The first blitzkrieg August 1914. Blitzkrieg is what the Wehrmacht miscalculated
On September 3, 1945, millions of Soviet people, having opened the Pravda newspaper, read I. V. Stalin’s appeal on its front page: “... We, people of the older generation, have been waiting for this day for forty years. And this day has come. Today, Japan has acknowledged defeat and signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender... Our Soviet people spared no effort and labor in the name of victory. We have been through difficult years. But now each of us can say: we won. From now on, we can consider our homeland delivered from the threat of the German invasion in the west and the Japanese invasion in the east. The long-awaited peace has come for the peoples of the whole world ... ".
The signing the day before, on September 2, of the Act of Unconditional Surrender ended the bloodiest war - World War II.
But the Soviet-Japanese war is not legally over. The peace treaty with Japan has not yet been signed...
Entering the war with Japan, the Soviet Union pursued certain goals, primarily to ensure the security of its Far Eastern borders. Relations between the USSR, and even earlier the Russian Empire and Japan, have always been far from cloudless. The shameful defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. resulted in the loss of Russian territories. During the years of foreign military intervention (1918–1921), the Japanese occupied Vladivostok and part of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In 1938, they provoked a military conflict near Lake Khasan, and in 1939 they invaded Mongolia, which had a union treaty with the USSR, near the Khalkhin Gol border river. During the Second World War, until the end of 1943, there was a constant danger of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact concluded in April 1941 was violated. In the four years since its signing, Japanese warships have stopped about 200 times (often with the use of weapons) and inspected Soviet merchant and fishing vessels, taken some of them to their ports, and sank at least 8 vessels. Total losses of Soviet shipping in 1941–1944 as a result of the provocative actions of the Japanese Navy, they amounted to 637 million rubles of that time. In addition, Japan throughout the war provided political and economic assistance to Nazi Germany. And finally, near the Soviet borders in the Far East, there was a large strategic grouping of Japanese troops, which for many years had been intensively prepared to carry out the main task - an attack on the USSR.
In turn, the Soviet Union throughout the war was forced to keep at the borders in the Far East from 32 to 59 calculated divisions of ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions, up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of air defense troops with a total strength of over 1 million soldiers and officers, 8-16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30% of the combat forces and means of the Soviet armed forces in different periods of the war. The use of these forces could contribute to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in a shorter time and with fewer losses.
On the other hand, by waging a war against Germany in Europe, pulling back a million-strong grouping of Japanese troops, the Soviet Union significantly eased the fate of the allies, thereby providing an opportunity to recover from the first defeats, restore the losses incurred in ships and aircraft by mobilizing the economy, and create shock groups and prepare for broad offensive operations in the Pacific Ocean.
Occupied by the Japanese in the 1930s the Manchurian-Korean region was of major strategic importance for Japan, the region with its more than a million troops, industrial and raw materials base and large strategic reserves. Since this area was the link between the Japanese metropolis and the continent, the loss of it for Japan meant a real opportunity to lose most of the necessary funds to continue the war.
A number of military leaders of the allied armies also linked their plans with the obligatory entry into the war against Japan of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in response to the proposal to join the USSR in the war in the Pacific Ocean, I. V. Stalin, in a conversation with the US Ambassador to Moscow, A. Harriman, in October 1944, raised the territorial issue. At the Crimean Conference in February 1945, this issue was again discussed at the negotiations between F. Roosevelt and I. V. Stalin. In response to Russia's agreement to enter the war against Japan, two or three months after the surrender of Germany, the United States undertook to support the demands put forward by the Soviet side. The special Agreement signed by the heads of governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, in particular, spoke about the return of the southern part of Sakhalin Island to the Soviet Union after the war, the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur, the transfer of the Kuril Islands, the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, giving access to the port of Dairen, etc.
The continental part of the theater of operations of the Soviet troops covered the territory of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and North Korea. The naval part of the hostilities, in which the Pacific Fleet participated, was also extensive. It included the basins of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the Yellow Sea, as well as the water area of the northwestern Pacific Ocean. In the meridional direction, its length was about 4 thousand miles (7.5 thousand km). The area of the land part was 1.5 million square meters. km (this is the territory of Germany, Italy and Japan combined). From north to south, the theater of operations stretched for 1500 km, and from west to east - for 1200 km. The total length of the border along which the Soviet troops were to be deployed was more than 5,000 km.
The land Kwantung Army under the command of General O. Yamada was in Manchuria. By August 1945, this army included three fronts, one separate combined-arms, two aviation armies and the Sungari military river flotilla. The total number of Japanese troops was 1,040,000 people, and taking into account local formations - over 1,200,000 people. It was armed with 6640 guns and mortars, 1215 tanks, 1907 combat aircraft and 26 ships.
The Japanese, in anticipation of a war with the Soviet Union, created a whole system of defensive structures. 17 powerful fortified areas were built along the borders with the USSR and Mongolia, 8 of them with a total length of about 800 km (4500 long-term structures) - against the Soviet Primorye. Each fortified area stretched for 50–100 km along the front and up to 50 km in depth. On Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (near Kamchatka), coastal artillery batteries were hidden in reinforced concrete shelters, and military garrisons were located in permanent structures.
The imperial headquarters and the general staff, together with the headquarters of the Kwantung grouping, chose a variant of the operational plan, according to which, in the event of a war with the USSR, defensive actions were envisaged only at the first stage, and subsequently a transition to a counteroffensive and even an invasion of Soviet territory was planned.
Considerable hopes were also pinned on the organization of partisan actions in the territory occupied by the enemy. Small groups of saboteurs, if possible from among the White emigrants, as well as suicide bombers, were supposed to carry out small-scale, but systematic "special operations". Another option was also being developed - to use Manchuria as the "last stronghold of the empire." The emperor and his entourage were to be evacuated there in the event of the retreat of Japanese troops from the metropolis. The Kwantung grouping, according to the Japanese command, was capable of resisting the Soviet troops, which were superior in strength and training, for a year.
