List of Russian heroes of the Chechen war. Which Russian generals performed best in the First Chechen

The first Russian general to be awarded the title of Hero of Russia even before the end of the First Chechen War was Colonel General Anatoly Romanov. In July 1995, he, being the commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, headed the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic.
Anatoly Alexandrovich served in this position for less than three months - in October 1995, the convoy, which included the general's car, was blown up in Grozny by a radio-controlled landmine. Romanov survived, having received severe injuries. He is still undergoing treatment in a military hospital. Anatoly Alexandrovich, in addition to the medical staff themselves, is supported by relatives, all these years his wife Larisa has always been there.
Anatoly Alexandrovich was a brilliant negotiator who worked hard and fruitfully to peacefully resolve the military conflict in Chechnya.
A. A. Romanov received the highest title of Russia a month after the assassination attempt. Earlier, in 1994, he was awarded the Order of Military Merit. Anatoly Alexandrovich has the “Krapovy Beret” (April 1995, for the development of special forces of the explosives). These are only the awards that General Romanov received during the First Chechen War. Previously, there were the Orders of the Red Star (1988) and For Personal Courage (1993), the medal For Impeccable Service, and commemorative medals.
For the heroism shown in the First Chechen campaign, the Star of the Hero was received by another general of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation - Major General Nikolai Skrypnik, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasian District VV. Nikolai Vasilyevich replaced his seriously wounded predecessor at his post, Skrypnik led the tactical grouping of the Internal Troops in Chechnya.
In the summer of 1996, in the area of ​​​​one of the Chechen villages, under the direct supervision of N.V. Skrypnik, units Russian troops carried out an operation to destroy a large gang of militants led by field commander Doku Makhaev. Skrypnik's armored personnel carrier, just like General Romanov's UAZ, was blown up by a radio-controlled landmine. The mortally wounded general did not live even an hour, dying without regaining consciousness.
The title of Hero of Russia was posthumously awarded to him after the formal end of the First Chechen campaign, in November 1996.

