications of the works of St. Macarius, and all these publications were censored by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.

But, perhaps, St. Macarius in other places of his creations develops his teaching more deeply? No, this does not occur. On the contrary, this is how he says in other places about the nature of the soul: "The soul is not from God's nature and not from the nature of evil darkness, but is a smart creature, full of beauty, great and wonderful, a beautiful likeness and image of God ...". Or this is what St. Macarius says in his 46th Conversation: “... When the soul cleaves to the Lord, and the Lord, merciful and loving her, comes and cleaves to her, and her mind ceaselessly already abides in the grace of the Lord, then the soul and the Lord become one spirit, one merging, one mind" (Chapter 3)...

"... So, truly, the soul is a great thing, God's and wonderful. When creating it, God created it in such a way that there was no vice in its nature, on the contrary, He created it in the image of the virtue of the Spirit ...". “In a word, He created her such that she would become His bride and companion, so that He would be in union with her, and she would be with Him in one spirit, as it is said: “Cleave the Lord, for there is one spirit with the Lord” (1 Cor. .6:17)…" .

How can a corporeal, material, though very subtle soul be "one spirit" with the Lord? This is only possible for a "smart creature" created as a "beautiful likeness and image of God." This means that Saint Macarius, if he intended to state some special thought about created spirits, then this thought remained his personal private opinion, although very "subtle". Consequently, no one in the Church of God should dare, seizing on such an opinion, to base on it a doctrine that is obligatory for all believers.

Bishop Ignatius cites the saying of St. John Cassian the Roman: “Although we call many beings spiritual, such as angels, archangels and other powers, also our very soul, or what is this subtle air, but they should not be recognized as incorporeal. They have a corresponding body, in which exist, though incomparably the subtlest of our bodies.They are the body, according to the apostle, who said: "...both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies ...", and again: "A natural body is sown, a spiritual body is raised" (1 Corinthians 15: 40.44), which clearly indicates that only God is incorporeal. (Conversation 7, ch.13 ...) ".

As Bishop Theophan notes in his book "The Soul and the Angel is not a body, but a spirit," the quoted saying of St. John Cassian does not at all concern the essence of angels and spirits. St. John believes that angels and spirits have a "corresponding body in which they exist." Therefore, it is implied that one who exists in such a body is not himself a body, but a spirit. This is also a peculiar opinion, not recognized by the Church as obligatory, but again it is impossible to deduce from it the idea of ​​the corporeality of the nature of the created spirits.

One can disagree with such a remark by Bishop Theophan, taking into account the further expressions of St. John Cassian, where the corporality of spirits is directly affirmed: "they are bodies ..." and "... only God is incorporeal ..." However, the opinion of this saint only says that the realm of the essence of spirits is an unexplored region of theological wisdom, in which one can work and reflect, but one cannot draw categorical conclusions about the actual materiality of the human soul and other spirits created by God.

Here is what St. Gregory the Theologian says, interpreting in his 28th Word on theology the words of the Psalmist: "Create Thy angels spirits and Thy servants, Thy fiery flame": and the First Essence will take the same names. However, let it not be corporeal with us, or, as much as possible, close to that ... ". The great theologian, as we see, does not share the "new" teaching. He believes that it is better to believe in "incorporeality" than in the corporality of spirits, whose nature is "mental" and "cleansing", and not material, not material.

Let us compare the new teaching on the corporeality of spirits with the sayings of some other Holy Fathers.

Here is what St. John Chrysostom writes in his Discourse on the book of Genesis: “When you hear that God “breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,” understand that, just as He produced incorporeal forces, He was so pleased that the human body, created from dust, had a rational soul that could use bodily members... First, a body is created from dust, and then life force is given to it, which constitutes the essence of the soul. Therefore, regarding the dumb, Moses said that "the soul ... of the body is his blood" (Lev.17: 14) And in man there is an incorporeal and immortal essence, which has a great advantage over the body, and just such as is appropriate (to have) for the incorporeal over the body ... ".

St. John Chrysostom does not say a word about the "subtle" corporeality of the soul. He directly calls the soul an incorporeal and immortal life force that can “use bodily members, but itself remains incorporeal, like other incorporeal forces. And nowhere in the creations of the Holy Father is there even a hint of the involvement of the soul in the material world. describes with admiration the high spiritual properties of the soul, exclaiming: "What can be compared with the soul? Name the whole universe, and then you will not say anything ... ".

St. John Chrysostom also has wonderful words about the unknowability of the essence of the human soul: “We do not know with accuracy the essence of angels and cannot recognize it, no matter how much we think about it. But what do I say about angels when we do not know well, or rather, we don’t even know the essence of our soul at all? .. But why do I say: what is the soul in essence? It’s even impossible to say how it is in our body ... ".

If it is impossible to know the essence of the spiritual nature of the soul and the image of its connection with the human body, then all the more it is impossible to attribute something new to the soul, to attribute to it materiality, corporality; and even more so it is impossible to insist on the truth of precisely this, and not another, view (that is, the view held by Bishop Ignatius). This is the conclusion from all the quoted words of St. John Chrysostom.

St. Gregory the Theologian in his 38th Discourse on Theophany describes God's creation of man, composed of bodily nature and spiritual nature, in these words: , man, and from already created matter, taking a body, and putting life from Himself (which is known in the Word of God under the name of a rational soul and the image of God), creates, as it were, some second world, in a small great; puts on earth another angel, from of different natures, a composed worshiper, a spectator of a visible creature, a secret of a creature contemplated, a king over what is on earth, subject to a heavenly kingdom, earthly and heavenly, temporary and immortal, visible and contemplative ... creates a living being, here prepared and transmigrating to another world and ( which constitutes the end of the mystery) through the striving for God, reaching deification ... ".

He, in Word 40 on Holy Baptism, writes: “Since we consist of two natures, that is, of the soul and the body, of the visible and invisible nature, then the purification is twofold; namely: water and the Spirit; and one is received visibly and bodily, and the other at the same time is done incorporeally and invisibly ... ".

Again, St. Gregory the Theologian does not contain thoughts about the corporality of the soul. As with him, as with many holy Fathers, the expression "from two natures" is often used. If a person consists of two natures, and apart from the spiritual and bodily nature, there is no third nature, then, consequently, in him, in addition to the body, which is certainly material, the second nature - the soul is an immaterial essence. Otherwise, if the soul were involved in materiality, constituting the "subtle flesh", why would one speak of two natures? Then both the body and the soul would be related to the same nature, with only a certain variety.

St. Simeon the New Theologian, like St. Gregory the Great, clearly distinguishes two natures in man, calling the soul completely immaterial: sensual image and bodily eyes ... ".

In another place, the Monk Simeon the New Theologian says: "The soul, as a smart force, is single and simple and not composed of different parts ...". In his 13th Word, he calls the soul "immaterial, simple and uncomplicated ...", and in the 34th song of the Divine hymns he says: "Truly, in the image of (His) the soul of every man is the verbal image of the Word ...", which quite clearly implies the soul as a completely immaterial essence . Here is what he writes in his 27th Word: “While it (the soul) is in this body, it sees and cognizes material things through the body; but as soon as it separates from the body, at that very hour it is separated from intercourse with everything material, ceases to see that and to think about that, but enters into a relationship with the invisible and the mental ... ".

All the passages cited from the works of St. Simeon the New Theologian eloquently testify to his completely clear understanding of the human soul as an immaterial essence, absolutely incorporeal, without any signs of "subtle" materiality.

The result of the review of the statements of the Holy Fathers on the question of the nature of spirits will be the final conclusion that all St. The Fathers unanimously recognized the immateriality of souls and angels. If some of them held a special opinion about the "secondary" nature of the spiritual essence of the soul, then by this very fact none of them ever put the soul in the category of objects involved in matter. And therefore, comparing both teachings about the nature of created spirits, we come to the conclusion that the teaching of Bishop Theophan about their unconditional spirituality is closer to the general patristic opinion, closer to the common Orthodox understanding of this subject than the peculiar statements of Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov) ...

Combining all the above, we come to the following conclusions.

Bishop Ignatius believes that created spirits (souls) are material, material, although their materiality is very subtle, unlike other objects of the material world, which have a gross materiality. The soul of a person, for example, has the entire appearance of a person: eyes, ears, face, head, arms, legs, etc. The soul can be measured, weighed. In a word, the soul is some subtle, ethereal, tender copy of the human body.

Bishop Theophan claims that the spirit, soul, angel are certainly immaterial, do not consist of any material particles. The human soul, for example, has neither body parts nor organs similar to those of a living person. The soul cannot be measured, weighed, felt.

As mentioned above, neither the Holy Scriptures, nor the teaching of the Holy Fathers of the Church, nor the data of the humanities and natural sciences provide sufficient evidence for the validity of the teachings of Bishop Ignatius, while they present a lot of data in favor of the teachings of Bishop Theophan...

To what extent is the doctrine of the spirit, soul and body conducive to the salvation of man?

His Grace Bishop Feofan himself answers this question in the following way: “You and I have explained that a person has three tiers of life: spiritual, spiritual and bodily, that each of them gives its own amount of needs, natural and characteristic of a person, but some are higher, others are lower, and that a commensurate satisfaction of them gives a person peace.Spiritual needs are above all, and when they are satisfied, then others, although they will not be satisfied, there is peace, and when they are not satisfied, then, if all others are richly satisfied, there is no rest. This is why their satisfaction is called "only for the needs" ... ".

All the writings of Bishop Theophan, which speak of the spirit, soul and body, are imbued with this desire: how to teach people to achieve this "one thing that is needed." Great paternal love, concern for salvation, concern for spiritual life emanates from the instructions of His Grace Theophan, who invariably divides the inner life of a person into three spheres: spirit, soul, body. If all the writings of Bishop Theophan could be collected into a single large book and it would be necessary to give it an independent title, then it would rightfully be called only two names: "What is spiritual life and how to tune in to it", or "The path to salvation ". And if it were necessary to give a brief answer to the question: what is spiritual life, then the answer would be this - this is the path to salvation. And if the question were asked: what is the way to salvation? - The answer would follow: in the spiritual life, in the growth of a person in the spirit, in the dominance of the spirit over the soul and body.

Saint Theophanes says: “When spiritual needs are satisfied, they teach a person to bring satisfaction of other needs into harmony with them, so that neither what satisfies the soul, nor what satisfies the body, does not contradict spiritual life, but helps it, - and a complete harmony of all the movements and manifestations of his life is established in a person - the harmony of thoughts, feelings, desires, enterprises, relationships, pleasures. And lo - paradise! ... This is what Bishop Theophan leads his followers to - to achieve paradise on earth through the correct development of spiritual life in oneself.