The plan of the Soviet command included the Manchurian strategic offensive operation, the South Sakhalin offensive and the Kuril landing operation. The Manchurian operation was to be carried out by the forces of the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet) and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla. In addition to them, three air defense armies were involved in military operations against Japan - Transbaikal, Amur and Primorsky, 4 cavalry divisions, an armored brigade, tank and artillery regiments, an aviation division, as well as troops of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army led by Marshal X. Choibalsan.
By the beginning of hostilities, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies were concentrated in the Far East. The Soviet grouping numbered more than 1.7 million people, about 30,000 guns and mortars, over 5,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and more than 5,000 combat aircraft. The ships (93 combat surface ships of the main classes, 78 submarines and 273 boats) and aviation (1450 combat aircraft) of the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev since 1941, were in full combat readiness. The Amur Flotilla was led by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov.
On June 3, the Soviet command made a decision to transfer to the Far East additional forces and means from the western fronts and districts. In total, by the beginning of the war with Japan, two front-line departments were regrouped in the Far East (reserve front-line department of the former Karelian Front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the front-line department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front), four army departments (5th, 39th, 53rd combined-arms and 6th tank armies), 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main types of troops and two fortified areas. In parallel with the build-up of the ground grouping, additional formations and units of aviation, air defense arrived in the Far East, and the naval forces were strengthened. Means of material and technical support of the Soviet troops have not been transferred to the Far East since February. And since May, 2 front and 4 army departments, 15 departments of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 departments of rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, as well as 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified area, which in total amounted to 30 settlement divisions. In total, by the beginning of hostilities, more than 87 settlement divisions were concentrated. Commands of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions, 3 air defense corps also arrived here. From May to August 8, over 403 thousand military personnel, about 275,000 small arms, 7,137 guns and mortars, 2,119 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 17,374 trucks, about 1,500 tractors and tractors, more than 36 000 horses. In terms of its spatial scope, the timing of implementation, the number of deployed troops, weapons, military equipment and materiel, this was a strategic regrouping unprecedented in the history of wars. The personnel of formations and formations entering the Far East, especially officers, had unique combat experience. Formations and units of the 5th Army, which had recently participated in breaking through the fortified defensive lines in East Prussia, were sent to the 1st Far Eastern Front, which had to overcome a continuous line of enemy reinforced concrete fortifications, designed for long-term autonomous survival. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front, which was to advance in the mountainous regions and in the desert expanses of the Manchurian Plain.
On July 5, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky arrived in Chita, who was instructed to form the governing bodies of the High Command on the spot and lead their work. On August 1, 1945, Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on August 5, the operational group of generals and officers led by him was transformed into the headquarters of the High Command, headed by Colonel General S. P. Ivanov. At the same time, the Primorsky Group of Forces was renamed the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front - the 2nd Far Eastern. Operations in the Far East were entrusted to experienced military leaders: A. M. Vasilevsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky, K. A. Meretskov, M. V. Zakharov and others.
Thus, the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, deployed on the borders with Manchukuo and in Primorye, included the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. The coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. Air operations were led by Air Force Commander Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov. Soviet troops outnumbered the grouping of enemy troops in different directions: in tanks by 5-8 times, artillery by 4-5 times, mortars by 10 or more times, combat aircraft by 3 or more times. The quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops was reinforced by qualitative characteristics: Soviet units and formations had rich experience in combat operations and significantly outnumbered the enemy in tactical and technical terms.
On August 8 in Moscow at 11 p.m., a statement from the Soviet government was handed over to the Japanese ambassador, which stated that in connection with Japan's refusal to stop hostilities against the USA, Great Britain and China, the Soviet Union considers itself in a state of war with it from August 9. Military operations began, as planned, on the night of August 8-9, 1945, simultaneously on land, in the air and at sea on a vast front with a total length of 5130 km. The first to cross the border were reconnaissance units and forward detachments of the armies of the three Soviet fronts, as well as 76 Soviet Il-4 bombers from the 19th long-range bomber air corps, which soon dropped hundreds of bombs on Japanese garrisons in the cities of Changchun and Harbin. Aviation of the Pacific Fleet at the same time flew out to bomb the ports of Yuki, Rasin and Seishin in Korea.
The actions of the Trans-Baikal Front and the formations of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army developed most successfully. During the first five days of the war, the 6th Guards Tank Army advanced 450 km, overcoming the Great Khingan ridge on the move, it entered the Central Manchurian Plain a day earlier than planned. The breakthrough of Soviet troops into the rear of the Kwantung Army in the Khingan-Mukden direction made it possible to develop the offensive in the direction of the most important military, administrative and industrial centers of Manchuria: Shenyang (Mukden), Chanchun, Qiqihar. All attempts by the enemy to stop the Soviet troops with counterattacks were in vain.
Already in the first six days of the offensive, Soviet and Mongolian troops defeated the fanatically resisting enemy in 16 fortified areas and advanced 250–450 km with the Transbaikal Front, 120–150 km with the 1st Far Eastern Front, and 50–200 km with the 2nd Far Eastern Front. .
The offensive of the tank troops developed especially successfully. Already on August 12, formations of the 6th Guards Tank Army of Colonel General A. G. Kravchenko overcame the "impregnable" Greater Khingan and broke into the Manchurian Plain, wedging deep into the rear of the Kwantung grouping and preventing the exit of its main forces to this mountain range. In the first 5 days they traveled more than 450 km and by the end of August 12 they rushed to the key centers of Manchuria - Changchun and Shenyang (Mukden).