Chechen generals ... The first general of the Russian (tsarist) army from the Chechens is Alexander Chechensky (1776-1834), who, as a boy, was picked up by Russian soldiers in the village of Aldy (in the homeland of Sheikh Mansur), which was deserted after a brutal raid by punishers, and taken to Russia . In captivity, he was brought up by the future hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, Nikolai Raevsky (from the nobility). In the first years of military service (since 1794), he fought in the Caucasus as part of the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment stationed in Kizlyar (participated in expeditions against the Persians in the Caspian Sea and the Ottoman Turks in the Black Sea region), later he took part in battles with the troops of Napoleon (Battle of Borodino). In 1822 he was promoted to major general in cavalry (with the appointment to stand under the head of the 2nd Hussar Division). Cavalier of the so-called "Order of St. George IV degree with a bow." Alexander Chechensky (from the historical story of the same name by Umar Gaisultanov it is known that his Chechen name was Ali) is also considered the first Chechen who entered Moscow University (now Moscow State University) and successfully graduated from it. He was married to the daughter of the Privy Councilor at the royal court of I.M. Bychkov - Catherine, from whose marriage he had 6 children (2 sons and 4 daughters). Another Chechen general of the tsarist army, Batai Shakhmurzaev, was also taken to Russia as a child from the village of Dadi-Yurt, as you know, wiped off the face of the earth by order of the notorious conqueror of the Caucasus, General of Artillery Alexei Yermolov. In captivity, he was brought up by the future participant in the Decembrist uprising of 1825, Baron Andrei Rosen. Subsequently, he fled to Chechnya and fought against the Russians on the side of the highlanders. Became naib of Imam Shamil in Greater Chechnya (Michik). But in 1851 he went over to the side of the tsarist troops and participated in hostilities against the Imamate as part of the native militia and the translator of Prince Alexander Baryatinsky. After the end of the Russian-Caucasian war, Batai Shakhmurzaev (Shikhmirzin Botha) received more than 500 acres (about 600 hectares) of land for services to the tsar. Major-General of the tsarist army Artsu Chermoev also gained fame among the Chechen people, whose military career began in the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853-1856, when he distinguished himself in battles against the Ottoman Turks. Artsu Chermoev (Charmoin Ortsa) was the commander of the "Chechen militia" (up to 700 people), which in January 1861, as part of the expedition of General Musa Kundukhov (from Ossetians), opposed the uprising of Baisangur Benoisky in the Vedeno district, as well as the commander of the "Chechen cavalry irregular regiment, formed from among the so-called "Chechen volunteers" (about 800 people), who volunteered to fight against their co-religionists from the Ottoman Empire. The son of Artsu Chermoev, a well-known oilman and politician (chairman of the government of the Mountainous Republic) Tapa (Abdul-Mejid) Chermoev, also gained wide popularity in the Caucasus. military rank general of the Russian army. In 1901, he graduated from the Nicholas (Tsar's) Cavalry School and served in the personal convoy of Emperor Nicholas II. During the First World War 1914-1918. Tapa Chermoev (Ortsin Tapa) was an adjutant of a Chechen regiment in the so-called "Wild Division". As you know, among the Chechens there were many professional military and regular officers of the tsarist army, who glorified Russian weapons directly on the battlefields and battles. One of them was artillery general Iriskhan Aliyev, who distinguished himself during Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 (he was even appointed interim commander-in-chief of the Russian Front - instead of General Litsevich, who was out of action). And before the war with the Japanese, Aliyev commanded the 2nd West Siberian Corps of the Russian army (all this is written in the Military Encyclopedia, published in Moscow in 1907). During civil war in the North Caucasus (in 1919), the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia, Anton Denikin, appointed General Iriskhan Aliyev as the "ruler of Chechnya." Prince Inaluk Arsanukaev-Dyshninsky, a general of the tsarist army, was also a professional military man; with its capital in the mountain village of Vedeno. At the same time, Dyshninsky was the commander-in-chief and minister of foreign affairs in the government of the SKE, an alliance with which the Bolsheviks widely used against the army of Denikin's White Guards. After the actual collapse of the Emirate (due to the triumph of Soviet power in the North Caucasus) and the unexpected death of Sheikh Uzun-Khadzhi (poisoning), Prince Inaluk (aka Magomed Kamil-Khan) Arsanukaev was shot by the Bolsheviks in broad daylight right on Grozny Street (in 1921). The first general from the "Chechens" in Soviet times there was Stalin's security officer-sadist Mazlak Ushaev - one of the most hated "heroes" in the history of the Vainakhs, considered "the personification of betrayal and fierce hatred for his people." Kosterin wrote about him in his book “Across Chechnya” (1924): “... In two days I leave with a Chechen comrade for Chechnya. Comrade, Mazlak by name, an ardent atheist, and in revolutionary battles - from the age of 17. The Bolsheviks widely used the "rich experience" of the ardent atheist-Chekist Ushaev against the "abreches" in the North Caucasus and to fight the "Basmachi" in Central Asia. At the end of his anti-people activities, this terrible monster in human form was transferred from the NKVD and appointed chairman of the Supreme Court of the CHIASSR (1937), in this position he soon died a dog's death. The next Soviet general of Chechen nationality is Supyan Mollaev, who at the time of the deportation of the Vainakhs to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (February 23, 1944) served as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (the first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee of the CPSU was then Russian Ivanov). Many Chechens and Ingushs tend to blame Mollaev for the tragedy of 1944, who did not show proper integrity and decisiveness at the most critical and crucial moment in the history of the Vainakh people and was unable to protect the republic from the punitive sword of the NKVD, as did, for example, the leader of Dagestan Daniyalov. The first Soviet Chechen general after the restoration of the CHIASSR was the long-range aviation pilot Dzhokhar Dudayev, originally from the high-mountain village of Yalkhara (Galanchozhsky district), who retired in 1990 and headed the Executive Committee of the OKCHN. In October 1991, Dudayev was elected the first President of the Chechen Republic (Nokhchichoy), in whose post at the end of the First RCV (April 21, 1996) he became the immortal Shahid. The CRI parliament posthumously awarded Dzhokhar Dudayev (Dudin Musin ZhovkhIar) the highest military rank of the Chechen state - Generalissimo. So, Dudayev deservedly opens in recent history CRI is a list of Chechen generals who devoted their lives to serving their native Fatherland, and not to an enemy state, and in this respect has nothing to do with the characters in our story. At the decline of Soviet power, another general (through the Ministry of Internal Affairs) was Aslambek Aslakhanov, a graduate of the Kharkov Institute of Public Catering, originally from Novye Atagi, who became famous for shamelessly betraying the interests of the Chechen people, who restored their state independence in 1991 (Aslakhanov’s anti-people activities were especially pronounced as the "People's Deputy" of the RSFSR from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, who held the post of "Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR on issues of legality, law and order and the fight against crime"). In 1992, the former "People's Deputy" Aslakhanov, who was left without a job after Chechnya's secession from Russia, was appointed by Yeltsin's decree "Head of the Provisional Administration of Ingushetia." In August 2000, retired police major-general Aslakhanov was "elected" as a "Deputy of the State Duma from Chechnya" (OVR faction), and in the fall of 2003, Russian President V. Putin appointed him his "assistants for the affairs of the south of Russia." Aslakhanov is also the “President” of the Association of Law Enforcement Workers of the Russian Federation and the “Chairman” of the Board of the Socio-Political Organization Union of the Peoples of Chechnya. Vakha Ibragimov from Sadoy teip, who served in the internal troops, is considered the last Soviet Chechen general. Soviet Union. He was once very influential person in shaping the Kremlin's policy in Chechnya. So, in the midst of the revolutionary events in Grozny in the fall of 1991 (after the failure of the putsch of the State Emergency Committee in Moscow), he was appointed by Yeltsin to the post of “Minister of the Interior of the CHIR”, which he never managed to take (Dudaev appointed Umalt Alsultanov to this position). At the beginning of the Second RCV, Major General of the Internal Service Ibragimov became "deputy plenipotentiary representative of the government of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic." He currently holds the position of “Director of the representative office of the Federal Agency for Construction, Housing and Communal Services in the North Caucasus” (under the direct supervision of the infamous Koshman). Ibragim Suleimenov - Major General Russian army. A native of the village Pervomaiskoye (Hyazhin-Evl) of the Vedensky district. In 1991, Lieutenant Colonel of the Soviet Army Suleimenov was "discharged" from the USSR Armed Forces and introduced by the Russian special services (through the GRU) into the inner circle of the leadership of the OKCHN IK. He served as "Chairman of the Defense Committee" in the CRI Parliament of the 1st convocation. In 1993, he created the so-called. "Committee of National Salvation", whose militias undertook a number of failed attempts to overthrow the "Dudaev regime". One of the