Notes
1. From the Greek words: tricwz - in a threefold way - and h tomh - section, difference, separation.
2. Letters from Moscow Metropolitan Filaret to the late Archbishop of Tver Alexy. (1843-1867). Letter 26.- M., 1883.- P.27.
3. A word about death // Op. Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.585.
4. The writings of Bishop Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - S.745-746.
5. Conversations and words of St. Macarius the Great: Conversation 7, chapter 8, Translation of Moscow. Spirit. Acad. - 1820.
6. Ep. Feofan. What is spiritual life and how to tune in to it? - M., 1904. - P.49.
7. Word about death // Works of Bishop. Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II, - S.591-596.
8. See the Introduction of this work. - p.7.
9. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - SPb., 1865. T.II. - S.592.
10. Ibid. - S.591-593.
11. Ibid. - S.592.
12. Matveevsky P. Teachings of Ignatius, Bishop of the former Caucasus and Black Sea // Wanderer. - 1863. - Sept. - P.28.
13. Ep. Feofan. The soul and the angel are not the body, but the spirit. - M., 1913. - S.210.
14. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.749.
15. Ibid. - P.595.
16. Ep. Feofan. The soul and the angel are not the body, but the spirit. - M., 1913. - P. 120.
17. Ibid. - P.121.
18. Ibid. - P.122.
19. Word about death // Op. ep. Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.593.
20. Ep. Feofan. The soul and the angel are not the body, but the spirit. - M., 1913. - S.127.
21. Ibid. - P.129.
22. A word about death // Op. ep. Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.595.
23. Matveevsky P. Teachings of Ignatius, Bishop of the former Caucasus and Black Sea // Wanderer. - 1863. - Sept. - P.30.
24. Acts of the Ecumenical Councils. - Kazan, 1873. - T.VII. - P.347.
25. Orthodox confession of the Eastern Catholic and Apostolic Church. - St. Petersburg, 1842. - P.15. - Question 18.
26. Ibid. - P.26. - Question 28.
27. Conversations and words of St. Macarius the Great: Conversation 7. - Tr.-Sergius Lavra, 1904. - P.67.
28. Ibid. Conversation 4. - P.28.
29. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.591.
30. St. I. Damascus. Exact presentation of the Orthodox faith. Book 2. Chapter 3.
31. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.594.
32. Ep. Feofan. The soul and the angel are not the body, but the spirit. - M., 1913. - S.21.
33. Translation of Archimandrite Pimen from Min's Patrology. Patrologiae cursus complectus. Series graeca. Accurante J.-P. Minne. Tomus XIV. 1860. S. Joannes Damascenus.
34. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T. II. - P.594.
35. Conversations and words of St. Macarius the Great: Conversation 4, chapter 9. - Tr.-Sergius Lavra, 1904. - S.27-28.
36. Ibid. - p.27.
37. Ibid. Conversation 1, chapter 7. - P.9.
38. Ibid. Conversation 4. - S.295-296.
39. Bishop's writings Ignatius (Bryanchaninov). - St. Petersburg, 1865. - T.II. - P.594.
40. Creations. - M., 1889. - Part 3. - P.40.
41. John Chrysostom. - T.IV. - P.104.
42. Ibid. - P.336.
43. John Chrysostom. Against the anomeans. - T.I. - P.528.
44. Creations. - M., 1889. - Part III. - S.200.
45. Ibid. - P.228.
46. ​​Rev. Simeon the New Theologian. Divine Hymns. Song 44. - Sergiev Posad, 1917.
47. Rev. Simeon the New Theologian. The words. Word 24. - M., 1892. - Issue I. - P.220.
48. Ibid. Word 13. - P.127.
49. Rev. Simeon the New Theologian. Divine Hymns. Song 34. - Sergiev Posad, 1917. - S.146.
50. Rev. Simeon the New Theologian. The words. Word 27. - M., 1892. - Issue I. - P.242.
51. Ep. Feofan. What is spiritual life and how to tune in to it? - M., 1914. - P.65.
52. Ibid. - P.65.

Questions of philosophy and psychology. - M., 1900. - Year XI, book. II (52). - S. 287-333.

The pagination of this electronic article corresponds to the original.

Chelpanov. G.I.

OUTLINE OF MODERN DOCTRINES ABOUT THE SOUL *).

In this article, I intend to introduce our readers to modern philosophical teachings about the soul. I will begin by considering that teaching which is usually called psychophysical monism or parallelism.

In order to make this doctrine quite clear, I will consider the historical conditions under which it arose. This will enable us to understand the logical necessity due to which this doctrine should have arisen. It arises precisely in close connection with the teachings of Descartes.

Descartes, in order to explain everything that exists: spirit and nature, recognized the existence of two substances, spiritual and material, radically different from each other. Spiritual substance has only the ability to think, but does not have extension; material substance has extension, but does not have the ability to think. The body is never without extension, the spirit without thinking. For the activity of one and the other substance, there are completely peculiar laws. The material substance obeys only mechanical laws, i.e. it can be set in motion, it can impart motion to another body; spiritual substance can only

*) From public lectures given in Kyiv in the spring half of 1899.

think. Therefore, Descartes thought that there could be no interaction between material and spiritual substance, i.e. the body cannot have any effect on the soul, just as the soul cannot have any effect on the body. The movement of any body can only be due to the movement of another body. In addition, Descartes assumed that if, for example, one body moves and meets another body on its way and sets this latter in motion, then it loses exactly as much of its motion as it imparted motion to the other body. In this sense the amount of movement in the world is unchanged.Therefore, it would be completely incomprehensible if the soul were able to produce the movement of the body. In this case, it would have to change the total amount of motion. But this is impossible.

Thus, according to Descartes, all movements of the human body must be explained without the intervention of a spiritual principle; The human body is, as it were, a machine whose actions are carried out exclusively according to mechanical laws, and in this sense Descartes is one of the founders of the mechanical interpretation of life phenomena.

But denying the interaction, Descartes could not consistently carry out his point of view to the end. Along with the negation of interaction, we find in his writings the actual recognition of interaction. Thus, for example, he says that the soul has the power to set the pineal gland in motion. In a word, Descartes could not free himself from those contradictions into which he had to fall, denying the possibility of interaction between spirit and matter.

In the same position we find this teaching in his school. His followers, like him, proceeded from the recognition that the body and spirit are fundamentally different from each other, that there can be no interaction between them, since the soul can only think, and everything

the corporeal can only move. But they could not fail to see that there were facts proving their interaction. For example, in my soul there is a “desire” to make a “movement” with the hand, and the hand begins to move. Something psychic, desire, has an effect on my body. If a light beam acts on my eye, then I get a sensation of light, therefore, something physical produces a sensation in my soul. How to explain these facts of interaction from the basic principles of Cartesian philosophy?

Since this interaction seemed impossible to them, and yet the actual interaction between mental and physical processes existed, the followers of Descartes assumed that in order to explain it, it is necessary to admit the intervention of God. They imagined the matter as follows: when I have a desire to make a movement with my hand, then I could not do this, since my soul is not able to make a movement of the body, but God assists me by making the movement of my hand at that moment. In the same way, when any excitation of light, sound, etc., affects my senses, then the sensation appears due to the intervention of God. According to the Cartesians, the influence of the soul on the body and the body on the soul, or, what is the same, the correspondence between physical and mental processes is possible only due to the intervention of God.

This theory is called in the history of philosophy occasionalism*), and later appears with some modification in Leibniz (1046-1716) under the name of pre-established harmony. Leibniz, like Descartes, did not consider it possible to allow interaction between

*) According to this theory, body and soul are not causes in the proper sense, but they are accidental or apparent causes ( occasions per occasion ) for changes occurring in one or the other. They are only an occasion, an occasion for the action of the true cause—God.

home and matter, but did not agree with the occasionalists, because he thought that if they were right, that God intervenes in the natural course of phenomena with respect to each of our actions, then each of our acts would be a miracle.

In order to understand his own theory of pre-established harmony, we will turn our attention to the comparisons he makes about the teachings on the soul. In his opinion, we can imagine two wall clocks, which, in complete agreement with each other, constantly show the same time. This agreement between two clocks can be imagined as occurring due to the following three causes. First, one can imagine that the mechanism of one clock is connected to the mechanism of another, so that the course of one clock exerts impact on the course of others. Secondly, it can be imagined that some skillful worker, who is between two clocks, by means of a movement of his hand, establishes an agreement between them. Thirdly, one can imagine that a skilled craftsman arranged the clock in advance in such a way that one clock can show the same as the other.

The same relation can be imagined existing between the body and the soul. The first case is the interaction recognized in everyday life; the second case is the cooperation of God, recognized by the Cartesian school, and, finally, the third case is the pre-established harmony of Leibniz. Leibniz precisely thought that God intervenes not every time when it is necessary to establish agreement between bodily and mental processes, but that he established once and for all that such and such a particular mental process should correspond to such and such a material one; such and such a material process - such and such a spiritual one. This explains why there is a constant correspondence between material and spiritual processes.

The same question of agreement between mental and physical phenomena Spinoza (1632 -1077) decided quite peculiarly. He also proceeded from Cartesian basic principles about the fundamental difference between mental and physical. He also, like Descartes, thought that there are special laws for the mental and physical spheres, that there is no interaction between the soul and the body, that the soul cannot interfere with the actions of the body. *), that all the material phenomena occurring in our organism are explained exclusively by mechanical laws. Our body can perform a whole series of expedient movements without any intervention of the soul; so, for example, a lunatic, a person in a state of somnambulism, performs a whole series of quite expedient movements, and it is certain that in such actions, performed without consciousness, the soul does not take any part. The same must be said about instinctive movements, which in the same way receive their expedient character not from the influence of the soul, but exclusively from the body.

Spinoza thought that the amazing agreement that exists between mental and physical actions can be explained by only one assumption, namely, the assumption that the soul and body are same, but only viewed from two different points of view.

Spinoza, while agreeing with Descartes that there is a fundamental difference between the physical and the mental, did not agree, however, with the fact that in order to explain everything that exists, it is necessary to accept two substance, spiritual and material, but thought that it was enough to recognize one substance. In his opinion, this substance, directly inaccessible to human knowledge, is revealed

*) See Ethica III. prop . 2. scholium.

to the human mind in the form of attributes, of which two are available to human knowledge, namely: thinking and extension. Therefore, we note, according to Spinoza, there is one substance, which is found in the form of two attributes; but thinking and extension are manifestation the same substances. In essence, they represent the same thing, which we know in different ways, so to speak, from two points of view. With this assumption, the question of the correspondence between the physical and the mental is very easily resolved. They are actually one and the same, and therefore it is understandable why there is a complete correspondence between them, which Spinoza formulated in the expression: “the order and connection of representations are the same as the order and connection of things.”

Only under the assumption of identity between the psychic and the physical could the correspondence between them be understood. When he says that spirit and matter are one and the same, but only viewed from different points of view, then this explanation of Spinoza is not entirely clear, and only when considering modern teachings can it become understandable.

Let us therefore turn to the views of modern philosophers to the same question.

In the current century, the experimental sciences: anatomy, physiology, chemistry, etc., delivered a huge amount of material proving conformity between physical and mental phenomena. It is known that in the animal kingdom the more perfect the nervous system is, the higher the mental abilities correspond to it. Mental activity is accompanied by a change in blood circulation in the brain; with a decrease in brain activity, mental activity also decreases; with the destruction of certain parts of the brain, the corresponding parts in the mental sphere fall out. There are many other facts that indicate that, along with

a change in the physical Sphere changes in the psychic sphere, and, conversely, along with a change in the psychic sphere, changes occur in the physical Sphere.

The defenders of materialism tried to interpret this fact in such a way that the mental is a product of the physical, that the physical is cause mental processes that it generates them. This they prove mainly by the consideration that the physical is conceivable without the psychic—for example, blood circulation, digestion, respiration are conceivable without the corresponding mental processes, while without physical is unthinkable.

The fallacy of this view lies in the fact that materialists misunderstand the word causality·. Cause is usually understood as something creative, creative, while from a strictly empirical point of view, such an understanding of causality is incorrect. If we say that A is the cause of B, then we do not mean by this to say that we have grasped the inner connection between A and B. The only thing we can say is to admit that when A appears, then B appears with it; when there is no A, then there is no B, etc. We do not want to say anything more when we say that there is a causal relationship between A and B.

This gave rise to modern empiricist philosophers to attempt to eliminate the very concept of causality and to introduce instead the concept functional relationship, which is used in mathematics.