The command of the troops demonstrated high military skill, and the soldiers - mass heroism and selflessness, as evidenced by combat reports. “If someone had told me earlier,” said the commander of the 1136th rifle regiment of the 338th rifle division of the 39th army, Colonel G. G. Savokin, “that my regiment would pass through hot sands, over mountains and gorges at the speed of a march up to 65 km per day, with a limited supply of water and with such a load, I would never believe it ... The great Suvorov was a master of large transitions, but he led trained soldiers who served 20-25 years, and I had young people in my regiment 1927 year of birth ... Only people with high morale can go the way we go.
The Pacific Fleet, having entered the open sea, cut the sea communications used by the troops of the Kwantung Group to communicate with Japan, and the forces of aviation and torpedo boats delivered powerful blows to the naval bases in North Korea. With the assistance of the Amur flotilla and the air force, Soviet troops crossed the Amur and Ussuri rivers on a wide front and, having broken the stubborn resistance of the Japanese in the fortified border areas, began to develop an offensive deep into Manchuria. Great assistance to the Soviet troops in the coastal (North Korean), Sungarian and Sakhaly directions was provided by the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla.
In the coastal direction, the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front were advancing. From the sea, they were supported by the forces of the Pacific Fleet, which, during the Manchurian strategic offensive operation, with the help of landings, captured the Japanese bases and ports of Yuki, Rasin, Seishin, Odejin, Gyonzan in Korea and the Port Arthur fortress, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to evacuate his troops by sea.
The main forces of the Amur flotilla, consisting of three brigades of river ships, operated in the Sungari and Sakhaly areas. The flotilla, supporting the offensive of the 15th and 2nd Red Banner armies of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, ensured the crossing of troops across the water lines, assisted the ground forces with artillery, and landed tactical landings.
The troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front at the first stage of the Manchurian operation met fierce resistance from the Japanese troops, primarily on the borders of the enemy's Pogranichny, Dunnin, Khutou fortified areas. The heaviest battles were fought in the area of the city of Mudanjiang, an important transport center in Manchuria. Only by the end of August 16, the troops of the 1st Red Banner and 5th armies finally took possession of this well-fortified communications junction. Thanks to the successful actions of the 1st Far Eastern Front, conditions were created for an offensive in the Harbino-Girinsky direction.
The task of capturing Harbin fell on the shoulders of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts with the assistance of the 2nd Far Eastern Front. In cooperation with the ships and vessels of the Amur Flotilla and the troops of the Khabarovsk Red Banner Border District, the main large islands and several important bridgeheads on the right bank of the Amur were captured. As a result, the enemy's Sungari military flotilla was locked up, and the troops of the 2nd Front were able to successfully develop an offensive along the Sungari River against Harbin.
Simultaneously with participation in the Manchurian operation, the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front launched an offensive on South Sakhalin from August 11, while actively interacting with the northern Pacific military flotilla. The attack on Sakhalin was carried out by the 56th Rifle Corps of the 16th Army with reinforcement and support units in extremely difficult conditions of mountainous, wooded and swampy terrain, where the enemy had a powerful and extensive system of defensive structures. The fighting on Sakhalin took on a fierce character from the very beginning and continued until August 25th. South Sakhalin was defended by the reinforced 88th Japanese Infantry Division, which was part of the 5th Front with headquarters on the island of Hokkaido, based on the Koton fortified area with a length of 12 km along the front and up to 30 km in depth.
The offensive of the Soviet troops on the island was carried out along the only dirt road that connected Northern Sakhalin with Southern Sakhalin and passed between the hard-to-reach spurs of the mountains and the swampy valley of the Poronai River. On August 16, landing behind enemy lines in the port of Toro (Shakhtersk), the amphibious assault blocked the roads leading to the fortified area along the western coast of Sakhalin. Counter strikes from the front and rear on August 18 broke through the enemy's defenses, and a swift offensive of Soviet troops was launched towards the southern coast of the island. On August 20, an amphibious assault was landed in the port of Maoka (Kholmsk), on August 25 - in the port of Otomari (Korsakov). On the same day, Soviet troops entered the administrative center of South Sakhalin, the city of Toyokhara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), where the headquarters of the 88th Infantry Division was located. The organized resistance of the Japanese garrison, which numbered about 30 thousand soldiers and officers in South Sakhalin, ceased.
From mid-August, the course of the Manchurian operation was corrected in accordance with a sharp change in the military-political situation in the Far East. On August 14, the Japanese emperor signed an edict ending the war. On the same day, the decision to surrender Japan was made by the Cabinet of Ministers. This decision was brought through the government of Switzerland to the American leadership, which, in turn, already on August 14 informed the government of the USSR about it. According to the American side, this was "the complete acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which determined the terms of Japan's unconditional surrender."
The result of the rapid offensive of the Soviet army with the support of the air and naval forces was the dismemberment and actual defeat of the strategic grouping of Japanese troops in Manchuria and North Korea.
On August 16, a radio message was transmitted from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army: "The Kwantung Army has stopped all military operations ... therefore the Soviet Army is called upon to temporarily suspend its advance ... ". In response, on the morning of August 17, Marshal Vasilevsky appealed to the commander of the Kwantung Army, General O. Yamada, with an appeal from 12.00 on August 20 to "cease hostilities against the Soviet troops on the entire front, lay down their arms and surrender." Over the next few days, the question of the surrender of the Japanese army was being negotiated (by radio, through parliamentarians, through pennants, through the Soviet Consul General in Harbin). At the same time, the Soviet command sought to speed up the advance in Manchuria in every possible way with the aim of capturing Changchun, Mukden, Kirin, and Harbin. In this regard, on the orders of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts, from August 18, went over to actions in specially formed, fast-moving and well-equipped detachments. Having overcome the waterless steppes, the Gobi Desert and the mountain ranges of the Greater Khingan, the troops of the Transbaikal Front, on August 18-19, having defeated the Kalgan, Solun and Hailar enemy groups, rushed to the central regions of Northeast China. On August 20, the main forces of the 6th Guards Tank Army, having entered Mukden and Changchun, began to move south to the cities of Dalian (Far) and Luishun (Port Arthur). The cavalry-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander - Lieutenant General I. A. Pliev), leaving on August 18 to Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) and Chengde, cut off the Japanese grouping in Manchuria from the Japanese expeditionary forces in China. The troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, advancing towards the Trans-Baikal Front, having repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the Mudanjiang region, entered Kirin on August 20 and, together with formations of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, entered Harbin. The 25th Army, in cooperation with the amphibious assault, liberated the ports, and then the entire territory of North Korea, cutting off the Japanese troops from the mother country.