organizers of the storming of Grozny on November 26, 1994. In December 1995, General Suleimenov was “elected” as a “Deputy of the State Duma from Chechnya” (NDR faction). Currently, he is the "military commander of the Achkhoi-Martan district" in the rank of "deputy military commander of the Chechen Republic." Hamid Inalov - major general of militia, the so-called "Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic" in the governments of Khadzhiev and Zavgaev in the First RCV. After the events of August 1991 (Operation Jihad), he fled Chechnya and lived in the Stavropol Territory. But in connection with the beginning of the Second RCV and the restoration of puppet power in the republic, General Inalov’s “experience and knowledge” were again in demand by Moscow, and he was appointed “head of the law enforcement department of the Security Council of the Chechen Republic.” Currently, the retired general works as "deputy head of the hunting (!) Economy of Chechnya." Said-Selim Peshkhoev - major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation, personnel security officer (graduate of the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR). A native of Psedakh, Malgobeksky district, CHIASSR. At the end of 2001, by decree of Russian President Putin, he was appointed "Head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic" (before that, he held the position of "Deputy Head of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic"). Currently, Peshkhoev works as "deputy plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District." “Suspicious of war crimes and genocide against CRI citizens, the use of prohibited means and methods of warfare, terrorism” (State Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes and Genocide Committed officials Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen state - PE, 28.12.2004). Ruslan Tsakaev - major general of justice, professional lawyer (graduated from the law faculty of Moscow State University). From 1991 to 1995 engaged in "socio-political activities", and from 1997 to 2002. first worked as "senior prosecutor for supervision in the internal affairs bodies of the Prosecutor General's Office of Russia", then "senior prosecutor of the department for the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation." At the end of December 2002, President Putin appointed Tsakaev Minister of the Interior of the Chechen Republic by decree (instead of Peshkhoev). In early April 2003, the "head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic" submitted a letter of resignation due to a quarrel with the "head of the Chechen Republic" Akhmat Kadyrov (officially Tsakaev was "transferred" to serve in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for family reasons), and on April 30 he "suddenly" died in the house of his relatives in Stavropol, where he was visiting (official diagnosis: extensive heart attack). So ingloriously ended the treacherous career of another Chechen collaborator. Alu Alkhanov - major general of militia. In April 2003, he became the "successor" of Tsakaev as the "Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic" (before that, he "headed" the transport police department of the Internal Affairs Directorate of Grozny with the rank of police colonel). In August 2004, general-ment Alu (aka Ali) Alkhanov became the "official successor" to Kadyrov Sr. as the "president of Chechnya." After that, he received the nickname among the people - "the successor of the dead." Bek Baskhanov - lieutenant general of justice (he is the first "Chechen" in Russia to receive the rank of lieutenant general, all other mankurts are only major generals). A native of the village Serzhen-Yurt, Shali region. A well-known national traitor and collaborator since Dudayev's times. During the first war, he served as "Prosecutor General" in the government of Zavgaev. In February 2000, he was appointed "Head of the Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for the Chechen Republic" in the government of Koshman, and later became the "Minister of Justice of the Chechen Republic" in the government of Kadyrov. Cavalier of the Order of Courage. Baskhanov's grandson is married to the daughter of the same Yegorov, who during the first war was appointed by Yeltsin as his plenipotentiary in Chechnya, and is the representative of Krasnodarbank on the island of Cyprus. Rudnik Dudayev is a major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation, a personnel security officer with many years of experience in the KGB of the USSR, a native Muscovite. In the late 1990s headed the so-called. "Association of External Relations of Muslim Organizations of the CIS", patronized by the Supreme Mufti of Russia Talgat Tadzhuddin. In 2000, he was appointed Akhmat Kadyrov's deputy for cooperation with law enforcement agencies (before him, the work of law enforcement agencies in Chechnya was supervised by Beslan Gantamirov, who resigned these duties in connection with his appointment as mayor of Grozny). Later, Rudnik (aka Abdul-Rashid) Dudayev became "Secretary of the Economic and Public Security Council of the Chechen Republic." AT recent times in the "government circles" of the Chechen Republic, rumors are actively circulating about the appointment of Rudnik Dudayev as "commissioner for human rights in the Chechen Republic" (if this really happens, then the FSB general will become the "Chechen ombudsman" for the first time - such a title is unlikely even the Russian ombudsman Vladimir Lukin has ). Musa Umarov - major general of militia. In Dudayev's time, he held responsible positions in the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, including the position of deputy minister, and in April 1993 he was even appointed acting. Minister of Security of the Republic (but at the most crucial moment he defected to the camp of the opposition). In December 2003, he was appointed "representative of the State Council of the Chechen Republic in the Federation Council" (instead of Adnan Muzykaev, who was recalled from the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation because "he was practically unable to solve the problems of the Chechen Republic and did not maintain contact with the State Council"). Prior to his appointment as a senator, General Umarov worked as chairman of the board of directors of the Moscow Red Cloth Factory. In the Federation Council, the former “cloth director” is now an ordinary member of the committee on legal and judicial issues. Umar Avturkhanov - major general of the tax police, professional military man (graduated from the Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Combined Arms Command School). Since December 1991 - Chairman of the so-called. "Provisional Committee for the Administration of the Nadterechny District of the Chechen Republic". In April 1992 he was "elected" mayor of the Nadterechny district. Since 1992 - co-chairman of the party "Marsho" ("Freedom"), a member of the leadership of the bloc of anti-Dudaev parties and movements " Round table". In December 1993, he was elected chairman of the so-called. "Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic" (this mythical structure became a kind of "legislative body" in the constitutional field of the Russian Federation, which legalized the entry of occupation troops into the territory of a sovereign republic exactly a year later). Participated in organizing opposition protests against the "Dudaev regime" in Grozny in May-June 1993 and the assault on the Chechen capital on November 26, 1994. In March 1995, he was elected chairman of the so-called. Committee of National Consent of Chechnya. After the events of August 1991, he fled Chechnya and lived in Moscow. On the personal instructions of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, he was assigned to work in Federal Service tax police as a "deputy head of the director" (he oversaw the department of physical protection and fire safety), but in April 1999 he was dismissed. Currently, the former tax general Avturkhanov earns his living by working as "president of the International Academy of Construction and Ecology." Umar-Pasha Khanaliev - Major General of the FSB. Originally from the city of Khasav-Yurt (Dagestan), an ethnic Chechen-Akkin. In the First RCV, he was "Deputy Head of the Khasavyurt Regional Department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Dagestan." Currently, he works in the central office of the FSB of the Russian Federation in Lubyanka. “Suspicious of war crimes against CRI citizens, terrorism, murders, torture and kidnappings, attacks on persons and institutions that enjoy international protection, complicity in the murder of the first President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev” (State Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes and Genocide Committed by Officials persons of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen state - PE, 12/28/2004). Mairbek Khusiev - Major General of the FSB of the Russian Federation, works as "head of the Nadterechny FSB of Chechnya." Known for his bloodthirstiness to fellow tribesmen and co-religionists. In September 2004, with his personal participation, close relatives of the CRI President Aslan Maskhadov were abducted and taken to Khankala. Akhmed Kelimatov is the infamous “police colonel” of the times of Dudayev-Maskhadov, a failed “commander”, who, until the beginning of the Second RCV, pretended to be “First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic”. And with the beginning of a new aggression of the Russian Federation against the CRI in the summer of 1999, he “unexpectedly” changed his place of “work” and became “deputy chairman of the Adamallah-Humanity” UPD, headed by the impostor Caliph Adam Deniyev. After the destruction of his boss, the "prophet", the "human cop" Kelimatov found another like-minded person and ideological patron in the person of the notorious communist writer Prokhanov and immediately retrained as "people's writers". He even wrote and published in Moscow a “book of memoirs” under a long and frightening title - “Chechnya: in the claws of the devil or on the way to self-destruction (history, arguments and facts through the eyes of an eyewitness” (Ecoprint publishing house, 2003).