What is a functional relation, it is very easy to explain with the help of the following example. We have an expression for the area of ​​a circleTo= π r 2 . There is a functional relationship between these two quantities. This should be understood as follows: To and magnitude rmay change, i.e. increase or decrease, but

variances of one quantity and another are related to each other, and precisely in such a way that if To, i.e. the area of ​​the circle increases andr, i.e. circle radius if decreasing TO, it decreases andr. In other words, the essence of a functional relation lies in the fact that a change in one quantity is associated with a certain change in another quantity.

Avenarius and Mach suggested that it would be quite expedient if, instead of the concept of causality, the concept of a functional relation were introduced into science. According to Avenarius, for example, in the relationship between the physical and the mental, it is most expedient to introduce the concept of a functional relationship, and then many difficulties would be eliminated. Just as in a mathematical function it does not matter which of the two quantities we will call independent variable and which dependent variable, so here: we can consider the physical to be independently variable, then the mental will be dependently variable, and, conversely, we can consider the mental to be independently variable, then the physical will be dependently variable. Thus, both the dependence of the physical on the psychic and the psychic on the physical is expressed. Then we could say that physical phenomena and the corresponding mental phenomena occursimultaneously. We will not say that mental processes are created by physical ones, or vice versa, but we will only say that when we have certain mental processes in our soul, then at this time certain material processes are taking place in our body; we can say that when in our brain certain physiological processes take place, then in the soul certain or other corresponding mental processes take place. We will say that mental processes and their corresponding physical processes take place simultaneously,next to each other, or, as some put it,in parallel with each other. By using this

In the case of the term “parallel”, philosophers only want to say that, just as two parallel lines go next to each other without meeting, so physical and mental processes take place next to each other, without connecting with each other, without interfering with each other. into interaction.

It is easy to see that the modern defenders of the doctrine of the parallelism of mental and physical phenomena are on the same point of view as Descartes, occasionalists, Leibniz, when they assumed the existence of two worlds that do not interact with each other. And modern parallelists recognize two different laws for the physical and mental. The physical represents a separate, closed circle of phenomena. It can only be explained by the physical. Here only the laws of mechanics reign. Here everything is explained by the movements of material particles. The movement of the material derives its origin from the movement of the material, the psychic is explained from the psychic, originates only from the psychic. Here reigns its own causality, precisely the so-called mental causality. For example, if some "imagination" A is followed by a "feeling" B, then we can say that A, something mental, is cause B. Causality in the mental sphere is also something closed. Thus, according to modern parallelists, there are, as it were, two worlds, closed and separated from each other, in which processes are carried out in harmony with each other, exactly like in Leibniz, according to his pre-established harmony.

But modern philosophers , of course, they could not avoid the question why the action of these two different worlds is in agreement with each other, and here is the difference between the two groups of philosophers . Alone argue that it is quite enough to state the connection that exists between the physical and the mental. Quite

suffice it to say that they occur in parallel with each other. Others find that this is not enough, that it is necessary to explain what kind of reason exists, what kind of internal connection exists between mental and physical, thanks to which the indicated ratio is established. The first can be called supporters empirical parallelism, the latter can be called supporters monism or teachings about unity, identity mental and physical. They are also called supporters of the psychophysical monism or neo-Spinozism. By this last title they wish to indicate the connection that exists between the modern teachings and the teachings of Spinoza.

Before proceeding to clarify the question of why there is a correct relationship between physical and mental processes, I will show how the defenders of psychophysical parallelism explain the proposition that the mental always has its source in the mental. This proposition seems to be contradicted by the simplest observation. For example, a bell trembles: we have a sensation of sound. The simplest and most natural explanation is that the trembling of the bell (something physical) is the cause of the sensation (something mental). But the defenders of psychophysical parallelism find that it would be wrong, that sensation, according to their theory, should be born from sensation; but it is extremely difficult to explain this to them, because without the trembling of the bell, the sensation of sound could not have arisen.

The defenders of psychophysical parallelism, in order to prove that mental phenomena have only the mental as their source, point to the fact that every mental process corresponds to some kind of physiological process, and, conversely, what is in our brain every physiological process is accompanied by a certain mental, even though the latter could not be discovered by us. When we have some physical series, then we

far from being able to indicate the entire set of conditions that participate in the generation of a given phenomenon; for example, for a commoner, the flight of a cannonball from a cannon is the result of the burning of gunpowder, but the fact that there are still such intermediate processes as the formation of gases with a certain elasticity, the influence of elasticity, the influence of gravity, air resistance, etc., remains to him completely unknown. We are in the same position when we wish to determine the causes * of the appearance of a sound sensation after the trembling of the bell has occurred. That the trembling of the bell was among the conditions preceding the appearance of sound sensation is beyond doubt; and that there are still numerous mental states that precede the appearance of the sensation of sound remains unknown to us. It is these numerous mental states that, according to the supporters of psychophysical parallelism, are the source of the sensation of sound, one of the causes of which is the physiological changes generated by the trembling of the bell. This is the explanation for the situation Ήτο the psychic has the psychic as its source*).

Consider now the doctrine of monism, precisely that necessary conclusion from the teaching of psychophysical parallelism, according to which the mental and the physical are two sides of the same phenomenon, that the mental and fithe physical is the same thing, only viewed from two different points of view. The substantiation of the identity of mental and physical is one of the weakest points of psychophysical monism.

The defenders of monism offer the following interpretation of identity from the point of view of theory of knowledge.

In general, from the point of view of the popular theory of knowledge,

*) Cm. Wundt. Lectures on the Soul of Man and Animals. SPb., 1894. Paulsen (Introduction to Philosophy, 2nd ed. 1899, pp. 94-95) explains this somewhat differently.

there is a huge difference between the spiritual world and the material world, between the subject and the object, between the "I" and the "not-I". In fact, this is not true. “Material things and material processes, on the one hand, and psychic phenomena, on the other, are not at all different in their kind. Both of them fit under the concept of phenomena of consciousness, and these phenomena, moreover, are mutually correlated with each other. Their difference or their opposite consists only in the fact that the first kind of phenomena can be objectified, while the second lacks this property. That is, in other words, there is no difference between the inner world and the outer world, as is usually recognized. One and the same content can be both internal and external, depending on the point of view from which we look at it. Hence the general distinction between external and internal.

First of all, what is inner and outer? If we consider some thing that is outside of us: a stone, water, then this is an object of external observation. If we perceive any “idea”, “feeling”, then this is something internal. Every mental process is something internal. From this point of view, the brain, for example, is something external. It is a soft, whitish mass with length and other properties.

Now we must show that the brain and mental process are two sides of the same phenomenon. This seems to be a completely unthinkable thing, because there is a fundamental difference between the physical and the mental: one is extended, the other is not extended. How can they represent the same thing? The difficulty seems insoluble, but the defenders of monism proceed from the position that, in reality, from the point of

*) Riel. Theory of Science and Metaphysics, p. 225. Wundt . Outline of Psychology § 22. Taine. De l'Intelligence. Book. IV. Ch. IX.

From the point of view of the theory of knowledge, there is no fundamental difference between material and mental processes, because everything material is nothing but the totality of our ideas. What is, for example, a piece of stone? A piece of stone has a certain extent, a certain heaviness, color, roughness, etc., but space, color, heaviness, roughness are nothing but our sensations, so that the stone is in reality the totality of our sensations, i.e. mental elements. If we are talking about material things, then in reality we are talking about them as a collection of mental elements; and that our soul is a certain totality of thoughts, feelings, desires, etc., this is self-evident. Thus it is clear that between the mental and the physical, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, there is no essential difference; they are, so to speak, woven from the same material, and this makes clear their identity with each other, as well as the fact that they are two sides of the same phenomenon, that the brain and mental phenomena are one and the same, viewed from two different points of view.

This can be explained with the following example. If, for example, I “think”, I have some “desire”, some “volitional decision”, then the processes of movement of some brain particles take place in my brain, etc. From my inner experience I know that I have such and such a thought, such and such a feeling. But if, while I am thinking, some physiologist with the help of some improved instruments, if I began to examine the processes that take place in my brain, then it would perceive the same thing that I perceive, but only from the other side, i.e. what I call thought would be for him the movement of brain particles. The difference between thought and the movement of brain particles stems from the fact that we consider the same thing from two different points of view.

Nya: what i see from the inside then the physiologist swears from the outside; in fact, what we are both considering is one and the same. The state of affairs here is such that I cannot consider the same thing from both points of view at the same time.

Thus, one must understand the idea that the spiritual and the material are one and the same thing, considered from two points of view: from the internal and external.

This explains everything. When the occasionalists recognized the agreement between the psychic and the physical, then for them the physical and the psychic were two different worlds, between which they recognized parallelism. The proponents of monism are in a different position. They just accept identityof both processes. “We have no right to say,” says Riel, “that the will is only corresponds brain innervation; we must, on the contrary, say emphatically that the will the samea process that appears to objective contemplation as a central innervation, and to subjective contemplation as an impulse of the will.

The defenders of psychophysical monism tried to explain the incomprehensibility of the identity of the mental and the physical with the help of various figurative comparisons.

Fechner, one of the most prominent defenders of this doctrine in recent times, to explain the position that the mental and physical are two sides of one and the same phenomenon, used the following comparison. Imagine a circle. If you are inside a circle, then the circle will seem concave to you; if you stand outside the circle, the same circle will appear convex to you. This comparison shows that the same thing, viewed from two different points of view, may appear to us differently. In exactly the same way, in the relationship between the mental and the physical. The same thing, viewed from within, is

*) Theory of Science and Metaphysics, p. 231.

is psychic to us, viewed from the outside, appears to us as physical. Another comparison of his seems to portray the relationship between mental and physical better. “The solar system, viewed from the sun, presents a completely different view than from the earth. From there it represents the Copernican world, hence the Ptolemaic one. It is not possible for one and the same observer to observe both world systems, although they are both inseparably linked.

A similar comparison is also made Ten:he likens everything that exists to a book written in two languages, one of which is the original and the other is a translation of that original. The original is mental and the translation is physical. The same content in two different views.

All these comparisons pursue the same goal: they wish to show that we cannot perceive the psychic and at the same time perceive the other side of it, i.e., the psychic. physical. That which lies at the basis of the physical and mental contagion can only be considered from one side—either from the internal (mental) or from the external (physical).

The best comparison, in my opinion, offered Ebbinghaus. Imagine spherical cups nested one inside the other. Imagine further that the surfaces of these cups have the ability to perceive. It is easy to understand that some surfaces would perceive only convex surfaces, while others only concave, not even suspecting that what they perceive at the same time appears as concavity and as convexity. But if some being, for example, man, were to consider the same thing, it would see that they represent the same thing. We are in the same position when we consider

*) Elemente d. Psychophysic V . I. p. 3.

we ourselves; we can contemplate ourselves either from within or only from without, and once we perceive ourselves either only as spiritual or as physical.

By this comparison, Ebbinghaus wants to say that it seems to us that spiritual and material phenomena are different because we perceive them in different ways, but if we could perceive them simultaneously, they would seem to us one and the same.

This is the essence of psychophysical monism, which we must carefully distinguish from psychophysical parallelism. Empirical parallelism is an empirical doctrine that only states the existence of a certain correspondence between mental and physical phenomena; psychophysical monism strives explain such conformity by recognizing their unity. One can be a supporter of empirical parallelism without going so far as to seek explanations for it, especially since these explanations for the most part lead to metaphysical hypotheses.

This is why one must carefully distinguish one proponent of concurrency from another. For example, Avenarius is a supporter of only empirical parallelism, since he considers completely wrong the monism according to which the brain and the soul are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Göfdit turns out to be a parallelist of another type; he recognizes the unity between spirit and matter, but does not ask what is the essence of that single principle, the two sides of which are spirit and matter, and he considers it necessary to add that his theory does not exclude the possibility of constructing a metaphysical hypothesis. Wundt distinguishes these two points of view. In empirical psychology, he is a proponent of empirical parallelism; in his metaphysics, he considers it necessary to recognize single, underlying physical and mental phenomena.