The 2nd Far Eastern Front, having successfully crossed the Amur and Ussuri in cooperation with the Amur Flotilla, broke through the long-term defense of the fiercely resisting enemy in the Heihe and Fujin regions, overcame the Lesser Khingan mountain range, and on August 20, together with the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, captured Harbin.
Thus, by August 20, Soviet troops, having advanced deep into Manchuria, reached the Manchurian Plain, dismembered the Japanese troops into a number of isolated groupings and completed their encirclement. From August 19, enemy troops almost everywhere began to surrender. To speed up surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command decided to land airborne assault forces at the key locations of the Kwantung Army - in Changchun, Kirin, Mukden, Harbin, Port Arthur, Dairen. Detachments of paratroopers were led by specially authorized military councils of the fronts, vested with the appropriate rights to accept the surrender of Japanese troops. On August 19, airborne troops landed at Kirin, Mukden, and Changchun. At the airfield in Mukden, a plane with the Emperor of Manchukuo Pu Yi and his entourage, who were heading to Japan, was hijacked. In order to prevent the enemy from evacuating or destroying material assets, airborne assaults were landed on August 18-27 in Shenyang, Changchun, Luishun, Dalian, Pyongyang, Hamhung and some other cities. For this purpose, army mobile forward detachments also operated.
The successful course of hostilities in Manchuria, Korea and South Sakhalin allowed the Soviet troops on August 18 to begin the operation to liberate the Kuril Islands and at the same time prepare a major landing operation in Hokkaido, the need for which soon disappeared. For the implementation of the Kuril landing operation, the troops of the Kamchatka defensive region and ships of the Pacific Fleet were involved.
In the Kuriles, the 5th Japanese Front had over 50,000 soldiers and officers. Of all the islands of the Kuril ridge, the most fortified in terms of anti-landing was the island of Shumshu - the closest to Kamchatka. According to the plan of the Soviet command, it was supposed to suddenly land an amphibious assault in the northeastern part of the island, the mastery of which would violate the entire defense system of the northern islands of the Kuril ridge, and, using it as a bridgehead, subsequently attack Paramushir, Onekotan and other islands of the Northern Kuriles.
On August 18, the landing of troops on the island of Shumshu began, liberated by August 23. By the beginning of September, the troops of the Kamchatka defensive region and the Petropavlovsk naval base occupied the entire northern ridge of the islands, including Urup Island, and the forces of the Northern Pacific Flotilla occupied the rest of the islands south of Urup.
As a result, by the beginning of September, the Japanese armed forces had stopped organized resistance in all directions and completely capitulated. Armed clashes between individual Japanese servicemen and groups were noted only in some areas. The liberation of the territory of Manchuria, Korea and the Kuril Islands from Japanese garrisons, their disarmament and the reception of surrendered troops also continued in September, after the official end of World War II.
The crushing blow to the Kwantung grouping in the Far East was one of the determining factors in the defeat of Japan. Its losses exceeded 720,000 soldiers and officers, including 84,000 killed and wounded, and more than 640,000 prisoners. Japan, having lost the largest military-industrial base on the Asian subcontinent and the most powerful grouping of ground forces, was unable to continue the armed struggle. This greatly reduced the timing of the end of the Second World War. The defeat by the Soviet armed forces of Japanese troops in Manchuria and Korea, as well as in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, deprived Japan of all bridgeheads and bases that it had been creating for many years in preparation for war with the USSR.
On September 2, 1945, on board the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, on behalf of the emperor, the Japanese government and the imperial headquarters, Foreign Minister M. Shigemitsu and Chief of the General Staff Y. Umezu signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, which stated that "Japanese the government and its successors will faithfully fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.”
The signing of the act ended World War II. For feats of arms in the war against Japan, 308,000 Soviet generals, admirals, officers, sergeants, foremen, soldiers and sailors were awarded orders and medals. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 93 soldiers, and 6 people were awarded this high title for the second time. But the victory was not easy: the Soviet armed forces lost 36,456 people killed, wounded and missing in the war with Japan, including 12,031 dead.
This war lasted less than four weeks, but in terms of scope, skill and results, it can be attributed to the outstanding campaigns of the Second World War. The victory achieved in a short time was indisputable evidence of the might of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a vivid manifestation of Soviet military art. |
V. Trushnikov
What is blitzkrieg?