Hot August 96th

The history of mankind is the history of betrayal. From the creation of the world and the first people of Adam and his son Cain to the present day, little has changed. This is especially noticeable in war, when the human spirit is subjected to special tests.

As once in the 41st ...

It all started in the early morning of August 6th. The militants, numbering about 1,000 people, who had accumulated in advance and concentrated in the city, suddenly attacked the railway station, the commandant's offices of Grozny, the Government House, the building of the FSB of the republic, the Coordination Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and almost all checkpoints.

The militants are firing

At the same time, hundreds of armed people gathered in advance in the suburban villages began to arrive in the city in an organized manner, safely bypassing the posts, some of which had been eliminated the day before as part of the Moscow and Nazran agreements. For the sake of truth, we must admit the fact: more than 130 roads lead to Grozny. Only 33 were directly under the control of the federal forces at that time, it is believed that there were not enough people for more.

Grozny Map

Subsequently, the total number of militants in Grozny reached 4-6 thousand people. They were led by the most experienced commanders headed by Maskhadov: Basaev, Gelaev, Israpilov, Khattab. A very serious "mess" was being brewed (the separatists gave it a loud name - operation "Jihad"), which could have been avoided, but, unfortunately, our guys had to disentangle. How could this happen?

A long time later, a document prepared in the bowels of the headquarters of Alexander Lebed, who in 1996 was the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, caught my eye. It contains, in my opinion, wording that reflects the essence of the current situation, to which not only the soldiers and officers of the group of forces in Chechnya, its commander, but, perhaps, the president himself have become hostages. I will quote a few paragraphs from the document: “The tension in Grozny did not decrease. The significant forces of law and order concentrated here provided only the appearance of maintaining public safety and protecting citizens from criminal encroachments. At night, the city, in essence, passed under the control of criminal elements and militants who penetrated into residential areas, since the patrol service and visits to the scene of incidents by the internal affairs bodies were not carried out during this period. So the "suddenness" was quite predictable. In addition, military intelligence reported on the impending attack, sparingly shared information from the FSB, and the information received through its channels was reported to the top by the opera of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It is difficult, and hardly appropriate, to cite the chronology of those tragic days. Events developed on the rise, with kaleidoscopic diversity and speed. Today they are quite honestly and clearly recorded and reflected in a variety of documents: from summaries and reports to documentaries and memoirs. At the same time, there are still “white spots” in this dark story, which is yet to be shed light on. I will try to supplement this very colorful picture with my modest strokes of what I saw, heard, experienced, and thought about.

Leave to return

According to the plan of the command of the United Group, the defense of Grozny was entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was believed that there were about 12,000 law enforcement officers in the city (of which no more than 6,000 were servicemen of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The troops, mainly units of the 101st and 34th separate operational brigades (obron), stationed in the former 15th military camp, guarded 22 checkpoints, 5 commandant's offices and 2 commandant's stations; several detachments of OMON and SOBR reinforced the commandant's offices and administrative buildings. There were also several formations of the Zavgaev militia in the city. True, even the day before, just for August 6, an operation was planned in the suburbs of the Chechen capital, and part of these forces was withdrawn from Grozny. Army units with heavy equipment and weapons, for the most part, according to the orders of the command, were in the south of the republic.

101st defense

In the film of the famous TV journalist Alexander Sladkov “Shooting August”, the then acting commander of the United Group, Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovsky (instead of Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, who had gone on vacation), admitted that he did not have enough to figure out the fidelity of such a decision on the alignment of forces. time, no authority - such a disposition was approved at the very top. I have not been able to determine the author of such a plan with absolute accuracy. Let the late Boris Nikolayevich, who approved such a decision, most likely without reading it, be the “extreme” one.