Herbert Spencer is a monist in the sense of Spinoza. Just as Spinoza thought that the basis of all phenomena is one substance, the attributes of which are spirit and matter, in the same way Spencer assumes that the unknown, incomprehensible lies at the basis of all phenomena. reality, the manifestation of which are spirit and matter. By recognizing some thing in itself, lying outside immediate experience, Herbert Spencer becomes a Spinoza-type metaphysician.

Monism is now very widespread and has a lot of prominent advocates. In England, its representatives are Ben and Herbert Spencer; in France, Taine and Ribot; in Germany, Wundt, Paulsen, Ebbinghaus, Jodl; Finally, among the representatives of monism, one should also mention the well-known Danish psychologist Gefding in Russia.

If we were to ask what are the reasons for this success of monism, then, in all probability, we would have to recognize two such reasons, scientific and philosophical.

From a scientific point of view, psychophysical parallelism seems attractive because it is, so to speak, a rather indifferent point of view, recognizing equally both the rights of the mental and the physical; in addition, with this point of view, which denies the interaction between spirit and matter, remains intactmechanical interpretation of life phenomena. Here the intervention of some mystical principle, which natural science cannot reckon with, is not recognized. Here all bodily phenomena are explained by physical and chemical causes.

This point of view is also of interest in the sense that, recognizing the constant parallelism between mental and physical phenomena, it does a great service psychophysiology, since he considers psychological research legitimate where a continuous physiological goal is interrupted, and, conversely, he considers

physiological investigation melts away where the psychic chain is interrupted.

The philosophical reason for the success of monism is this. In the current century, there is a tendency to build an idealistic worldview on scientific principles. Psychophysical parallelism seems to be the most consistent with modern scientific requirements. In addition, if parallelism is carried out consistently to the end, then it will be possible to recognize not only the animation of man and animals, but also plants, and likewise the entire inorganic world. Then it will turn out that everything that exists in the world is animate, and since the mental is only the inner side of that, the outer side of which is the physical, and since the mental side represents reality as it is in itself, the physical is only an external manifestation, then we can say that the most important aspect of reality is spiritual. According to Paulsen, for example, “my bodily life serves as a mirror of my mental life, the bodily system of organs is an expression of the will and the system of its motives that is accessible to my external perception; the body is the appearance or appearance of the soul.” According to Wundt, "spiritual being is the own reality of things."

Thus, the spiritual principle expresses the essence of reality; the task of world life is the development of the spiritual side, the creation of spiritual blessings, and so on. In a word, an idealistic world outlook is erected on empirical foundations.

These are the main reasons for such a huge success of the monistic worldview at the present time *).

*) Literature of the question of psychophysical monism: Gefding.Psychology. Ch. II. Paulsen.Introduction to philosophy. M., 1894. Prince. I-I. Ch. I-I. Wundt.Essay on Psychology. M., 1897, § 22. 8. Wundt.Lectures on the Soul of Man and Animals. SPb., 1894. Lekts. 30th. Wundt.The basis of physiological psychology. M., 1880. Ch. 25. Riel.The theory of science and metaphysics. M. 1887.

A few years ago, destructive work began in Germany. Outstanding thinkers begin to express themselves in the sense that psychophysical monism is a completely untenable doctrine.

I consider this moment highly significant, because the proof of the interaction between the mental and the physical can deal a serious blow to the mechanical worldview. The doctrine of free will, which has hitherto been an insoluble problem due to the fact that it was impossible to prove the influence of spirit on matter, can now receive a completely different solution. The expediency of organic life, which remained incomprehensible for the same reasons, will, in all likelihood, receive a completely different interpretation.

Among the opponents of parallelism are such prominent writers as Siegwart, James, Stumf and many others.

What are the shortcomings of the doctrine of identity? First of all, anyone could easily see that its most important drawback lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand how it is possible identitybetween spirit and matter. The monists themselves say that there is a fundamental difference between the mental and the physical, that the mental cannot influence the physical, and, conversely, that the mental world and the physical are two heterogeneous areas. How can the identity of such heterogeneous phenomena be conceivable? The proponent of identity may say that he does not intend to make the identity of two such heterogeneous phenomena intelligible or concretely conceivable. For him, identity is only hypothesis, at

Dep. 2nd. Ch. 2nd. Ebbinghaus. Grundzuge d. psychology. 1897. pp. 37-47. Jodl. Lehrbuch d. psychology. 1896. Ch. 2nd. Spencer. Foundations of Psychology. § 41, 56, 272 etc. Ban. Soul and body. Tan. About the mind and knowledge. Book. 4th. Ch. 2nd.

by means of which he can explain the correspondence between the physical and the mental, because if he did not admit such an identity, then he would have to admit, like the occasionalists, either the intervention of God in each of the acts, or the pre-established harmony of Leibniz. True, there is an epistemological argument which makes the identity of spirit and matter probable. We discussed this argument above. It boils down to the recognition that there is no difference between spirit and matter, since matter is in reality also a collection of sensations, and therefore both spirit and matter are woven as if from the same material.

But the following objection can be raised against this argument. One may agree that matter is a collection of sensations or ideas, but for our knowledge in the end there remains an impenetrable difference between spirit and matter; it seems, therefore, that monism can only be accepted as a plausible hypothesis if there is no other hypothesis which can more satisfactorily explain the relation between mind and matter.

We have seen that monism does not recognize the possibility of the intervention of the spirit in matter, because in this case the law of conservation of energy would be violated. But according to the law of conservation of energy, the amount of energy in the world is constant, and if the soul could interfere in the activities of the body, then it would, so to speak, add energy, which physicist cannot be taken into account. If, on the other hand, material movements could be transformed into something psychic, this would mean that physical energy would disappear. Therefore, in general, the recognition of such an interaction could contradict the basic laws of mechanics.

Defenders of interaction point out that the intervention of the spirit in the activity of matter could not at all contradict the laws of mechanics. For example, the first law

Mechanics says that "a body is at rest until some external force brings it out of equilibrium." In general, this law is understood in such a way that a body in a state of rest can only be set in motion by another body; but some object to this, saying that the first law says only that the body can be brought out of rest only by some external force, but it has not been proven at all that this force must necessarily come from the body, and therefore it can be assumed that cause, changing movement, may come not from the body, but, as in this case, from the spirit.

According to Croman*), the principle of conservation of energy means speed movement, and not the direction of movement, and therefore it can be assumed that the soul has an influence on the direction of bodily movements, if only speed movements remains constant, and this would not contradict the law of conservation of energy: “Imagine,” he says, the world of atoms, which a crowd of spirits would play like a ball: the amount of energy of this atomic world would remain unchanged if only each atom was thrown away from constant speed."

The same intervention of the spirit in the activity of matter is considered conceivable by the Viennese physicist Boltzmann, and he thinks that this intervention could not contradict the laws of mechanics**).

But there is another way to prove the possibility of interaction without contradicting the laws of mechanics; this is exactly

*) Croman.Kurzgefasste Logik u. psychology.

**) Here are his words quoted in the psychology of Höfler'a. (Psychologie 1897, pp. 59 - 9 notes) Mit dem Energiesatz eine Einwirkung des Psychischen auf das Physische nicht unverträglich sei, wenn man annehme, dass diese Einwirkung normal gegen die Niveaufläche erfolge. To understand this statement, one should remember that if a force acts on a body at right angles to the direction of its motion, then it does no work in the body and only changes the direction, but not the magnitude of the speed. Therefore, the kinetic energy, which depends on the square of the speed, remains unchanged. Maxwell. Matter and motion. SPb., 1885, § 78.

if understood in a special way energy. Then we can recognize, along with physical energy and mentaland recognize the convertibility of one energy into another. This point of view is held Siegwart and Shtumf.They say that the law of conservation of energy is mainly the law transformation one energy into another, that is, we can say that thermal energy, for example, can turn into light, into electrical; and, conversely, we can also say that the amount of energy during such transformations remains unchanged - but at the same time, we should not at all think, as many do, that this or that type of energy must necessarily be interpreted mechanically., how movement of molecular particles.For example, if a moving core meets the ship's armor on its way, then the movement of the core stops, but at the same time the kinetic energy of the core is converted into thermal energy. Many interpret this phenomenon in such a way that the movement of visible mass is transformed into molecular movement; but several physicsfind such an interpretation unlawful and assert that at the present time we do not actually have any data for the assertion that heat is a genus movement. We can only say that it is energy, without giving the nearest definition of it.

With this understanding of energy, since it is not reduced to the movement of the smallest particles of matter, it is easy to assume that there is psychic energy that can turn into physical, and vice versa. After all, the essence of energy is to do work, and whether this energy is physical or mental is immaterial. If we understand energy in this way, then the interaction is explained extremely simply: physical energy turns into mental energy and vice versa.

“As regards the law of conservation of energy,” says Stumf *), it seems to me that there are two ways to bring

*) See it Rede zur Eröffnung des III Internationalen Congresses für Psychologie.

bring it into agreement with the postulate of universal interaction.

First of all, the distinction between potential and kinetic energy already shows that energy is not necessarily conserved in the form of motion. But regardless of this, the validity of the law does not depend on the concrete idea that all natural processes consist in motions. If it is expressed without any hypothetical addition, then it will be just a law transformations. If kinetic energy (the living force of visible movement) is converted into other forms of force, and this one can eventually be converted back into kinetic energy, then the same amount is obtained that was consumed. What these and other forms of energy consist of, the law says nothing about this, and therefore, as I think, one could look at the psychic as an accumulation of energy of a special kind, which could have its exact mechanical equivalent.

Lest anyone think that this teaching, which recognizes the existence of a special psychic energy, has a materialistic character (because here the psychic is placed side by side with physical energy), I hasten to note that such a character is not at all inherent in this teaching, since it does not recognize that physical energy is converted into a special kind of physical energy. This would be possible if energy were recognized as a special kind of motion, but this is not at all the case here. In addition, philosophers In this direction, the psychic is considered in advance to be just as real as the physical, and only in order to explain the interaction is it necessary to admit the existence of psychic energy.

But in view of the fact that both of the above interpretations are based on our ignorance of the physical processes involved in the interaction, I will allow myself to give an interpretation in which the law of conservation of energy

gie remains intact and which is based mainly on the logical analysis of the concept of causality.

Since the time of Descartes it has been said that causality can only exist between phenomena. homogeneous*); but this is wrong, and here's why: it would be right only if we understood by cause something that creates an effect, or if we were looking for some kind of internal connection between cause and effect, meanwhile, in In fact, by causality, we must understand this is not at all. By the term causality, we only wish to signify that if A is given, then B follows it, a change in A causes a change in B, and so on. homogeneity. The most heterogeneous phenomena can be with each other in relation to causality.

It usually seems that the causal relation in the physical world is extremely simple and understandable, while the causal relation between the psychic and the physical is completely incomprehensible. If, for example, a ball is moving, and on its way it meets another ball, which is set in motion by it, then we say that the motion of the first ball is cause movements of the second. This connection seems simple and understandable to us; but if, following a certain volitional decision, I have a movement of the hand, then it seems that the causal relationship between one and the other is incomprehensible. In reality, however, one causal relationship is no more intelligible than another, and it may even be that the second is more intelligible than the first. Perhaps the first relation becomes clear to us only because we are already familiar with the second.

This consideration shows that we actually have no grounds for denying the possibility of causal

*) According to Descartes, every action is already potentially contained in its cause. For where, asks Descartes, can an action receive its real content, if not from the cause?

the relationship between the physical and the mental, and this is actually characteristic of the interaction.

