Which peoples of the USSR suffered the heaviest losses during the Great Patriotic War. Losses in the Great Patriotic War

There are different estimates of the losses of the Soviet Union and Germany during the war of 1941-1945. The differences are associated both with the methods of obtaining initial quantitative data for different groups of losses, and with the methods of calculation.

In Russia, official data on losses in the Great Patriotic War are considered to be those published by a group of researchers led by Grigory Krivosheev, a consultant at the Military Memorial Center of the Russian Armed Forces, in 1993. According to updated data (2001), the losses were as follows:

• Human losses of the USSR - 6.8 million military personnel killed, and 4.4 million captured and missing. Total demographic losses (including civilian deaths) - 26.6 million Human;
• German casualties - 4.046 million military personnel killed, died from wounds, missing in action (including 442.1 thousand died in captivity), more 910.4 thousand returned from captivity after the war;
• Human losses of Germany's allied countries - 806 thousand military personnel killed (including 137.8 thousand died in captivity), also 662.2 thousand returned from captivity after the war.
• Irreversible losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million And 8.6 million people (not to mention 1.6 million prisoners of war after May 9, 1945) respectively. The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany with their satellites is 1,3:1 .

History of calculation and official state recognition of losses

Research into the Soviet Union's losses in the war actually began only in the late 1980s. with the advent of glasnost. Before this, in 1946, Stalin announced that the USSR had lost during the war 7 million people. Under Khrushchev this figure increased to "more than 20 million". Only in 1988-1993. a team of military historians under the leadership of Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev conducted a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about human losses in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD. In this case, the results of the work of the General Staff commission to determine losses, headed by Army General S. M. Shtemenko (1966-1968) and a similar commission of the Ministry of Defense headed by Army General M. A. Gareev (1988), were used. The team was also cleared to be declassified in the late 1980s. materials of the General Staff and main headquarters of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, border troops and other archival institutions of the former USSR.

The final figure of human losses in the Great Patriotic War was first published in rounded form (“ almost 27 million people."") at the ceremonial meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990, dedicated to the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. In 1993, the results of the study were published in the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: A statistical study,” which was then translated into English. In 2001, a reissue of the book “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century” was published. Losses of the Armed Forces: A Statistical Study."

To determine the scale of human losses, this team used various methods, in particular:

• accounting and statistical, that is, by analyzing existing accounting documents (primarily reports of losses personnel USSR Armed Forces),
• balance, or the method of demographic balance, that is, by comparing the size and age structure of the population of the USSR at the beginning and end of the war.

In the 1990-2000s. Both works proposed amendments to official figures (in particular, by clarifying statistical methods) and completely alternative studies with very different data on losses appeared in the press. As a rule, in works of the latter type, the estimated loss of life far exceeds the officially recognized 26.6 million people.

For example, the modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945. V 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. V 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). If you believe his calculations about the loss 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, the total human losses of Germany in 1939-1945. he rated it at 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, Gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel (including foreign formations) is 3,950 thousand Human). However, it must be taken into account that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not keep such a calculation for Germany. Count total losses The USSR is based on outright falsification: the population of the USSR in mid-1941 was taken to be 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - 167 million (3.5 million higher real), - which in total gives the difference between the official and Sokolov figures. B.V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches of writer Viktor Astafiev, book by I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

Casualties

Overall rating

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimates the total human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, determined by the demographic balance method, in 26.6 million people. This includes all those killed as a result of military and other enemy actions, those who died as a result of the increased mortality rate during the war in the occupied territory and in the rear, as well as persons who emigrated from the USSR during the war and did not return after its end. For comparison, according to the estimates of the same team of researchers, the population decline in Russia in the First world war(losses of military personnel and civilians) amounted to 4.5 million people, and a similar loss in the Civil War - 8 million people.

As for the gender composition of the dead and deceased, the overwhelming majority, naturally, were men (about 20 million). In general, by the end of 1945, the number of women aged 20 to 29 years was twice the number of men of the same age in the USSR.

Considering the work of G. F. Krivosheev’s group, American demographers S. Maksudov and M. Elman come to the conclusion that their estimate of human losses of 26-27 million is relatively reliable. They, however, indicate both the possibility of underestimating the number of losses due to incomplete accounting of the population of the territories annexed by the USSR before the war and at the end of the war, and the possibility of overestimating losses due to failure to take into account emigration from the USSR in 1941-45. In addition, official calculations do not take into account the drop in the birth rate, due to which the population of the USSR by the end of 1945 should have been approximately 35-36 million people more than in the absence of war. However, they consider this figure to be hypothetical, since it is based on insufficiently strict assumptions.