We, the officers of the 8th detachment of the special forces of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia "Rus", in which I was in Chechnya at that time, did not have the opportunity to master all the information, although our intelligence officers, wandering around the republic daily, brought news, the essence of which was reduced to the next - the silence that was established at the beginning of the summer, after the declarative statement of Boris Nikolayevich that, they say, "the war is over, that's enough, we've fought" was deceptive. By the way, our detachment is directly related to this propaganda and political action. During the famous May visit of President Yeltsin to the republic, a column of our armored personnel carriers “accidentally” caught the eye of the Supreme Commander, imitating the withdrawal of troops. Yeltsin, it seems, really believed then that "the process has begun", signing on the armor of one of our "boxes" a decree on reducing the service life of soldiers who served in Chechnya. And then the column, having made a detour, returned to the base - the war continued for us.

Yeltsin in Chechnya

The very beginning of this last operation of the first Chechen campaign found me in Rostov-on-Don, where I had flown on a business trip from still “peaceful” Chechnya just the day before. I returned a couple of days later in a completely different environment. The first thing I saw on the take-off of the Severny airport was cars standing in a row, from where they carried out a stretcher wrapped in foil. There were many. Somebody's legs, shod in sneakers of the 45th size, ran into my memory, going beyond the dimensions of the stretcher. I confess I was scared...

There is nothing to counterattack

We know the results of those heavy battles, which, however, we do not like to remember, but we must learn to face the truth: an almost complete loss of control over the city, a large number of dead and wounded, a blow to the prestige of the state and its security forces. However, this formal truth also has a kind of lining, consisting of thousands of "truths" of direct participants in the defense of Grozny.

One of the groups of our detachment, led by Captain Alexander Iglin in the amount of no more than 20 people, on August 6 was in the Coordination Center (CC) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was located next to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB near the Dynamo stadium. The place is not the best even for conducting active defense, and even more so for deploying almost a counteroffensive, which General Pulikovsky blamed the policemen in the mentioned film. The KC itself is a closed building with “checkpoints”, a building surrounded by houses with an adjacent territory, surrounded by a concrete fence and the only entrance gate. From equipment - a pair of detachment BTR-80 - and that's it! True, as expected in large headquarters, there were many generals and officers who knew how to hold weapons in their hands.

The senior chief at the facility was the First Deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Militia Colonel-General Pavel Golubets. Later, he was accused of having removed himself from management, did not lead the defense of the city, and the forces entrusted to him. There were objective reasons for this: shortly after the start of intense fighting, the government communications line failed, which disrupted the unit control system. Yes, and what could be done when the enemy simultaneously attacked almost all the facilities where military personnel and police officers were serving, and the air was filled with pleas for help, screams of the wounded, curses against the militants and higher leadership, and squabbles.

In addition, outright "misinformation" was also broadcast on the radio channels, alternating with Maskhadov's appeal to the federal forces and Chechen policemen with a demand to lay down their arms. For example, there was information that the latter fled or completely went over to the side of the militants, which was not true: there were traitors and cowards among them, but those who remained faithful to the oath steadfastly defended the railway station, the base of the Chechen OMON, the location of the 2nd regiment of the PPSM of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Russia in the Czech Republic. At the same time, it is worth recognizing that the bandits managed, especially at first, to disorganize the work of managing units. However, it is, of course, impossible to talk about widespread panic, manifestations of cowardice or wholesale drunkenness of servicemen and employees who suddenly found themselves surrounded. My archive contains video footage, audio recordings of radio conversations, from which it becomes clear with impartial accuracy who did what, including the leadership.

KC Ministry of Internal Affairs and the entire so-called. the government quarter came under intense attack. Using 100% knowledge of the area, having studied all the approaches and weak spots defense, the militants cut communications, which were shot through, made several attempts to break into the territory of the KC. This was prevented by the competent actions of his defenders. Captain Iglin, as soon as it became known what was happening in the city, put a secret of two fighters on the roof of a nearby building. Their task was to monitor the situation around and, most importantly, the approaches to the KC and inform the commander by radio station.

The militants made their first serious attack around 6 p.m. on August 6. Prior to that, the bandits fired at the special forces from sniper rifles all day long. A group of militants advancing from furniture factory, secret noticed in time. They were fired from underbarrel grenade launchers, the fire was successfully corrected by fighters who were in secret. Several attackers were wounded, the assault organized by them was thwarted. By 23.00, when it was already dark, the militants again tried to attack the positions of the special forces. And again they ran into competent resistance. Underbarrel grenade launchers were used, and at the windows of the main post office, from where they were shooting especially densely, a detachment armored personnel carrier fired several long bursts. The attack was repulsed. But confident in their numerical and moral superiority, the militants launched a third assault around one in the morning. Radio interception showed: the bandits believed that there was almost no one to defend the object, everyone fled and therefore attacked furiously, went into the open. And again they stumbled upon an organized rebuff. No more assault attempts were made, but all the defenders were kept under the supervision of a sniper and machine gunners. By the way, the object was never handed over to the enemy.

Fighting in Grozny

According to eyewitnesses, the situation in the neighboring buildings of the FSB and the Department for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was worse. There, the bandits even managed to capture the lower floors, and the fighting went on inside the buildings. I had to call in aviation, which also carried big losses: in the very first hours of the attack, militants shot down three helicopters.

Prolonged "Minute"

Another facet of the truth, its separate page, is the feat of soldiers and officers of the 34th Armored Forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who defended two GPs in the area of ​​Minutka Square and the so-called. "Romanovsky bridge". They fought for two weeks in complete encirclement, suffering losses (only 10 people died and died from wounds), experiencing serious problems due to lack of ammunition, medicines, food and water. The militants several times offered them to leave the buildings they held, guaranteeing safety, but the officers refused, hoping that they had not been forgotten, that the situation would soon be reversed and the victims they had suffered would not be in vain.