It seems to me that there is another consideration which makes interaction intelligible if we only examine the scientific use of the concept of causality.

In everyday life we ​​usually understand the word cause one from the antecedent conditions of some action, often forgetting that each action is determined by a whole beside conditions, from which we choose one of some for convenience.

For example, we say: "The merchant received a telegram informing him of some trade failure, and this telegram was causehis death." Meanwhile, in fact, there were extremely many such reasons. Maybe before that he had received some unpleasant news, maybe his nervous system this time was especially unstable, and so on. Of a number of these reasons, the sad news was only one of the reasons that determined this or that action. If you take any example of the cause of a connection in the field of physical phenomena, you get τά same thing. Thus, strictly speaking, every reason is, so to speak, partial reason, every action is always determined set of reasons.

If we begin to understand the cause in this way, then we will see that between the psychic and the physical world there can exist causal interaction.

Let us take, for example, the case when, after some volitional decision, movement arises. Considered from a physical point of view, this movement can be explained in such a way that an excitation arises in the cortex of the brain, which is transmitted along the motive nerve to the muscles of the hand and produces a contraction of these latter. But can we say that physical excitation is the only condition by which the hand moves? What does it mean in ta-

which case is a voluntary decision? Can we say that it has no significance for the movement of the hand? Obviously not. If there were no volitional decision, then there would be no movement of the hand; therefore, let us say simply that the will in this case is the cause of motion, but only partial reason. If there were no will, then there would be no nervous excitement, and at the same time no movement of the hand; Consequently, will in this case undoubtedly has a causal value.

Someone will perhaps say that the will is of no importance because the same actions that are performed with the help of the will can be performed without the help of the will, for example, the so-called automatic actions. Persons in a state of somnambulism perform a number of expedient actions. But this objection is completely unfounded, and on the contrary, it shows the causal significance of the will, because, however complex automatic actions may be, however expedient they may be, they can never have such a character as purely volitional actions. No case is known of a somnambulistic person giving a speech in parliament; a person cannot automatically create some kind of machine, and so on.

From the same point of view, the emergence of a sensation can also be explained by the influence of physical causes, namely, if we take into account that physical causes are a partial cause of the occurrence of a sensation; for example, if a bell trembles and we have a sensation of sound, then the occurrence of this sensation cannot be explained by physical causes alone, but also cannot be explained solely by mental causes: it must be assumed that both kinds of causality act together. For the emergence of sensation, both the nervous excitations going from the auditory apparatus to the brain and the preliminary sensations are of equal importance.

Mental states that exist in consciousness. That physical causes are important in this case is obvious to everyone. It may not be clear how mental states can have a causal significance in a given process, but it is extremely easy to verify this latter if we take the example of a person sleeping or in a state of swoon. When the bell trembles, they get physical excitement, but they do not get the sensation of sound, because there are no mental states that are an additional cause of the sensations.

Thus, it is possible to explain the interaction between mental and physical phenomena, if the concept of causality is correctly interpreted. This interpretation is also that important that it does not violate the law of conservation of energy, because we can assume that, for example, a volitional decision when creating a movement does not create physical energy, and, conversely, when nervous excitation causes sensation, then physical energy is not destroyed, turning into mental phenomenon.

There is also evidence of the influence of spirit on matter, borrowed from the theory of evolution; by the way, it belongs James. This proof boils down to the following. According to Darwin's theory, organisms adapt to their environment. Those organisms which are provided with organs to help in the struggle for existence survive; those organisms that do not have such organs perish in the struggle for existence. Organs contributing to the struggle for existence develop; organs that do not contribute to this goal atrophy and are destroyed. If we consider the mental life of an elementary organism, such as a mollusk, and the life of a man, we will see that there is an enormous difference; human consciousness is developed, while in a mollusk it is in its infancy.

If consciousness were for man some superfluous, unnecessary appendage, then, of course, it would atrophy a long time ago; and the fact that it develops shows that it is a necessary function. If functions develop only as a result of their usefulness, then, obviously, consciousness develops as a result of its usefulness. The usefulness of consciousness lies in the fact that it helps in the struggle for existence, and this it can only do if it affects the course of the bodily history of the organism. It is easy to see how this can happen. A poorly developed organism regulates its relations with the outside world very poorly; the organism endowed with consciousness adapts much better: the intellect helps it in this, making a choice from various kinds of possible actions. It chooses favorable actions and suppresses unfavorable ones and at the same time helps the organism in the struggle for existence.

But, helping in the struggle, consciousness at the same time exerts a certain influence on the very physical form of the organism. How this happens can be easily imagined if one pays attention to how strongly vegetable organisms differ from animals, which, in the struggle for existence, used the services of the intellect.

Thus, it is clear that consciousness has a certain effect on the organism.

This view was proposed by James, but it was equally held by the adherents of monism, like Paulsen and Wundt *). Strictly speaking, both Paulsen and Wundt, supporters of monism, this is a contradiction, because the possibility of the influence of consciousness on the body cannot be reconciled with the recognition of the monistic principle.

In general, it must be admitted that to carry out a monistic

*) James.psychology. Vol. I. 138-144. Paulsen . Introduction to Philosophy p. 196 and D. Wundt in Grundz üge d. phys. Psychologie, 4th ed., vol. 2, p. 641, recognizes in general the influence of the will on the physical organization.

the principle quite consistently turns out to be a rather difficult matter. In "The System of Philosophy “ Wundt recognizes organic expediency and is explained by the fact that the will, of course, the world, intervenes in the course of natural phenomena and determines them. In general, Wundt does not find it possible to explain organic life by mechanical causes and recognizes the intervention of the will in it *).

If such an eminent writer as Wundt could not carry out the principle of monism consistently, then this clearly indicates the inadequacy of the principle of monism itself, and therefore it seems that at the present time the question of which can be considered more correct, monism or dualism, should be answered, that dualism, which recognizes a material and a special spiritual principle, in any case explains phenomena better than monism **).

Now we can begin to consider the question of "Soul". To many it may seem that this

*) See his System d . Philosophy in esp. page 533. Hauptmann in his book Metaphysik in d. modernen Physiologie cites many passages from Wundt's Psychology which clearly show that Wundt looked upon the spirit as a guiding principle.

**) Stumf . Rede zur Eröffnung des III Internationalen Congresses für Psychologie in „Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung Jahrg. 1896. No. 180, as well as Berichte des III Internationalen Kongresses für Psychology. München, 1897. Siegwart . logic. B. IL 1893, p. 518 —41. James. Principles of Psychology. 1890.V. 1 . 138—144.

Croman.Kurzgefasste Logik und Psychology. 1890 pp. ii8 etc. Rehmke.Lehrbuch d. allgemeinen Psychology. 1894 pp. 107-115. his own . Aussenwelt und Innenwelt, Leib und Seele. 1898.Kulpe.Einleitung in die Philosophie 1894, as well as in Zeitschrift f. Hypnotism. B. 7. H. 2.Hof 1 er. psychology. 1897, pp. 58-59. Wentscher.lieber physische und psychische Kausalität und das Princip des psychophysischen Parallelismus, 1896 and Erharat.Die Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Seele. 1897 . In Russian literature, in favor of interaction, Prof. N. Ya. Grot in the article "The concept of the soul and mental energy in psychology." (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, No. 27), as well as Arch. f. systemat. Philosophie, 1898. Die Begriffe der Seele und der psychischen Energie in der Psychologie. For a critique of parallelism, see L. M. Lopatin. The concept of the soul according to internal experience. Questions of philosophy and psychology. 1896 XXXII.

the question is not at all scientific, that the question of the soul may enter the field of religious philosophy, but by no means constitute the subject of psychology. At the extreme, only metaphysicians can speak of the soul; the empiricist philosopher will not consider this issue the subject of his research. But those who think in this way are mistaken, because even such empiricists - philosophers , how D. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, not only considered it possible to speak of a "soul", but even recognized it as existing, as we shall see below.

If the view is very widespread among today's intelligent public that science proper cannot speak of the soul, this stems from the fact that it ascribes to philosophers a crude animistic view that belongs to primitive man. Many of the public think that if a philosopher speaks of the soul, he understands by it the same thing as primitive man.

But what, in fact, did primitive man mean by soul? For him, questions about whether there is a soul in a person were not alien: he came across these questions by observing such phenomena as the difference between a living person and a dead person, between a sleeping and waking person. Primitive man explained this difference by the fact that a living person has a "soul" - this is a special being that lives in him. It can leave a person, and then he becomes dead. This soul is something like a thin shell, something like shadows or pair. This soul, leaving the body, for example, in a dream can wander, go to places very far from the sleeping person, and return to him again. After death, the soul leaves the body of a person, according to popular expression, it “flies away” from him, and as a result, some peoples have a custom to open windows at a time when someone dies, something

the soul would be able to fly away without hindrance. This is the understanding of the soul some attribute fi philosophers, but everyone can easily see that the soul, whose existence primitive man recognized, is material, that his understanding of the soul is purely materialistic and cannot be recognized by any modern philosopher.

What is a soul? Many, when asking such a question, think they will get a very simple and definite answer. This kind of expectation is explained by the habits we have acquired since childhood. When in childhood we ask the question, what is a “steamboat,” and receive a quite definite answer, it seems to us that if we ask the question, what is the soul, then the philosopher should give the same definite answer, which would show what he understands by the soul something that has the visibility of a material thing. But this is far from the case here.

What kind of data are the data on which the philosopher builds his assumption regarding the existence of the soul? These facts are mainly the following. First, the so-called unity of consciousness, and secondly identity of the individual. Under the unity of consciousness we must understand the following. If, for example, we compare two representations, A and B, then we must simultaneously keep in mind both these representations, therefore, it must be something such that connects these views are one. This something that unites into one whole is the soul. Indeed, in the process of comparison, it is necessary that both "representations be thought at the same time, so that they are simultaneously present in our consciousness. This combining is what philosophers called the soul.

Another argument that is made in favor of the existence of the soul is our identity "I» our personality. But what is the "I" and what is to be understood by the identity of the individual?

To answer this, we need only ask ourselves what we think when we use the word 'I'. When I use the word "I", I am thinking that I occupy such and such a social position, that I was born there, that I am so many years old, that I have such and such an appearance, that I have such clothes that I am the one who spoke a week ago in this very place. If I wanted to think further on the same topic, then I would remember my childhood and would notice that I am the one who studied there so many years ago, spent my childhood there, etc. This there is my "I", my "personality". We consider the identity of a person to be the fact that I identify my present “I” with the “I” that I had many years ago. There is actually a huge difference between them. In fact, when I was a child, when I used the word "I", I thought quite differently than when I now use this word. But it seems to me that my present "I" is identical with my past "I".

If I did not feel the identity of my current "I" with my "I" a month ago, then I would not consider myself responsible for my actions committed a month ago. But since I consider myself responsible, this means that I recognize my identity at various points in my life.

Here are the facts, the reality of which hardly anyone will doubt - but how to explain them? In trying to explain these facts, some philosophers and came to recognize the need to admit the existence of a "soul".

They assumed that there was a special spiritual substance, which they considered simple and indivisible, intangible and indestructible. This spiritual substance is the bearer of all spiritual states; it unites all separate states into one whole. Thanks to her, our "I" seems identical and continuous.

nym. This spiritual substance is not something identical with our spiritual states, with our feelings, thoughts, desires, etc. It is something separate, standing outside them and having the goal unite spiritual states and one whole. In other words, it resembles a material atom. Just as the atom, hiding behind material phenomena, is in fact the bearer of all the properties of these latter, so the spiritual substance, being directly inaccessible to our perception, is the bearer of the forces with which it causes the phenomena of consciousness.