According to another foreign researcher M. Haynes, the figure of 26.6 million obtained by G. F. Krivosheev’s group sets only the lower limit of all USSR losses in the war. The total population decline from June 1941 to June 1945 was 42.7 million people, and this figure corresponds to the upper limit. Therefore, the real number of military losses lies in this interval. He, however, is opposed by M. Harrison, who, based on statistical calculations, comes to the conclusion that even taking into account some uncertainty in estimating emigration and the decline in the birth rate, the real military losses of the USSR should be estimated within 23.9 to 25.8 million people.

Military personnel

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, irretrievable losses during combat operations on the Soviet-German front from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 amounted to 8,860,400 Soviet troops. The source was data declassified in 1993 - 8,668,400 military personnel and data obtained during the search work of the Memory Watch and in historical archives. Of these (according to 1993 data):

• Killed, died from wounds and illnesses, non-combat losses - 6,885,100 people, including
• Killed - 5,226,800 people.
• Died from wounds - 1,102,800 people.
• Died from various reasons and accidents, shot - 555,500 people.

According to M.V. Filimoshin, during the Great Patriotic War, 4,559,000 Soviet military personnel and 500 thousand persons liable for military service, called up for mobilization, but not included in the lists of troops, were captured and went missing.

According to G.F. Krivosheev: during the Great Patriotic War, a total of 3,396,400 military personnel were missing and captured; 1,836,000 military personnel returned from captivity, 1,783,300 did not return (died, emigrated).

Civilian population

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimated the losses of the civilian population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War at approximately 13.7 million people. The final figure is 13,684,692 people. consists of the following components:

• were deliberately exterminated in the occupied territory - 7,420,379 people.
• died and perished from the brutal conditions of the occupation regime (hunger, infectious diseases, lack of medical care etc.) - 4,100,000 people.
• died in forced labor in Germany - 2,164,313 people. (another 451,100 people for various reasons did not return and became emigrants)

However, the civilian population also suffered heavy losses from enemy combat in front-line areas, besieged and besieged cities. There are no complete statistical materials on the types of civilian casualties under consideration.

According to S. Maksudov, about 7 million people died in the occupied territories and in besieged Leningrad (of which 1 million in besieged Leningrad, 3 million were Jewish victims of the Holocaust), and about 7 million more people died as a result of increased mortality in non-occupied areas. territories.

Property losses

During the war years, 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 98 thousand collective farms, and 1,876 state farms were destroyed on Soviet territory. The State Commission found that material damage amounted to about 30 percent of the national wealth of the Soviet Union, and in areas subject to occupation, about two-thirds. In general, the material losses of the Soviet Union are estimated at about 2 trillion. 600 billion rubles. For comparison, the national wealth of England decreased by only 0.8 percent, France - by 1.5 percent, and the United States essentially avoided material losses.

Losses of Germany and their allies

Casualties

The German command involved the population of the occupied countries in the war against the Soviet Union by recruiting volunteers. Thus, separate military formations appeared from among citizens of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Croatia, as well as from citizens of the USSR who were captured or in occupied territory (Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, Muslim, etc.). How exactly the losses of these formations were taken into account is not clear in German statistics.

Also, a constant obstacle to determining the real number of military personnel losses was the mixing of military casualties with civilian casualties. For this reason, in Germany, Hungary, and Romania, the losses of the armed forces are significantly reduced, since some of them are included in the number of civilian casualties. (200 thousand people lost military personnel, and 260 thousand lost civilians). For example, in Hungary this ratio was “1:2” (140 thousand - military casualties and 280 thousand - civilian casualties). All this significantly distorts the statistics on the losses of troops of the countries that fought on the Soviet-German front.

A German radio telegram emanating from the Wehrmacht casualty department dated May 22, 1945, addressed to the OKW Quartermaster General, provides the following information:

According to a certificate from the OKH organizational department dated May 10, 1945, the ground forces alone, including the SS troops (without the Air Force and Navy), lost 4 million 617.0 thousand people during the period from September 1, 1939 to May 1, 1945.

Two months before his death, Hitler announced in one of his speeches that Germany had lost 12.5 million killed and wounded, half of whom were killed. With this message, he actually refuted the estimates of the scale of human losses made by other fascist leaders and government agencies.

General Jodl, after the end of hostilities, stated that Germany, in total, lost 12 million 400 thousand people, of which 2.5 million were killed, 3.4 million missing and captured and 6.5 million wounded, of which approximately 12-15% did not return to duty for one reason or another.