Soldiers of the 34th defense are fighting in the area of ​​Minutka Square

And only when the defenders heard on the TV, reanimated with the help of tank batteries, that the main news of the day was the inauguration of the president, and “the situation in the Chechen capital is normalizing and being under control,” the defenders began to doubt that they were right. As a participant in those battles, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Polyakov later recalled: “Something inside us broke then, I won’t hide it. There were questions that had not arisen before. Why do we put boys? ... In general, the day after that “political information”, those who led the defense of the VOP began negotiations with Khunkar Israpilov, who got in touch, the field commander on whom lay general leadership the actions of militants in the Minutka area ... It was not about surrendering, but about our ability to freely go to our own, along with weapons, the wounded and the bodies of the fallen. Which ultimately happened on August 19th.”

The language does not turn to accuse these soldiers and officers of treason or cowardice (although such attempts were later made by the competent authorities). They did more than was required of them, because some other defended objects fell much earlier. And the will of the defenders was broken by the indifference to their destinies, shown on the “box” of the country; the confusion of the command, the lack of will of the top leadership of the state and the clearly treacherous position of the media. It's no secret that during the attack on the city, journalists from the leading Russian TV channels found themselves in one of the basements of the attacked government buildings, from where, without sticking their noses out, they broadcast panic messages about the surrender of the city. I myself remember this moment very well: the commandant's offices, including the KC MVD, are fighting with might and main, and the journalists have already “surrendered” them! It is hard to imagine a better service rendered to the enemy, because the panic, reflected like an echo in the thousand-voiced crooked mirrors of the media, is capable of bringing down even a stronger defense!

Keyword - betrayal

And then the chief peacekeeper of the country, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Alexander Lebed, arrived in Chechnya, with the wish of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who was tired of the war, to stop it and with great authority. I personally, neither then, nor even now, had any objections to this, and I did not really believe in the effectiveness of the ultimatum of the generals Pulikovsky - Tikhomirov, announced to Maskhadov the day before: to leave the encircled city within 48 hours. There were good reasons to doubt. Until very recently, the bandits managed to leave the encirclement more than once. Yes, and in other cases, when the militants were strongly pressed, the command “cease fire” and “enter into negotiations” immediately came, so I did not flatter myself with illusions that this time it would be somehow different.

Tikhomirov and Kulikov in Khankala. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko

But at what cost the next assault on the city would cost, I soon became convinced when I left with one of the groups of the detachment for negotiations, which were actively conducted between the parties to the conflict from the second half of August. On one of the streets of Grozny along the route of movement (in my opinion, Gudermesskaya) we came across a broken military column: gnawed skeletons of infantrymen with burnt-out wombs of airborne squads; unwound spools of caterpillars resembling the tails of dead alligators; spent shell casings, a helmet pierced by a bullet ...

The streets are deserted, there is dead silence, and on both sides of the road there are five-story buildings, from which, it seemed, death was watching us. One after another, the commands were passed: “do not open fire” and “do not jump onto the roadside”, which turned out to be mined. And then, as if from under the ground, armed people appeared, shaking their machine guns and greeting us with a victorious cry: “Allahu Akbar!”. Personally, I had a depressing feeling of moral superiority over us by the enemy, who was not at all going to capitulate.

During the negotiations, in which the well-known field commander Aslanbek Ismailov participated on the part of the militants, I managed to talk with some Chechens from his external guard. They celebrated victory and did not hide it. Barely restrained gloating and feigned nobility of "real warriors" is a typical appearance of the Chechen militia of that period.

I remember several episodes. I, not forgetting about the machine gun, tried to capture on photo and video cameras historical event. Many bandits posed, making characteristic gestures. One of them showed a cockade with a wolf on a cap and added that they were made in Russia, naming a specific factory. Another showed us a “Chechen body armor”, shouting “Allahu Akbar!” three times, assuring us that he was not afraid to die. There was one among them who, sincerely rejoicing at the victory, invited me to visit him. Just like Hasek: "at 6 pm after the war." It is impossible not to mention the children scurrying around everywhere, harassing us with chants on the theme “Allahu Akbar”.

I’ll be lying if, for the sake of completeness, I don’t mention the Chechen woman, who treated both us and the militants with homemade pies, which we unanimously refused (we don’t sell for gingerbread), gloomily remaining faithful to the oath. However, we had no reason to have fun: in addition to everything else, yesterday, in the area of ​​​​the 13th checkpoint, our comrade - intelligence officer, Sergeant Andrey Vasilenko, died in an ambush, on whom I had written a submission for awarding him the medal "For Courage" the day before.

Soldiers with the body of the deceased A. Vasilenko. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko

Another characteristic picture of those days that remains in my memory is the eyes of Chechen policemen who remained loyal to Russia. They were taken with their families and miserable belongings to Khankala. They wandered around the base lost, not knowing where to put themselves, because they could not return home. When I caught their distant gaze, I could not endure it for a long time, because we once again betrayed them. But they betrayed us in turn.

Betrayal is generally the key word for understanding this war. , the script of which, it seems to me, was written in advance, in the silence of high offices far from here. It seemed that the very hot to the limit, all-penetrating air of the Chechen capital was saturated with betrayal, dooming all our victories to defeat in advance. Indulged and sold (not without reason in Russian these words are so similar) not only defense plans or weapons, but also the soldiers themselves, officers, ordinary people, the interests of the state ... Wholesale and retail.