Philosophers , who recognized the existence of such a spiritual substance are called spiritualists in the proper sense of the word.

The strongest objection to this theory was made by the English philosopher David Hume *). According to this philosopher, we can only know what is available to our direct perception. We have sensations of cold, light, sound, and so on. We can speak of these immediately perceptible properties as something existing, because each of them corresponds to a certain idea. Can it be said that there is any idea that would correspond to what philosophers call personality? If, in order to resolve this question, we turn inside ourselves, to our consciousness, and look for any special idea of ​​“I”, simple, like, for example, the idea of ​​light, sound, etc., then it turns out that that there is no such idea. Every time we look inside ourselves, we find there only some particular idea: heat, cold, sound, light, etc., but we do not find the idea of ​​"I" there. If, however, we wish to know more closely the content of the idea "I", it will turn out that it consists of a whole series of simple ideas. Hence "I" is nothing but owl-

1) See . his Treatise on human nature. Book. I. part IV. 6.

bulkrepresentations, or ideas. Therefore, the view of those philosophers who thought that there is a simple spiritual substance, because there is a simple idea of ​​"I", must be considered wrong.

The only thing we can say about our "I" is that it is a collection of individual ideas, but we can by no means assert that any spiritual substance corresponds to our I. Therefore, if we had to answer the question of what the soul is, then, from the point of view of Hume's philosophy, we would have to say that it is nothing but a collection of individual ideas, but we could not recognize the existence of a separate spiritual substance.

This view has found very many defenders. There are currently philosophers, who think that there is no spiritual substance, and that the soul is nothing but a collection of individual ideas.

Against the spiritualistic theory, which derived the existence of the soul from the identity and immutability of our "I", those facts from psychiatry, which are known under the name split personality. These are precisely the cases when patients are given the existence of a new personality in them, which has nothing in common with the former personality. The patient, being in one state, speaks of his other state, as of something completely extraneous for him, “Not only did it seem to me,” said one patient, “that I was someone else, but I really was, others. Another "I" took the place of my first "I" *).

If this were so, then the spiritualistic theory would be impossible, because then it would be necessary to admit that the soul can be divided into several parts.

Further objections boil down to the following. "Representatives of spiritualism," says James**), were inclined

*) Taine. De l'Intelligence. Vol. I. Book. IV. Ch. Sh .

**) Psychology. 1896. pp. 150-6. psychology. Vol. I.

We assert that simultaneously cognizable objects are cognized by something, moreover, this something, according to them, is some simple and unchanging spiritual personality. But this, according to James, is completely unfounded. There is absolutely no need to recognize a special spiritual substance when we can explain the same process purely psychologically, i.e., with the help of the assumption that objects of this kind are cognized with the help of mental states known to us.

As for the identity of the individual, many people doubt its existence. There is no identity of personality, according to James, because my “I” is different at different moments of my life. The idea of ​​the identity of a person is a product of inference, and not of direct perception. Namely, seeing insignificant differences in my "I", at different moments of life, I ignore this difference, and I bring these different "I" into one class. In other words, I do the same thing that I do when, on the basis of a particular similarity between things, I bring them into one class.

If, for example, I perceive a number of similar objects, then at least there was some difference between them, I combine them into one class. I get one generic image; this is how I get a concept about some thing, about an animal, etc. According to James, the concept about my “I” is obtained in the same way. At different moments of my life I perceive my "I" not as the same, but as different. With an undoubted difference, there are also points of similarity between these "I", just as there are points of similarity between individual representatives of any class of things. Generalizing, I get a well-known generic concept of my "I"; therefore, there can be no question at all of the absolute identity of our “I”, and therefore it is impossible to refer to this fact in order to prove an absolutely identical “I” or spiritual substance. One can only speak of a relatively permanent "I".

Thus, according to some philosophers we don't have identity. Our personality today and our personality many years ago are completely different things. True, we recognize this identity, but this identity is not absolute. In this case, the concept of identity is used in a very special sense. We will consider several examples from which it will become clear how the concept of identity is used differently and in what sense it is used in this case.

If, for example, when contemplating a statue in a museum, we say that this is the same statue that once adorned some Athenian temple, then we use the concept of “identity” in this case in the proper sense. We can say that the statue in question is quite identical with the one with which we identify it. But here, for example, I contemplate some thousand-year-old oak, about which a legend has been preserved that many years ago some commander rested under it during a battle. Can we say that this is the same oak that the legend tells about? From a certain point of view, we cannot say this in any way. After all, if the oak is nothing but a collection of material particles, then not a single one of those material particles of the historical oak remains; they are known to have been replaced by completely new ones due to the metabolism in plant organisms. But nevertheless, we rightfully identify this oak with the historical one.

We do the same with our own body. I fully identify the body that I have at the present time with the body that I had a year ago, although I know from physiology, that, due to metabolism, not a single atom of those that were a year ago remained in my body. The change in the organism is so significant that there is

there is an old joke according to which, if there were no soul in us, but only a body, then we, having signed the bill a year ago, would not be obliged to pay on it at all, because the one who signed the bill, now no more. But even materialists will not agree with this conclusion. And this is because we consider our body, despite the most significant modifications, to be the same as before. It seems that with less right we use this expression in the following case. We call "English" the people who inhabit Great Britain, and identify them with the same people who inhabited the same islands a thousand years ago, although in reality not a single person who was part of the English people of the 8th century is no longer alive. .

But why do we allow ourselves to identify them with each other? As you noticed, I gave examples of identity from life organisms, and it seems to me that this identity is explained by the continuity of the existence of the organism. Under continuity I understand the following. If we take, for example, a people and imagine that it consists of a certain series of generations, then we will see that at a certain moment in its life one generation does not have time to die out before another is born, so that at every moment the old exists alongside the new, and this is true of all that we call an organism.

If we agree with this, then it is easy to understand the identity of our "I" at various moments of our life. Our consciousness consists of a set of ideas or spiritual states in general; this totality is different for each given moment; representations replace each other and are different for different moments of life. But nevertheless, we consider these representations to be continuous, in the sense in which we consider the elements in the life of a people to be continuous. Thanks to this continuity, the identity of our "I" is established.

Consequently, the concept of identity in relation to the individual is used not in an absolute, but in a relative sense.

All these considerations led to the fact that the existence of a spiritual substance was questioned.

At present, among philosophers there are supporters of the so-called substantiality, others are supporters relevance; the essence of this difference is that, according to the first, the soul is a substance, according to the second, it is continuously changing connection of processes or acts. The defenders of this latter theory are Paulsen and Wundt*).

Both of them are opponents of spiritualism in the former sense of the word, they do not consider it possible to recognize the existence of a separate spiritual substance and do so on the basis of the following considerations.

First of all, the spiritual substance is completely inaccessible to our perception. We can perceive our spiritual states, our feelings, thoughts, desires, but we are not able to perceive what is their carrier, and therefore do we have any reason to recognize its existence? It seems not. True, it may be said that “we also do not perceive the material atom, but nevertheless we recognize its existence. In exactly the same way, we must recognize the existence of a spiritual substance, because although we do not perceive it, but for that it explains a lot to us. Both Wundt and Paulsen answer this in the same way; “we recognize the existence of the material atom, because it explains a lot to us, the spiritual atom is nothing doesn't explain. Why, then, recognize its existence?

*) See Paulsen. Introduction to philosophy. M., 1894. Pp. 131-9, 369 and D. Wundt. Essay on Psychology. "M., 1897. § 22. Lectures on the soul of man and animals. St. Petersburg, 1894. Lecture 30. Foundations of physical. Psychology. M., 1886, p.

System d. Philosophie, 2nd ed. pp. 364 et al. For the concept of substance, see his Logik. B. I. pp. 524 and d.

It is said that spiritual substance is the bearer of spiritual states, that is what unites them into one whole. If there were no spiritual substance, our mental states, so to speak, would scatter in all directions. Spiritual substance serves to connect them into one. Paulsen thinks that this is completely wrong, because, recognizing substance in this sense, we would fall into materialism, because we imagine that spiritual states need a support in the same sense in which it is needed for material things. Therefore, Paulsen, and. Wundt think that there is no need to recognize the soul as something that is outsideindividual spiritual states. The existence of the soul, in their opinion, is exhausted by mental life, i.e., ideas, feelings, and other spiritual states. “The soul, according to Paulsen, is a multiplicity of facts of inner life, connected into unity in a way that we are not able to describe more closely.”

Thus Paulsen does not deny the existence of the soul. In his opinion, there is a soul, you just need to understand what it is. He even agrees to call the soul a substance, if by this latter we understand that which has an independent existence. In this sense, the soul "has" ideas, "carries" ideas in itself. We cannot in any way imagine that, for example, an idea exists outside of that connection which we call the soul.

But since it is impossible to understand how the soul, being totality representations, at the same time is bearerrepresentations, then Paulsen gives an example for illustration, which, in his opinion, clarifies this relationship between the soul and individual representations. Take, for example, a poem. It consists of separate phrases, words. Can we say that a poem is something that exists those this set of words that makes up a poem? Co-

sure, no. But can we, on the other hand, say that a poem is nothing but a simple collection of these words? Of course not. Because if we took all those words that are part of the poem and mixed them with each other, then we would no longer receive the poem. Why? Because a poem is not a simple mechanical addition of individual words. There is something here that precedes individual words. This is exactly what whole, which exists before its parts.It is the idea of ​​the whole that determines the order and placement of the words. We can place this or that word in this or that part of the poem only because it corresponds to the idea of ​​the whole. The idea of ​​the whole determines the place of each individual word.

In exactly the same way, the soul is not a simple mechanical combination of ideas into one whole; here the whole precedes its parts. Each sensation, representation that enters our consciousness is determined by the whole, which can be called the soul.

Thus it is easy to understand the essence of Paulsen's teaching. On the one hand, he admits that the existence of the soul is exhausted by spiritual life, spiritual states, that these spiritual states are united into one unity, but that there is no special spiritual substance. Thus a great difference is created between those philosophers who recognize spiritual substance and those who deny it.

But what is to be said of this denial of spiritual substance? Can it be considered sufficiently solid? Is it even possible to say that it is enough to recognize only spiritual states so that we can explain all the above phenomena in our mental life? Is it possible to say that there is no need for anything outsideor besides spiritual states? Supporters of the substantiality of the soul in modern philosophy think that it is possible. In general, they say against substance,

that in explaining psychic phenomena we can do with empirical laws alone. But this is wrong, because even empiricists-philosophers cannot do without the assumption of something outside individual mental states.

L. FROM. Mill, a direct follower of Hume, found that the soul cannot be reduced to a simple set of spiritual states, that it is still something inexplicable, worth outside these states. Here are his words: “As a substance there is a mysterious something... so the spirit is a mysterious something that feels and thinks... There is something, what I call my I, or, to put it differently, my spirit, and what I recognize as different from these sensations, thoughts, etc., something that I recognize not as thoughts, but being,(the being) possessing these thoughts, and that I can imagine existing eternally in a state of rest, without any thoughts ... The spirit can be recognized as the sensing subject of all feelings, that which has these feelings and experiences them. Elsewhere, Mill compares the soul to a thread that binds individual pearls into a necklace. If you pull out this thread, then there will be no necklace; In exactly the same way, the soul is something that is outside the individual spiritual states and serves to unite them. “You reduce the 'I' to a series of states of consciousness, but it is necessary that something connect them together. If you pull the string from your pearl necklace, what is left? separate pearls, and not a necklace at all. He finds that there is something real in the connection of spiritual phenomena, as real as sensations themselves.