According to the annex to the German law “On the Preservation of Burial Sites,” the total number of those buried on the territory of the USSR and of Eastern Europe German soldiers number 3.226 million, of which the names of 2.395 million are known.

Prisoners of war of Germany and its allies

Information on the number of prisoners of war of the armed forces of Germany and its allied countries, recorded in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR as of April 22, 1956.

Alternative theories

In the 1990-2000s, publications appeared in the Russian press with data on losses that were very different from those accepted by historical science. As a rule, the estimated Soviet losses far exceed those cited by historians.

For example, the modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945 at 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). According to his calculations about the loss of 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, he estimated the total human losses of Germany in 1939-1945 at 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, Gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel (including foreign formations) is 3,950 thousand people). However, it must be taken into account that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not keep such a calculation for Germany. The calculation of the total losses of the USSR is based on outright falsification: the population of the USSR in mid-1941 was taken at 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - 167 million (3. 5 million below the real one), which in total gives the difference between the official and Sokolov’s figures. B.V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches of writer Viktor Astafiev, book by I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

In contrast to Sokolov’s highly controversial publications, there are works by other authors, many of whom are driven by establishing the real picture of what happened, and not by the requirements of the modern political situation. The work of Igor Lyudvigovich Garibyan stands out from the general series. The author uses open official sources and data, clearly pointing out inconsistencies in them, and focuses on the methods used to manipulate statistics. Interesting are the methods that he used for his own assessment of Germany’s losses: the female preponderance in the age-sex pyramid, the balance method, the method of assessment based on the structure of prisoners, and the assessment based on the rotation of army formations. Each method produces similar results - from 10 before 15 million people of irretrievable losses, excluding losses of satellite countries. The results obtained are often confirmed by indirect and sometimes direct facts from official German sources. The work deliberately focuses on the indirectness of multiple facts. Such data is more difficult to falsify, because the totality of facts and their vicissitudes during falsification cannot be foreseen, which means attempts at falsification will not stand up to scrutiny. different ways assessments.

Military losses during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War have been the subject of both controversy and speculation for many years. Moreover, the attitude towards these losses changes exactly the opposite. So, in the 70s, the propaganda apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee for some reason almost proudly broadcast about the heavy human losses of the USSR during the war. And not so much about the victims of the Nazi genocide, but about the combat losses of the Red Army. With completely incomprehensible pride, the propaganda “canard” was exaggerated about supposedly only three percent of front-line soldiers born in 1923 who survived the war. They spoke with ecstasy about whole graduating classes, where all the young men went to the front and not a single one returned. An almost socialist competition was launched among rural areas to see who had more villages, where all the men who went to the front died. Although, according to demographic statistics, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War there were 8.6 million men of 1919-1923. birth, and in 1949, during the All-Union Population Census, there were 5.05 million of them alive, that is, the decline in the male population of 1919-1923. births during this period amounted to 3.55 million people. Thus, if we accept that for each of the ages 1919-1923. If the male population is equal, then there were 1.72 million men in each year of birth. Then it turns out that conscripts born in 1923 killed 1.67 million people (97%), and conscripts born in 1919-1922. births - 1.88 million people, i.e. about 450 thousand people. of those born in each of these four years (about 27% of their total number). And this despite the fact that the military personnel of 1919-1922. births made up the personnel Red Army, which took on the blow of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 and was almost completely burned out in the battles of the summer and autumn of the same year. This alone easily refutes all the speculations of the notorious “sixties” about the supposed three percent of surviving front-line soldiers born in 1923.

During “perestroika” and the so-called. “reforms” the pendulum swung in the other direction. The unimaginable figures of 30 and 40 million military personnel who died during the war were enthusiastically cited; the notorious B. Sokolov, a doctor of philology, by the way, and not a mathematician, is especially zealous with statistical methods. Absurd ideas were voiced that Germany lost only almost 100 thousand people killed during the entire war, about the monstrous ratio of 1:14 dead German and Soviet soldiers, etc. Statistical data on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, given in the reference book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” published in 1993, and in the fundamental work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century (Loss of the Armed Forces),” were categorically declared falsification. Moreover, according to the principle: since it does not correspond to someone’s speculative concept of the losses of the Red Army, it means falsification. At the same time, enemy losses were and are being underestimated in every possible way. With calf delight, numbers are announced that do not fit into any goal. For example, the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf during the German offensive near Kursk in July 1943 were given as only 6,900 killed soldiers and officers and 12 burned tanks. At the same time, poor and ridiculous arguments were invented to explain why the tank army, which had practically retained 100% combat capability, suddenly retreated back: from the Allied landings in Italy, to the lack of fuel and spare parts, or even about the beginning of the rains.