The late Alexander Lebed has been appointed to the role of one of the main traitors to the interests of the country. But I believe that he himself was sincere in his desire to bring peace to a weary country. Alexander Ivanovich's misfortune was that he was "drifted" in order, and he did not want to share the laurels of a peacemaker with anyone else, opening (as he really wanted) the way to the presidency. And in order to achieve this goal, he was ready for a lot. As time has shown - a lot. The victims of the ambitious Secretary of the Security Council were not only the army put on a short leash, and then actually expelled from Chechnya, but also Russia itself, its international prestige, which suffered as a result of the shameful Khasavyurt Treaty, is akin to the obscene Brest Treaty. I am sure that even by negotiating with the separatists, it was possible to beautifully get out of a difficult situation without losing face, while maintaining the status of a great power. Unfortunately, General Lebed, who fought well in Afghanistan and stopped the bloodshed in Transnistria, was much better than Lebed, a diplomat.

Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed

The signing of the Khasavyurt peace

Subsequent events showed that it is impossible to solve the "Chechen question" without taking into account the opinion of the Chechens and at the expense of the Chechens themselves . The times when Russian generals such as Alexei Yermolov, Yakov Baklanov or Soviet marshals such as Lavrenty Beria did politics in the Caucasus, catching up fear on the natives, have irrevocably gone. This was quickly understood when the new leader of Russia came to power (let me remind you, a retired FSB colonel), who, having shown outstanding diplomatic skills, managed to find the right and, probably, the only right solution.

Minutka Square area today

To judge who, in the end, was a hero, and who was a traitor; who is right and who is not, there will be God and descendants . But even repeatedly betrayed, Russian soldiers and officers continued to demonstrate high morale, believing in the coming victory. In confirmation, I will give a few known fact: the last to leave Chechnya were the soldiers of the 101st armored troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (brigade commander - Colonel Yuri Zavizionov), whose losses were the largest - over 80 people, took with them the symbol of Victory, the T-tank, standing on a pedestal in the former military town of the tank division 34. And on the armor of their "boxes" leaving Chechnya under the hooting of the crowd, these people, deadly tired of the war, hiding their resentment deep in their hearts, wrote: "Let her be wrong, but this is our Motherland!"

And while the feeling of faith in Russia among its defenders is indestructible, we cannot be defeated.

P.S. As a result of the fighting in Grozny from August 6 to August 23, 1996, according to generalized data obtained from various sources, we lost up to 2080 people (almost 500 killed, over 1400 wounded, more than 180 missing). On the streets of the city, up to 18 tanks, 61 infantry fighting vehicles, 8 armored personnel carriers, 30 vehicles were burned, 4 helicopters were shot down. The losses of militants in manpower exceeded ours by 2-3 times.

Eternal memory to the soldiers of the Fatherland who fell in those battles!

Roman Ilyushchenko - reserve lieutenant colonel, combat veteran

Corpses in the back of a truck in Grozny. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." On the same day, units of the Joint Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began fighting in Chechnya. Maybe some of the participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but hardly any of them suspected that they would get stuck in this war for almost two years. And then it will come back again.

I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main actors, about the number of casualties, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs must be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.

Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, back in November, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens.


Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev

Dudayev's militants pray in front of the Presidential Palace in Grozny


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

In January 1995, the palace looked like this:


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Dudayev's militant with a submachine gun handicraft at the beginning of January 1995. In Chechnya in those years they gathered different types weapons, including small arms.

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Padded BMP-2 of the Russian army


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel falling into a gas pipe

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Action


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Field commander Shamil Basayev rides in a bus with hostages


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Chechen fighters ambushed a column of Russian armored vehicles


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

On the eve of the new year 1995, the clashes in Grozny were especially cruel. The 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade lost many soldiers.

The militants fire back from the advancing Russian units.


Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG

Children play in the suburbs of Grozny


AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY

Chechen fighters in 1995


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP

Photo: Christopher Morris

Minutka Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees.

Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm.

A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in Grozny's central park. February 6, 1995


Photo: Reuters

Intersection of Rosa Luxembourg and Tamanskaya streets


Photo: Christopher Morris

Chechen fighters run for cover


Photo: Christopher Morris

Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995


Photo: Christopher Morris

Trapped in a ruined building Chechen sniper aims at Russian military personnel. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

Chechen negotiator enters the neutral zone


Photo: James Nachtwey

Children from the orphanage play on a damaged Russian tank. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

An elderly woman makes her way through the ruined center of Grozny. 1996


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Chechen militant holding a machine gun while praying


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during the operation of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows.


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Russian checkpoint near the Council of Ministers, 1995


Photo: AP Photo

People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny cook on a fire in the middle of the street


Photo: AP Photo / Alexander Zemlianichenko

People are fleeing the war zone

Photo: AP Photo / David Brauchli

The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict, up to 12 thousand fighters fought for it. Many of them were in fact children who went to war after their relatives.


Photo: AP Photo / Efrem Lukatsky

On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform


Photo: Christopher Morris

By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was a ruin


Photo: AP Photo / Mindaugas Kulbis

Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996


Photo: AP Photo

A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed in a rocket attack on federal troops on April 21, 1996


Photo: AP Photo

Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and in front of the soldiers signed a decree on the reduction of military service.


Photo: AP Photo

Election campaign

Photo: Piotr Andrews

On August 19, 1996, the commander of the grouping of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He suggested that civilians leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was to begin, but the commander was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted.

On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt under which Russia undertook to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, field commander of Chechen fighters and the future "president" of the CRI, are shaking hands.

Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny

Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords

According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War.


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was.


Photo: AP Photo / Misha Japaridze

The Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving ruins behind them.