Thus, it is clear that Mill differs from Hume precisely in that for him "I" is something outside individual mental states, although it cannot be more closely known *).

*) Mill. Logic system. Book. 3rd, ch. z-i, § 8. study of Hamilton's philosophy. Ch. XII.

In exactly the same way and Herbert Spencerrecognizes the soul in the sense just indicated: “although each individual impression or idea may be absent, but that which binds impressions and ideas together is never absent, and its unceasing presence has its necessary consequence, or even simply constitutes, our concept about some continuous existence that exists here, or about reality. Existence means nothing more than the presence or continuation of being, and therefore in the soul that which continues to remain despite all changes and maintains the unity of the aggregate, despite all attempts to divide it, is that existence which can be affirmed in the full sense of the wordand what should we call the substance of the soul, in contrast to the various forms it takes" *).

From this passage it can be seen that for Herbert Spencer, as for Mill, the soul is something outside of separate spiritual states, although, in their opinion, it cannot be known more closely.

Actualists say that there is no reason to admit the existence of a substance, because it is not perceptible; besides, it doesn't explain anything.

But can the explanation given by the proponents of actuality be considered solid, and can they really dispense with spiritual substance in their explanations? Indeed, in their opinion, instead of saying that the spiritual substance is the bearer of individual spiritual states, it is enough to say that the soul is a plurality of spiritual states, and that this plurality is the bearer of each individual spiritual state. But can this expression even be called understandable?

*) G. Spencer.Foundations of Psychology, § 59.

One spiritual state, taken by itself, cannot be a carrier of spiritual states, but how does it acquire this ability when it enters into conjunction with others, when there are many of these states? After all, it seems self-evident that if this property of being a bearer is not inherent in individual states, then it is not acquired if there are many of these states. Thus, the adherents of actuality, saying that the plurality of spiritual states is the bearer of individual spiritual states, do not actually explain anything *).

Is it possible to say that the defenders of actuality give a satisfactory explanation when, eliminating the spiritual substance, they propose to define the soul as a collection of separate spiritual states, united into a unity, in a more indefinable way? After all, to say this phrase means to say that what we know about the soul is not exhausted by a single combination of elements, that, in addition to individual spiritual elements of states, we must admit something else.

Proponents of actuality think that the concept of substance is completely inapplicable to spiritual phenomena. But is it?

It all depends on what you mean by substance. Defenders of actuality say that they do not want to recognize substance as something that is outside spiritual states given directly to us.

But is it possible to say that such an understanding of substance is the only possible one? After all, according to this understanding, the substance exists, as it were, on its own, and the manifestations of the substance exist on their own, separately. But is substance really something that necessarily exists outside of its phenomena? It would not-

*) See the objection to relevance at K u lpe, Einleitung in di Philosophie. 2nd ed., 1898.

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correct even with respect to material substance, material atoms.

After all, what is a substance?

In the things we know we always have elements which are permanent compared to other elements that are changing. A typical example of such a relationship between changing and constant elements is the material atom, as a constant carrier of material phenomena. In this sense, we call the atom a material substance. But is the atom something that exists apart from its manifestations? It seems not. Therefore, we can say that the term substance should be called that constant in things, which we see in them. But this substantial must not necessarily be any existence separate from what we perceive in appearances. We must not think that substance exists in things apart from its phenomena, or accidents, as they are also called in philosophy. .

“In itself, reality is not something divided into the world of substances and the world of accidents, but they really form one indivisible whole. The world process is not in fact any other reality than the atoms, which might be considered as being behind the resultant products—but they are in connection with them as members of one indivisible whole" *).

Quite rightly, Prof. L. M. Lopatin:“There are no phenomena outside of substances, just as there are no substances outside of their properties, states and actions; the nature of a substance is expressed in the laws and properties of phenomena, and vice versa, that which is not manifested in it cannot be considered as the nature of a substance. In other words, the substance is not transcendent,

*) Vanneerus. Arch. f. syst. philosophy. N. F. B. I. H. 3. page 362 and d.

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but immanent in its phenomena. Each phenomenon by its nature is the substance itself at a given separate moment of its existence.

So, by substance we must understand that side of phenomena, which is distinguished by a certain constancy, "and which serves basis for the changing side of phenomena. This relation between substance and its phenomena is something logically necessary. We cannot imagine that any activity could be without an agent, any phenomenon without substance. Such is the nature of all material phenomena that we always distinguish in them what is changing from what is constant, phenomenon from basics phenomena. We also have this kind of constant in psychic life. This constant need not necessarily be something existing outside psychic phenomena themselves, it can be completely exhausted by these phenomena, but at the same time it has properties by virtue of which we can call it substance.

It cannot be said that everything in our psychic life is fluid, that our psychic life is only a changing process. There is also something constant in our spiritual life. So, for example, in the process of comparison there is something, a constant subject, thanks to which the process of comparison can be carried out. Indeed, if we assume that our mind has only state A, and state B, then, of course, the process of comparison could not be carried out; so we must admit one more common subject.

Our spiritual world is enduring also because it represents unity. This unity we can best explain by comparing it with the unity we see in organisms. After all, relative

*) The concept of the soul according to inner experience. Questions of Philosophy and Psychology. 1896 XXXII.

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Concerning the latter, we can also say that all the parts are united into one unity. The body is also something composed of individual components. But this connection is unique, it is not a simple mechanical connection of separate elements. In exactly the same way, our mental organism does not represent a simple mechanical combination of separate parts, but also represents something whole, one in the genus of the organism. This unity is inherent in constancy and relative, immutability, and these are precisely the essence of those properties that characterize substance.

And if so, then it can be seen that both Wundt and Giaulsen are substantialists, because they recognized the substance in this sense. Both Wundt and Paulsen do not recognize substance only in the sense in which it signifies an existence separate from their discoveries. If, however, the essential characteristic of a substance is that it is something independent, something on which other phenomena depend, then in this sense both Wundt and Paulsen are equally supporters of substance. For them, the soul is not a mechanical addition of separate spiritual states, for them it represents a certain organization, a certain unity, which is the bearer of separate spiritual states. This unity is distinguished by constancy and relative immutability; in a word, it has all those properties that are attributed to spiritual substance in the proper sense.

It is clear, therefore, that the latest proponents of the theory of actuality, like Paulsen and Wundt, are not at all as different from the representatives of substantiality as it might seem at first glance. One has only to recognize the unity, something whole that precedes its parts, etc. under:, in order for the difference between substantiality and actuality to become imperceptible. The best proof of this latter circumstance is

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evidence is that the famous German philosopher , Lotze, at one time recognized the theory of substance in in its former form, and subsequently considered himself a defender of substances, but only he understood it in a slightly different way; he thought that " the fact of the unity of consciousness is thus the fact of the existence of substance. Everything, of course, depends on what meaning is given to the concept of substance. It all depends on how you understand the substance. According to Lotze, a substance is something that can act, be affected by something, experience different states, and in their change reveal unity. This concept is quite applicable to the soul. The soul acts on the body, is affected by the body, it is unity.According to Lotze, the soul is what it reveals itself: a unity that lives in certain feelings and strivings *).

Thus, we can say that modern philosophists, who recognize the existence of the soul, also recognize its substantiality, if not directly, then at least indirectly **).

G. Chelpanov.

*) Cm . his Medical Psychology. 1852. Then System d. Philosophie (Metaphysik) 1884.§ 238 and Grundzü ge d. psychology, § 78.

**) For the soul, see Bzn. Soul and body. (On animism) Kyiv, 1884. Mill. System of Logic. Book. I I, Ch. 3rd, § 8. Herbert Spencer, Foundations of Psychology. Section 59 Ribot. Modern English Psychology. M., 1881. Pp. 124-127. James. Psychology. St. Petersburg, 1896. Ch. XII. Wundt. Essay on Psychology. M., 1897, § 22. JamesPrinciples of Psychology. 1890, Ch. x.Paulsen.Introduction to Philosophy. M., 1894. Pp. 131-139 and 362-369. Lotide.System d. philosophy AT . P . Kn . 3- I . Ch . 3 - I . lotze,Grundzuge d. psychology. 1889. Page . 70 and d . Kulpe,Einleitung in die Philosophie. 2- e ed. . 1898. Ch . III. Section 23.Vannerus.Zur Kritik des Seelenbegriffs, ( in Archive f. systematische Philosophie). AT . I. Heft. 3. 1895. Criticism of Wundt's theory ). Lopatin . The concept of the soul according to internal experience. Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, March-April 1896 XXXII.

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Eminent scientists are seriously preoccupied with questions about the essence of the human soul and consciousness. Most recently, we wrote about a study by Dutch cardiologist Pim Van Lommel in the article "Scientists: consciousness exists independently of the body." It turns out that not only doctors are concerned about the question of the immortality of the soul today. Two scientists from the US and the UK have recently developed a very unusual theory of the existence of the soul, calling it the "theory of quantum consciousness." The first of them is Professor of the Department of Anesthesiology and Psychology, Director of the Center for the Study of Consciousness at the University of Arizona (USA) Stuart Hameroff. Its co-author and ideological ally is Roger Penrose, a well-known British mathematician and physicist from Oxford.

Scientists began their work on the theory of consciousness separately, without knowing about each other. Stuart Hameroff, early in his career, became interested in the functions of the microtubules found in neurons. He suggested that they were controlled by some form of computer program and that their functioning was an important part of unraveling the nature of consciousness. In his opinion, understanding the work of microtubules in brain cells at the molecular and supermolecular levels is the key to understanding consciousness.

The work of microtubules in neurons is very complex, their role is extremely important at the cellular level. This prompted the professor to suggest that they may have some computational-computer processes (processes of accumulation and processing of information) sufficient for the functioning of consciousness. In his opinion, the role of microtubules is much more important than the role of the neurons themselves, and it is they who turn the brain into a kind of “quantum computer”.

Roger Penrose, along with Hameroff, developed his own concept of consciousness, arguing that the human brain is capable of performing functions that are inaccessible to any computer or device based on algorithms. It followed from this that consciousness itself is initially non-algorithmic and cannot be modeled as a classical computer. At that time, the idea of ​​“artificial intelligence” and the idea that consciousness can be explained from mechanistic positions just prevailed in science.

Penrose, in turn, decided to use the principles of quantum theory as a basis to explain the origin of consciousness. He argued that non-algorithmic processes in the brain required the presence of "quantum wave reduction", which he later called "objective reduction", which allowed him to combine brain processes with the fundamental theory of space-time. True, initially Penrose could not explain how these quantum processes are realized in the brain at the physical level. In this he was helped by Stuart Hameroff, who, after reading Penrose's book, offered him his theory of microtubules as a source of quantum processes in the brain.

So, since 1992, two scientists began to develop a unified theory of quantum consciousness. The essence of this theory is simple and complex at the same time. Scientists, based on their premises, argue that consciousness is an immortal substance that has existed since the beginning of the universe. Simply put, it is our soul. The brain is a quantum computer device, and consciousness is its “program”, in which all the information accumulated by a person during his life is recorded at the quantum level. And when a person dies, this quantum information merges with the universal consciousness, which is the original substance, or "fabric" of the universe. The main idea is that consciousness is eternal.

As already mentioned, scientists believe that microtubules in neurons are the material carriers of consciousness, in which all work with information takes place at the quantum level. When a cardiac arrest occurs, the microtubules are "discharged", while the information accumulated in them does not go anywhere, but is stored in the general consciousness of the universe.

By the way, the idea of ​​quantum computing is not fantastic. Now scientists around the world are working on the creation of quantum computers, arguing that with their help it will be possible to perform calculations and process simply incredible amounts of information. I must say that in 2012 the Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to scientists working specifically on the technologies of quantum systems - Serge Haroche and David Wineland.