Leapfrog with definitions
... we remember a lot of his results, but at the same time, judging by the numerous discussions on Internet forums, and even the works of some popular writers, like Rezun and Solonin, we seem to be far from understanding what blitzkrieg is in general A. Wasserman. lightning war Looking through the Internet references to the blitzkrieg, I once came across an article by journalist Vlad Voronin. It is called "Blitzkrieg did not bring dividends to the British." The date 08/23/2007 prompted me for a moment to think that we are probably talking about the 15th anniversary of the Falklands War or the 4th anniversary of the capture of Iraqi Basra by British infantrymen. Nothing happened! Everything turned out to be much more interesting! The article is a report on a football match between England and Germany, which ended with the victory of German football players with a score of 2: 1. Among other things, it says there: "... At the beginning of the match, the British managed to organize a blitzkrieg, McLaren's wards firmly settled in the opponent's half of the field. And the efforts were not in vain - the result of these actions was the goal of Frank Lampard ... ". It is hard to imagine that a journalist, speaking about football, would use the word "blitzkrieg" in its direct meaning. In any case, surely none of those present at the stadium dreamed of armored tracked vehicles twisting benches. But then why was it needed at all? Hyperbola? "Joke humor"? Sarcasm in relation to the fact that the British still lost the match? Or simply - for the sake of a red word? .. Most likely, the latter. In this regard, it would not be out of place to mention the book by Barbara Tuckman, which tells about the events of August 1914. In Russian translation, the name sounds like "The First Blitzkrieg". The original name is "August Cannons", and, as you might guess, there is not a word about blitzkrieg in the book. What do Frank Lampard's goal and the first volleys of the First World War have in common? Red word! And no more. He scored a goal in the first minute of the match - made a blitzkrieg. He sent his opponent to a knockout in the first round - again a blitzkrieg. Even took possession of a woman without foreplay - again it's the same. Don't believe? But in vain ... Oleg Morozov in the article "Blitzkrieg Tactics" (sex.mir-x.ru) writes: "There is a method of blitzkrieg (sudden pressure), when a man acts so quickly that a woman does not have time to come to her senses, as she turns out to be in full power partner. So, you lured her to your home and intend to quickly master her ... "Next, in 10 paragraphs, the author tells how a woman should actually be raped, but do it so quickly that she does not have time to feel raped. According to the author, this is exactly what most women need, because it eliminates the need to "break". Here is point N3: the decisive throw must be sudden. Continuing to bombard her with a stream of words, suddenly start pestering her. Your ability to deftly, quickly and simultaneously unbutton the bodice, take off her panties and take out the penis, immediately passing it between the woman's thighs, is very important here. The paradox of female logic leads to the fact that some of them are more afraid for the safety of their underwear, quickly give up and say: "Let me go - I myself ..." And this is point N4: If you act from a standing position, hug the woman from behind, holding her chest and kissing her neck, then quickly bring her to the sofa, bend over and quickly, before she has time to understand anything, introduce a member ... Such is the simple science. Nevertheless, it allows us to clearly understand the main thing - touching on the topic of blitzkrieg, we try to talk about methods, means, a set of measures, but the conversation does not work. Every time he invariably rolls down to the result. The fortress fell during a short assault - a blitzkrieg. Surrendered after a long siege - something else. Historian Anatoly Wasserman claims that blitzkrieg is ... a goal (a video recording of his monologue with a text application is freely available on the Internet)! Like, usually commanders smash the enemy and seize his territory. Connoisseurs of blitzkrieg do not need this. They will disorganize the enemy! How is it possible to disorganize the enemy armed forces without entering into combat contact with them and without occupying the area? Bad luck, however! But as it is not difficult to guess, this question is gently rounded by Wasserman. He states that 1941-42. passed under the sign of the German blitzkrieg, and 1943-45 - the Soviet one. So we all fall into the same trap. We take out the goal, take a closer look - and this is again the result. And so on ad infinitum. Isaac Newton is credited with saying, "If you can't figure something out, go back to the beginning." Well, let's try to heed his advice. Let's ask ourselves a question - what signs make a blitzkrieg a blitzkrieg, and not something else? Or rather, not so ... What actions should be taken to end up with a blitzkrieg, and not something else? Oddly enough, but the efforts of the curious and inquisitive in this direction immediately run into a dead end of various logical absurdities. We get into the Internet, type in the search engine the combinations "what is blitzkrieg", "blitzkrieg theory", "blitzkrieg methods", "blitzkrieg means", "blitzkrieg tools", "blitzkrieg tactics", "blitzkrieg strategy", "blitzkrieg definition". "Google", "Yandex" and "Rambler" immediately strike on the spot. Almost half of the links are to a computer game released by the "Nival Interactive" campaign. The authors of Wikipedia offer the following characterization: "Blitzkrieg (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz - lightning and Krieg - war) is a theory of fleet warfare, according to which victory is achieved in terms calculated in days, weeks or months, before the enemy is able to mobilize and deploy its main military forces. It was created at the beginning of the 20th century by the German military leadership." Once upon a time there was a white bull, tail like a bast, we start all over again. We were presented with "blitzkrieg" as a "theory" and then told about the result. And then, what is it all about - "calculated in days, weeks or months"? Only the Hundred Years War between England and France (1337-1453) does not fall under this definition. What specifically needs to be done so that the enemy does not have time to "mobilize and deploy its main military forces" before the end of hostilities? The last sentence clearly indicates that this "theory" was born by the "German military leadership", but by whom exactly and when exactly, remains a mystery. Further in the article about blitzkrieg from the authors of Wikipedia, the subsection "Strategy" follows. Aha! This is where they will tell us everything ... No matter how ... "Blitzkrieg is based on the close interaction of infantry and tank formations with the support of aviation ..." Hello, we have arrived! Tanks first appeared on the battlefield in 1915. Germany had full-fledged tank formations only at the end of the 30s. I certainly understand that "created at the beginning of the twentieth century" is a rubber concept, but not to the same extent. This article contains a photograph showing the landing of German paratroopers on Crete in May 1941. It is understood, apparently, that this is also a blitzkrieg, but as you know, there were no German tanks in Crete at all. Let's go further... "The blitzkrieg strategy is similar to the theory of a deep offensive operation adopted in the USSR on the eve of the Second World War..." Not bad! It remains now only to understand how "similar". "According to the blitzkrieg strategy, tank units, supported by infantry, break