In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin ...

noted

Twenty years ago the First Chechen War ended. The signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996 by representatives of Russia and the Republic of Ichkeria put an end to it. According to the document, hostilities ceased, federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and the decision on the status of Chechnya was postponed until December 31, 2001. Journalist Olesya Yemelyanova talked to the participants of the first Chechen campaign about the storming of Grozny, Akhmat Kadyrov, the price of life, Chechen friends and nightmares.
source: icdn.lenta.ru

In Chechnya, there was always a feeling: “What am I doing here? Why is all this necessary? ”, But there was no other work in the 90s. My wife was the first to say to me after the first business trip: “Either me, or the war.” Where will I go? We tried not to get out of business trips, at least there we paid our salaries on time - 314 thousand. There were benefits, "combat" paid - it was a penny, I don’t remember exactly how much. And they gave me a bottle of vodka, it was sickening without it, in such situations you don’t get drunk from it, but it helped to cope with stress. I fought for a paycheck. The family is at home, it was necessary to feed it with something. I did not know any background of the conflict, I did not read anything.
Young conscripts had to be slowly soldered with alcohol. They are only after training, it is easier for them to die than to fight. Eyes run wide, heads are pulled out, they do not understand anything. They will see the blood, they will see the dead - they cannot sleep.

Murder is unnatural for a person, although he gets used to everything. When the head does not think, the body does everything on autopilot. Fighting Chechens was not as scary as fighting Arab mercenaries. They are much more dangerous, they know how to fight very well.

We were prepared for the assault on Grozny for about a week. We - 80 riot police - were supposed to storm the village of Katayama. Later we learned that there were 240 militants there. Our tasks included reconnaissance in force, and then the internal troops were supposed to replace us. But nothing happened. Ours also hit us. There was no connection. We have our own police radio, tankers have their own wave, helicopter pilots have their own. We pass the line, artillery strikes, aircraft strikes. The Chechens got scared, they thought they were some kind of fools. According to rumors, the Novosibirsk OMON was originally supposed to storm Katayama, but their commander refused. Therefore, we were thrown from the reserve to storm.
Among the Chechens, I had friends in the opposition areas. In Shali, for example, in Urus-Martan.

After the hostilities, someone drank himself, someone ended up in a madhouse - some were taken directly from Chechnya to a psychiatric hospital. There was no adaptation. The wife left immediately. I can't remember a good one. Sometimes it seems that it is better to erase all this from memory in order to live on and move forward. And sometimes you want to speak up.

Benefits seem to be, but everything is only on paper. There are no levers on how to get them. I still live in the city, it’s easier for me, but it’s impossible for rural residents. There are arms and legs - and that's good. The main trouble is that you are counting on the state, which promises you everything, and then it turns out that no one needs you. I felt like a hero, received the Order of Courage. It was my pride. Now I look at everything differently.

If I were now offered to go to war, I would probably go. It's easier there. There is an enemy and there is a friend, black and white - you stop seeing shades. And in a peaceful life, you need to twist and bend. It's tiresome. When Ukraine began, I wanted to go, but my current wife dissuaded me.

Psychologically, it was difficult, because it is often not clear whether you are a friend or an enemy. It seems that during the day a person calmly goes to work, and at night he comes out with a machine gun and fires at roadblocks. During the day you are on good terms with him, and in the evening he shoots you.
For ourselves, we divided the Chechens into lowland and mountainous. Plain more intelligent people, more integrated into our society. And those who live in the mountains have a completely different mentality, a woman is nobody for them. You ask the lady for documents for verification - and this can be perceived as a personal insult to her husband. We came across women from mountain villages who didn't even have passports.

Once, at the checkpoint at the intersection with Serzhen-Yurt, we stopped the car. A man came out of it, who had a yellow ID in English and Arabic. It turned out to be Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov. We talked quite peacefully on everyday topics. He asked if there was anything he could do to help. We then had difficulty with food, there was no bread. Then he brought two trays of loaves to us at the checkpoint. They wanted to give him money, but he did not take it.

I think that we could end the war in such a way that there would be no second Chechen one. It was necessary to go to the end, and not conclude a peace agreement on shameful terms. Many soldiers and officers then felt that the state had betrayed them.

When I returned home, I threw myself into my studies. I studied at one institute, at the same time at another, and also worked to keep my brain occupied. Then he defended his PhD thesis.

When I was a student, I was sent to a course in psychosocial care for survivors of hot spots organized by a Dutch university. I then thought that Holland had not been at war with anyone lately. But I was told that Holland participated in the Indonesian war in the late 40s - as many as two thousand people. I offered to show them as educational material videocassette from Chechnya. But their psychologists turned out to be mentally unprepared and asked not to show the recording to the audience.

Take, for example, the cash-in-transit KamAZ with money, which was standing near the headquarters of the 205th brigade when the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Bearded guys came and loaded bags of money. The FSB members allegedly gave money to the militants for the restoration of Chechnya. And we didn’t get paid, but Yeltsin gave us Zippo lighters.
For me, the real heroes are Budanov and Shamanov. My chief of staff is a hero. While in Chechnya, he managed to write scientific work about the rupture of an artillery barrel. This is a man due to whom the power of Russian weapons will become stronger. The Chechens also had heroism. They were characterized by both fearlessness and self-sacrifice. They defended their land, they were told that they were attacked.

I believe that the emergence of post-traumatic syndrome is highly dependent on the attitude of society. If they say “Yes, you are a killer!” in your eyes all the time, it can injure someone. There were no syndromes in the Great Patriotic War, because the homeland of the heroes met.

It is necessary to talk about the war from a certain angle so that people do not engage in nonsense. There will still be peace, only part of the people will be killed. And not the worst part. There is no sense from this.