In connection with these ideas, the scientist Seth Lloyd of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology wondered what could be the most powerful quantum computer? Obviously, it will be a computer that combines all the quantum particles of the universe. And is it possible that this computer already exists? More precisely, is it possible that our universe is already such a computer? And we are just “computational processes” taking place in it? One simple conclusion follows from this: if there is a computer, then its programmer must also exist. Thus, scientists are seriously thinking about the fact that the universe still has a creator.

The soul itself in this context is a self-learning program capable of development due to the information accumulated in it. And to put such a program in the human body, you do not need a lot of space: chromosomes or microtubules from neurons are quite suitable. It is difficult to say exactly where this substance is hiding. Further scientific discoveries will hopefully shed light on this question. Let's wait for new research.

It seems that science is getting closer and closer to the eternal ideas about the immortality of the soul and the existence of a higher mind. Perhaps the final reconciliation of science and religion will soon take place. In the meantime, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff remain pioneers in this area, and their ideas are seriously criticized by colleagues and not recognized by them. However, scientists do not lose confidence in their abilities, because their theories are based on the latest scientific developments.

In order not to wait until science is ripe for new global concepts, get acquainted right now with the books of Anastasia Novykh, which combine modern scientific data and spiritual traditions. Their main character, Sensei, initiates his students into such mysteries of the universe, to which our science is just approaching. Surprisingly, recent discoveries exactly confirm many of the ideas expressed in these books. So, if you are worried about what the soul is, what the Universe consists of, what time and space are, what is the original particle of matter, and how a person should develop in order to fulfill his mission on this earth, then be sure to include the books of Anastasia Novykh in your list. for reading! You will not be disappointed because you will discover many mysteries and mysteries of our universe! Books can be downloaded absolutely free of charge from our website, and below we offer you a quote on this topic

Read more about this in the books of Anastasia Novykh

I will try to explain to you in general terms. Roughly speaking, it looks like this. We believe that we are the mind that sees, hears, thinks and analyzes. But in fact, it is just a small piece of the area of ​​consciousness. Let's call it Something. This little Something floats on the surface of the ocean. The ocean is our subconsciousness, where all our genetic memory, conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, that is, all our “accumulated” experience, is stored at various depths. But all this refers to our material essence. This is our animal nature. Under the subconscious, at the bottom of the ocean, there are, as it were, “gates”. And finally, behind the “gates” is the soul, a particle of God. This is our spiritual beginning. This is what we really are and what we very rarely feel in ourselves. It is the soul that is reborn in the process of reincarnations, gradually maturing through the knowledge and Love of our mortal Something, since Something is connected with the soul.

- Anastasia NOVICH "Sensei I"

“If the blind are allowed to feel their way, be patient, my Cicero, while I take a few more steps in this chaos, leaning on your hand. Let us give ourselves, first of all, the pleasure of casting a glance at all existing systems.

I am the body, the soul does not exist.
I am the soul and there are no bodies.
I have a spirit soul in my body.
I am a spirit soul with my own body.
My soul is the sum total of my five senses.
My soul is a sixth sense.
My soul is an unknown substance, the essence of which is thinking, feeling.
My soul is part of the universal soul. souls not exists at all.

I am the body, the soul does not exist. This seems very rude to me. [...]

When I obey the orders of my general and others obey my orders, the will of my general and my own do not come from the bodies that set other bodies in motion according to the laws of this latter. Reasoning is not the sound of a trumpet. The command is given to me by reason, and by reason I obey. This expression of will, this will which I execute, is neither a cube nor a sphere, it has no form and contains nothing material in itself. So, I can consider it immaterial. I can believe that there is something that is not matter.

Only souls exist, not bodies. This position is very refined and subtle: if you believe it, matter is just a ghost! But it is enough to eat and drink or feel the impact of a stone on the tip of your finger to believe in matter.

I have a spirit soul in my body. How! I? Am I a casket in which a creature should be placed that does not take up any space? Am I, the extended one, supposed to be the case of an unextended being? Am I the owner of something that no one ever sees, does not feel, about which one cannot have the slightest idea, any idea? It is certainly a great impertinence to boast of the possession of such a treasure. And how am I able to have it when all my ideas so often come to me against my will during my waking hours and in my sleep? The funny master of his ideas is a being who is constantly curbed by them.

The spirit soul owns my body. This is even more impudent on the part of the soul: it can order my body to stop the rapid flow of its blood as much as it likes, to straighten out all its internal movements - the body never obeys it. She owns a very recalcitrant living being.

My soul is the sum of all my feelings. It is very difficult to understand and, therefore, to explain. The sound of the lyre, the touch, the smell, the sight, the taste of an African or Persian apple, seems to have little to do with proof. Archimedes; I do not see for certain how the principle acting in me can be the result of five other principles. I dream of understanding it, but I don't understand anything here at all. I am able to think without a nose; I can think without taste, without sight, and even if I lose my sense of touch. Thus, my thought is not the result of something that can be gradually taken away from me. I admit that I do not flatter myself that I would have ideas if I were always deprived of all my five senses; but I will not be persuaded that my ability to think is the result of the five combined potencies, for I continue to think when I lose them one by one.

The soul is the sixth sense. There is something fascinating about this system. But what do these words mean? Do they claim that the nose is a creature that sniffs on its own, regardless of anything? However, the most trustworthy philosophers say: the soul smells with the nose, looks with the eyes, and it is inherent in all five senses. In this case, if there were a sixth sense, it would also be present in it, and this unknown being, called the soul, would be present in six senses instead of five. And what would it mean then: the soul is a feeling? These words do not explain anything, except that the soul is the ability to feel and think; but it is precisely such a faculty that we must investigate.

My soul is an unknown substance whose essence lies in thinking and feeling. This almost brings us back to the idea: the soul is the sixth sense; however, under such an assumption, it is rather a mode, an accident, a capacity, and not a substance.

Unknown- I agree, but I cannot agree with the fact that the soul is a substance. If it were a substance, its essence would be feeling and thought, just as the essence of matter is extension and density. In this case, the soul would continuously feel and think, just as matter is always dense and voluminous.

Meanwhile, it is reliably known that we do not always think and feel. One must be ridiculously stubborn to claim that in deep sleep, when we are not even dreaming, we have ideas and feelings. A substance that loses its essence during half of its existence is something far-fetched, just a chimera. My soul is a part of the universal soul. This statement is more balanced. This idea flatters our vanity; it makes us gods Part of the deity is also a deity, just as part of the air is air or a drop of the ocean has the same nature as the ocean itself. However, this deity is funny, born between the bladder and the rectum, spending nine months in a state of absolute non-existence, emerging into the world without any knowledge, without any activity, and remaining for a number of months in this position; often it comes out of this state only to disappear forever, and lives only to commit all sorts of misdeeds.

I am not at all so arrogant as to consider myself a part of God. Alexander turned himself into God. Let Caesar also become God, if he wants: good luck! Anthony and nycomedes may become its high priests, Cleopatra- the high priestess. But I make no claim to that honor.

There is no soul at all. This system - the most daring, the most striking of all - is fundamentally and simpler than others. Tulip, rose - these garden masterpieces of nature - are generated, according to this system, by the action of an incomprehensible mechanism and do not have a soul at all. The movement that creates everything is not at all a soul, not a thinking being. Insects that have life do not seem to us endowed with that thinking entity, which is called the soul. We willingly allow in animals an instinct that we do not understand, but we deny them a soul that we understand much less. Another step - and the person will also be without a soul.

But what shall we put in its place? Movement, sensations, ideas, wills, etc. every individual. However, where will these sensations, ideas, expressions of will come from in an organized body? Yes, from his organs; they will owe their existence to a higher mind that animates all nature: this mind was supposed to give all well-organized living beings the abilities that we can call the soul; and we have the power to think without having a soul, just as we have the power to produce movements without being this movement ourselves. Who knows whether, more than other systems, such a system is worthy of God? No other system seems to place us more faithfully in the hands of God. But I confess that I am afraid that this system will turn a person into a mere mechanism.
Let's examine this hypothesis and criticize it like everyone else."

Voltaire, Letters of Memmius to Cicero / Philosophical Works, M., "Science", 1996, p. 345-348.

(394 - 322 BC)

First of all, Aristotle revised Plato's approach to the soul. From his point of view, the separation of the soul and body is an impossible and meaningless act, since the “idea”, “concept” cannot be a real physical object, which is a person. Based on the inseparability of the soul from the body, Aristotle gave his interpretation of the soul - the soul is a form of realization of a body capable of life, cannot exist without a body and is not a body. Explaining this approach, Aristotle says that if we wanted to find the soul of the eye, then vision would become it, i.e. the soul is the essence of this object, expressing the purpose of its existence. Matter without a soul is pure potentiality, it is nothing and at the same time can become everything, like molten metal that has not yet taken a definite form. But if cast in the shape of a sword, or a knife, or a hammer, it immediately acquires a purpose that can be determined from its shape. Thus, the soul really cannot exist without the body, since the form is always the form of something.

He wrote that there are three types of soul - plant, animal and rational. Each of them has certain functions. Thus, the vegetative soul is capable of reproduction and nourishment. In addition to these, the animal soul has four more functions - aspiration (feelings), movement, sensation and memory. And the rational soul, which only man has, also has the ability to think. Each higher form of the soul builds on the previous one, acquiring the functions that were inherent in it. Therefore, if the plant soul has only two functions, then the animal soul has six, and the rational soul has seven. Thus, the idea first appeared in psychology genesis, development, although this is not yet development in the process of human life or humanity, but the development of the psyche during the transition from one form of life to another - from plants to the animal world and to man.
The initial education of Aristotle was reflected not only in his thoughts about the connection of higher forms of life with elementary ones, but also in the fact that he correlated the development of an individual organism with the development of the entire living world. At the same time, in an individual person, during his transformation from an infant into a mature being, those steps are repeated that the entire organic world has passed in its history. In this generalization, in an embryonic form, the idea was laid, which was later called biogeneticby law.
Considering the connection between the types and abilities of the soul, Aristotle emphasized that all these functions cannot be carried out without the body. Indeed, it is impossible to feel, move or strive for something without possessing a material shell. From this, Aristotle concluded that both plant and animal souls are mortal, i.e. appear and disappear simultaneously with the body.
It would seem that based on these considerations, Aristotle should have come to the idea of ​​the mortality of the rational soul. But then he would have to conclude that all the knowledge that is in the soul is formed only in the process of a person's life, dying with him. However, not only his pedagogical experience, but also the research activities in which he was engaged, proved that a person cannot exist in the world without using the knowledge that was accumulated before him. If people could not transfer knowledge to each other, they would have to invent, rediscover laws already discovered by someone. At the same time, a person would not only not be able to come up with something essentially new, but simply would not be able to live in a complex world. Thus, for Aristotle and the psychology of that time, it was clear that a person not only lives in the space of culture, but is also its bearer in his soul.
Then a natural question arose about how the knowledge discovered by others becomes the property of a particular person. Plato and Socrates found the answer to this question based on the assumption that this knowledge is in the human soul from birth, and learning, reading books only help to update them. Aristotle shared the same point of view, since from the position of science of that time he could not explain the fact of internalization of knowledge external to man. On the contrary, his observations showed that someone else's experience, gleaned through reading, lectures, even by a respected teacher, does not become one's own for a person, does not convince him, but at best helps to cope with a certain problem or forms behavior that persists only if there is control. The possibility of internalization, emotional mediation in the process of cultural appropriation was not yet discovered at that time, and therefore Aristotle came to the conclusion, natural for that time, about the existence of innate knowledge, i.e., about the immortality and immateriality of the rational soul.