through behind enemy lines, bypassing and surrounding heavily fortified positions. Surrounded enemy formations, experiencing difficulties in supplying ammunition, equipment and food, are easily pursued by the attackers or surrendered." Ah, if only it were really that simple! But the trouble is: the enemy will not begin to experience difficulties with the supply immediately, and during this time he can drink a lot of blood. And he can go to break through the encirclement, thereby hitting the rear. In addition, the enemy, as a rule, builds "strongly fortified positions" not in a forest thicket or in a swamp, but in a strategically important direction. That is why it is not advisable to leave them in the rear until they themselves deign to surrender. A classic example: the Brest Fortress. It would seem that they surrounded and wait until the garrison itself dies of thirst (in the fortress from the very first days of the fighting there was an acute shortage of drinking water). Why storm? Looking back at the so-called blitzkrieg, this is simply stupid. Unnecessary losses! However, as you know, the devil is in the details. Leaving the fortress unattended meant for the Germans to put the entire Army Group Center, which was advancing across Belarus in the direction of Smolensk, in a difficult position. The fact was that an important road passed near the fortress, along which the Wehrmacht units leaving to the East were supplied and which was shot through by the Soviet garrison. There were, however, exceptions. Only they concern not absolutely Germans. More precisely, quite the opposite... In June 1944, the US 3rd Army landed on the French coast under the command of George Patton. She stood on the Cotentin Peninsula until August, doing nothing, just waiting for the British 21st Army Group under the command of Bernard Law Montgomery to take Caen, and then, having occupied Avrange, abandoned by the Wehrmacht, moved to Paris. The German garrisons in Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle and Gironde-Esturi were not touched by the Americans. In Brest, the Germans surrendered on September 18. In other cities - much later. They held out in Lorient until the end of the war. Blitzkig, however! Let's move on ... "An important feature of the blitzkrieg is that the main enemy forces are not the main targets of the offensive. After all, the battle with them gives the enemy the opportunity to use most of his military potential, which means unjustifiably delaying the military operation. The priority task of the blitzkrieg is to deprive the enemy's ability to continue successful combat operations even while maintaining manpower, equipment and ammunition. And for this it is necessary, first of all, to capture or destroy control systems, transport infrastructure, supplies and transport hubs." Aha! It turns out that a blitzkrieg is planned against enemies who are complete imbeciles, since they keep the "main forces" at a respectful distance from "control systems and transport infrastructure." Further, Wikipedia offers a subsection "Practical application": "One of the first attempts to carry out a blitzkrieg was made by German troops during the First World War on the Western Front. According to the Schlieffen plan, it was supposed to deliver a lightning strike on France, for 1. 5-2 months to end the war with her by signing a victorious peace, and then switch to the Eastern Front. However, the resistance of the French and Belgian troops thwarted these plans, the lack of tanks and the imperfection of aviation of that era, as well as the offensive of the Russian army in East Prussia, played a role, which required the transfer of part of the forces to repel it. All this led to the fact that the German troops advanced too slowly, and the Allies managed to pull up their forces and win the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. The war took on a protracted character. "It turns out that when planning the blitzkrieg, the German staffers relied on the lack of resistance from the French and Belgian troops, and they began to resist, so the blitzkrieg failed. Brilliant! There's nothing to complain about! I wonder if any the doctor of historical sciences will loudly announce that the Persian king Darius III in the 4th century BC could not defeat Alexander the Great due to the fact that, they say, "the absence of tanks played a role", the case for him, after all, will surely end in a straitjacket But why, in this case, can one carry exactly the same nonsense about the year one thousand nine hundred and fourteen? Well, now the end of the article on the blitzkrieg by the authors of Wikipedia: "For the first time, the blitzkrieg was successfully carried out in practice by German military strategists (Manstein, Kleist, Guderian, Rundstedt and others) at the beginning of World War II during the capture of Poland: by the end of September, Poland ceased to exist, although it remained There are more than a million non-mobilized people of military age. In France, the manpower reserves were also not exhausted by the time the armistice was signed. The entire campaign in France took only 44 days: from May 10 to June 22, 1940, and in Poland - 36 days: from September 1 to October 5 (the date the resistance of the last regular units of the Polish army ceased). At the beginning of the Second World War, the blitzkrieg strategy allowed Nazi Germany to quickly destroy Soviet troops in a strip of 100-300 km east of the border between the USSR and Germany and its allies. Nevertheless, the loss of time by the German army to destroy the encircled Soviet troops, the wear and tear of equipment and the resistance of the defenders ultimately led to the failure of the blitzkrieg strategy on this front. "As you can see, here we are again faced with the same fairy tale about the white bull. We were promised to be told about "practical application", instead, once again they recalled the well-known result. A little higher it was said that, they say, "the main enemy forces are not the main targets of the offensive", "encircled enemy formations. ..easily achieved by the attackers or surrendered", and now, like snow on the head, "the loss of time by the German army to destroy the encircled Soviet troops." It turns out that Leeb (commander of Army Group North), von Bock (commander of Army Group " Center") and Rundstedt (commander of Army Group South") in the summer of 1941 on the Eastern Front conceived one thing, but in reality they did something completely different. Considering that Hitler eventually dismissed all three, there is some truth in this , apparently, is present. Or maybe not. In the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and the Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, blitzkrieg is characterized as follows: "The theory of fleeting war with the achievement of victory in the shortest possible time (before the enemy is able to mobilize and deploy his main forces), created German militarists at the beginning of the 20th century and showed its inconsistency, both in the first and in the second world wars (especially against the Soviet Union of 1941-45). "So, we were told that the blitz rig is a "theory", but how it works or should work, according to its creators, and where to actually find it, was not explained. The theory has shown its inconsistency, but how, then, to explain the quick and relatively easy victories of the Wehrmacht at the initial stage of World War II? Especially in those cases when the enemy had a solid numerical superiority (Norway, France, North Africa, Crete, Belarus, the Baltic States). In the historical dictionary (mirslovarei.ru) we find the following version: "Blitzkrieg is a military strategy developed by the Nazi command of warfare, which was used by Hitler's generals during the French, Polish and Russian campaigns ..." Aha! Therefore, in Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Crete and North Africa, "Hitler's generals" did not use blitzkrieg. However! "For the first time, the theory of" blitzkrieg "was proposed in 1934 by the French colonel Charles de Gaulle in the book" Vers larmee de metier "Instead of endless military columns, overcoming only a few kilometers a day, instead of a fixed front line, which was common for military strategy during the 1st World War war, when the opposing armies, burrowing like moles into the ground, showered each other with artillery shells, he proposed placing the main emphasis on mobile motorized units. In 1935, the aforementioned book by de Gaulle entitled "The Professional Army" was published in the USSR by Gosvoyizdat in the translation of A.V. Pleshcheev and with a preface by M. Galaktionov. Today it is freely available online at militera.lib.ru. Whoever finds a definition of blitzkrieg there, not to mention its concept, a huge request - please write to me, please, in which chapter and on which pages. I haven't been able to find it. Further, mirslovarei.ru puts forward its vision of how it works. Quite impressive, I must admit. Hold on to the chairs! "... The Hitlerite command, having developed de Gaulle's general strategy more carefully and in detail, successfully applied it at the first stage of the 2nd World War. The method of using the" blitzkrieg "was as follows. reconnaissance and disorganizing the enemy’s actions. Then followed a massive massive bombing strike, in which the enemy’s air force was destroyed while still on the ground, and all enemy communications and vehicles were disabled. This was followed by a bombing attack on enemy troop concentrations. And only after that, in mobile units were introduced into battle - motorized infantry units, light tanks and self-propelled artillery.After them, heavy tank units entered the battle, and only at the end regular infantry units were brought in with the support of field artillery.Successfully using similar tactics during the war in France and Poland, Hitler decided to use it in an attack on the Soviet Union. However, despite the initial success, the tactics of the "blitzkrieg" ended in complete failure. "To be honest, I have no information about exactly how the" fifth column "disorganized the actions of the Polish army in 1939. Regarding the Norwegian campaign, it can be noted that On April 10, several thousand fighters of the National Front, led by Vidkun Quisling, tried to capture their own king. The Norwegian 2nd Infantry Division took the fight with them and repulsed the attack. Later, the king fled to England. I. Bunich in his works repeatedly emphasized that the "fifth column" the Communist Party was in France and that it was its leader Maurice Thorez who by his actions led the French army into a state of degradation and decline.J. Fuller in the book "The Second World War 1939-1945. Strategic and Tactical Review" wrote: "Before the start of the war with Russia, the German intelligence service relied heavily on the "fifth column". But in Russia, although there were dissatisfied, there was no "fifth column". As for the destruction of the enemy air force on the ground, we can safely say that this was not done in any of the military campaigns of Nazi Germany. I described how this happened in Poland in the work "What is a blitzkrieg? 09/01/1939". Regarding the campaign in France, there is a wonderful article by A. Stepanov "Problems of the Luftwaffe" (airforce.ru), which indicates that Germany's losses in combat aircraft were higher than those of the French and that air battles continued until the second half of June. In the Norwegian campaign, there is also a slight advantage in favor of the Anglo-French allies. Soviet aviation, although it suffered significant losses in June 1941, was by no means destroyed. Further, I would very much like to know what "heavy tank units" are. If you mean heavy tanks, then this is nothing more than blatant demagogy, since the Nazis did not have heavy tanks until 1942. A little higher it is stated that during a blitzkrieg, first, bomber aircraft methodically destroy strategically important objects, and only after the destruction of the latter, ground units invade the enemy’s territory. To some extent, the US military operations against Iraq in 1990 and 2003, respectively, fall under this doctrine. However, the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht never acted according to such a scheme. It turns out that under the definition of a blitzkrieg, we were presented with another information "zilch"! In A. Isaev's book "Antisuvorov. 10 Myths of the Second World War" in the first chapter, entitled "Panzer and the thing is equal to blitzkrieg" the following is said: "The tanks and dive bombers "Ju-87" became vivid images of the successes of the Germans in 1939-1941, known as "thing" (short for "Sturzkampflugtsoyg" - dive bomber) and nicknamed by our soldiers "lappet" and "singer". However, this image somehow lost sight of the fact that the German tanks of the Blitzkrieg period were far from perfect. In During the Polish campaign, most of the tank fleet was made up of obsolete "Pz-I" and "Pz-II" "Shtuka" is an archaic aircraft with a non-retractable landing gear and did not at all look like a miracle weapon, despite the really impressive capabilities of dive bombing. Moreover, during the blitzkriegs, the "pieces" did not operate on all sectors of the front. For example, in Ukraine in June 1941, there was simply not a single squadron armed with Yu-87 dive bombers." On my own behalf, I can only add that the "Pz-I" can only be called a tank with a very big stretch, since it had no cannon armament. Further, A. Isaev continues: "The term" blitzkrieg "should be interpreted in this case in the most general way, as the achievement of the goals of the war as a result of one major operation or a chain of operations. From this point of view, the German war plan of 1914 is also a blitzkrieg, an attempt to defeat France in a fleeting campaign. Then the war passed into a protracted phase due to the insufficiently rapid advance of the enveloping wing of the German army. The French in August 1914 managed to collect enough forces against the enveloping "claw" by transportation from their right flank to stop it and turn the war into a positional one for several long years. "Any term, concept has certain boundaries. Beyond these boundaries, the term ceases to be such and becomes something else. Another term, another concept. Offering to interpret "blitzkrieg" in the "most general form" A. Isaev, in fact, proposes not to interpret it in any way. And then, absolutely any war implies "achievement of goals ... as a result of one major operation or chain of operations. "From this point of view, of course, 1914 is a blitzkrieg, as well as 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918 too. The Germans in 1914 tried to go around the French, the French prevented this These actions and counter-actions were called the "Run to the Sea". Everything ended on the seashore. The question is: what should the French have done in the opinion of those in Germany who planned ckrig? Due to what, in the opinion of these people, the German "run" should have turned out faster than the French? There are no answers to these questions and it is not expected. I am often told that if a term does not have a definition, it does not mean that the term does not exist. I cannot agree with this. Because in this case it is not at all clear how to separate the truth from the bullshit. To be continued...With the reissue of the famous book by B. Takman "The Guns of August" we continue the new scientific and artistic series "Military History Library".
Working on the text of B. Takman, the editors came to the conclusion that the publication of this book, which in itself is of considerable interest, should be equipped with an extensive reference apparatus, so that a professional reader, a lover of military history, as well as a schoolboy who has chosen an appropriate topic for an essay, received not only a scientific and artistic text that tells about the events in compliance with the "historical truth", but also all the necessary statistical, military, technical, biographical information related to the events recreated by the American historian.
Thus, the editors considered it necessary to supplement the book with a voluminous commentary and provide the author's text with maps. After all, it is quite obvious that the level of awareness of the Russian reader and the American author do not match. Will every reader be able to draw conclusions from B. Tuckman's half-hint about the degree of staffing of the divisions of one or another power or recall the entire set of diplomatic letters and documents that necessitated the adoption of one or another strategic or political decision? The tasks of actually recreating the reality of Takman in figures and facts are devoted to the Appendixes: "Chronology of political events in the summer - autumn of 1914", "Military statistics: size, composition, structure, potential capabilities of the armed forces of the warring parties", "Mobilization and deployment", "Balance forces in August - September 1914.
Analyzing the works of B. Tuckman in order to fit the political concepts and strategic ideas of the author into the context of the 90s of the XX century, the creators of the Applications came up with the idea of an annotated edition, i.e. a book containing not only the author’s text and an adequate reference apparatus, but also representing reaction to this text of modern military historians. You will get acquainted not with criticism, but with an analysis of the military-historical events of the First World War, clarify for yourself or designate those nuances of the period that, due to the artistic intention, were not affected by B. Takman. "Commentary on the operations of August 1914" forms Appendix 5, consisting of two extended analytical articles: "The World Crisis of 1914: An Outline of Strategic Planning" and "The Schlieffen Plan in Action."
In addition to military journalistic works and military-economic statistics, the publication is provided with comments directly in the course of the text. Additional information about the military and political figures mentioned by B. Takman in "August Cannons" is given in the "Biographical Index". The bibliography at the end of the edition is designed for scrupulous readers who are interested in sources, names, their signs in the war, or the so-called personal characteristics that officially define official history.
The publishing group, preparing the book, did a great deal of research work, thus demonstrating their interest in events, their creative attitude to the strategic principles of war and diplomacy, their interest in creating a series of books dedicated to war as an art.
There are not many books in the world that can be referred to as a work of fiction, a textbook of strategy and a political treatise at the same time. The Guns of August by Barbara Tuckman, in our opinion, is just such a book. Completion of significant military-historical works to the level of "text - textbook of strategy - modern textbook of life" is the task of the current edition.
Necessary preface. O. Kasimov
If the saying is true that every book has its own destiny, then Barbara Tuckman pulled out the luckiest lottery ticket. Her book, first published in 1962, immediately attracted close attention in the West and became an object of study, although it was by no means conceived as another monograph designed to expand the horizons of historical science. In fact, the book does not report any facts that would be unknown to specialists, it is vain to look for new interpretations in it. This is understandable: the actors of the great drama of August 1914 are long gone, leaving behind cemeteries all over Europe and piles of yellowed books. Tuckman could do little more than follow in the footsteps of countless historians.
Nevertheless, the book began to be read avidly, it went through many editions. This is due not only to the fact that it is written lively and exciting. The generation of the 60s, living in the thick shadow of the nuclear threat, turning to the past, is looking for those sources in it that will help to understand the present. In today's unstable world, a repetition of the tragedy of 1914 threatens innumerable disasters.
Tuckman's success is primarily due to the fact that she tried to show how, in that fatal August, the world was drawn into a bloody slaughter, how statesmen got lost in a political labyrinth - a vast building erected over decades with their own hands and with the most, they say, good intentions. .
The stormy success of the book "The Guns of August" is due to another circumstance, perhaps decisive. The book, of course, appeared purely by accident on store windows on the eve of the confrontation between the US and the USSR in October 1962 and had an outstanding reader - John F. Kennedy.
President of the United States D. Kennedy, when he read this book, was struck by the irreversible avalanche-like process of slipping into war in the conditions of an acute international crisis. One of the researchers of the new section in the theory of international relations of "crisis diplomacy", the American professor O. Holsti noted: in the fall of 1962, "the president was reading B. Tuckman's book "The Guns of August", a story about the first month of the First World War. The book made a strong impression on him, for it shows how miscalculations and misconceptions influenced the course of events in 1914. Kennedy often referred to the decision-making that led to World War I as a classic case of common mistakes to avoid in the age of nuclear weapons. Discussing, for example, a few weeks after its completion the crisis in the Caribbean Sea (in October 1962), he argued: if we recall the history of this century, when the First World War, in essence, broke out as a result of a false assessment of the other side ... then it is extremely difficult make judgments in Washington as to what results our decisions will lead to in other countries.
It is well known that in October 1962 there was a process opposite to what happened in August 1914 - the de-escalation of the international crisis.
Kennedy did not see this difference at all, believing that the lessons of 1914, without the slightest change, are suitable for all times and all states without exception. That he was mistaken in the universality of this principle is probably natural, but in this case it is important that the American president in. the most difficult situation in the fall of 1962 recognized its applicability to the United States itself.
As T. Sorensen, a man close to Kennedy and influential, wrote: “... Kennedy's favorite word from the very beginning of our work with him (1953) was “miscalculation”. Long before Kennedy read Barbara Tuckman's The Guns of August, which he recommended to his staff, he had taken a course on the causes of the First World War as a student at Harvard University. He said that the course made him understand "with what speed the states, relatively uninterested, plunged into war in a few days." Their leaders said (as their successors now claim) that military might would keep the peace, but that might alone did not work. In 1963, Kennedy liked to quote exchanges between the two German leaders about the causes and expansion of that war. The former chancellor asked: “How did this happen?”, and his successor answered: “Oh, if only I knew!”.