Therefore, the question of the human losses of Germany during the Second World War is quite relevant. Moreover, interestingly, in Germany itself there is still no fundamental research on this issue. There is only indirect information. Most researchers, when analyzing German losses during the Second World War, use the monograph of the German researcher B. Muller-Hillebrandt “German Land Army. 1933-1945". However, this historian resorted to outright falsification. Thus, indicating the number of conscripts into the Wehrmacht and SS troops, Müller-Hillebrand provided information only for the period from 06/01/1939 to 04/30/1945, modestly keeping silent about the contingents previously called up for military service. But by June 1, 1939, Germany had already been deploying its armed forces for four years, and by June 1 of that year there were 3214.0 thousand people in the Wehrmacht! Therefore, the number of men mobilized into the Wehrmacht and SS in 1935-1945. takes on a different appearance (see Table 1).

Thus, the total number mobilized into the Wehrmacht and SS troops is not 17,893.2 thousand people, but about 21,107.2 thousand people, which immediately gives a completely different picture of Germany’s losses during the Second World War.

Now let's turn to the actual losses of the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht operated three various systems loss accounting:

1) via channel “IIa” - military service;
2) through the health service channel;
3) through the channel of personal accounting of losses in the territorial bodies for the list of military personnel in Germany.

But at the same time there was interesting feature- losses of units and subunits were not taken into account in total, but according to their combat purpose. This was done so that the Reserve Army had comprehensive information about which contingents of military personnel needed to be submitted for replenishment in each specific division. A fairly reasonable principle, but today this method of accounting for the loss of personnel makes it possible to manipulate the figures for German losses.

Firstly, separate records were kept of the so-called personnel losses. “combat strength” - Kampfwstaerke - and support units. Thus, in the German infantry division of the state in 1944, the “combat strength” was 7160 people, the number of combat support and logistics units was 5609 people, and the total strength - Tagesstaerke - 12,769 people. In the tank division according to the 1944 staff, the “combat strength” was 9,307 people, the number of combat support and logistics units was 5,420 people, and the total strength was 14,727 people. The "combat strength" of the active Wehrmacht army was approximately 40-45% of the total number of personnel. By the way, this makes it possible to very cleverly falsify the course of the war, when the Soviet troops at the front indicate their total strength, while the German troops only indicate their combat strength. Like, signalmen, sappers, repairmen, they don’t go into attacks...

Secondly, in the “combat strength” itself - Kampfwstaerke - the units “directly leading the battle” - Gefechtstaerke - were separately distinguished. The units and subunits “directly leading the battle” within the divisions were considered to be infantry (motorized rifle, tank-grenadier) regiments, tank regiments and battalions, and reconnaissance battalions. Artillery regiments and divisions, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions belonged to combat support units. In the Air Force - Luftwaffe - the flying personnel were considered “units directly leading the battle”, in the Navy - Kriegsmarine - the sailing personnel belonged to this category. And the accounting for the losses of “combat strength” personnel was kept separately for the personnel “directly leading the battle” and for the personnel of the combat support units.

It is also interesting to note that only those killed directly on the battlefield were taken into account in combat losses, but military personnel who died from severe wounds during the evacuation stages were already included in the losses of the Reserve Army and from total number irretrievable losses of the active army were excluded. That is, as soon as the injury was determined to require more than 6 weeks to heal, the Wehrmacht soldier was immediately transferred to the Reserve Army. And even if they did not have time to take him to the rear and he died close to the front line, he was still counted as an irretrievable loss in the Reserve Army and this serviceman was excluded from the number of irretrievable combat losses of a particular front (Eastern, African, Western, etc.) . That is why almost only the killed and missing appear in the accounting of Wehrmacht losses.

There was another specific feature of accounting for losses in the Wehrmacht. Czechs conscripted into the Wehrmacht from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Poles conscripted into the Wehrmacht from the Poznań and Pomeranian regions of Poland, as well as Alsatians and Lorraineers through personal registration of losses in the territorial bodies of the list of military personnel in Germany were not taken into account, since they did not belong to the so-called . "Imperial Germans" In the same way, ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) conscripted into the Wehrmacht from occupied European countries were not taken into account through the personal registration channel. In other words, the losses of these categories of military personnel were excluded from the total accounting of irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht. Although more than 1,200 thousand people were drafted from these territories into the Wehrmacht and SS, not counting the ethnic Germans - Volksdoche - of the occupied countries of Europe. Six SS divisions were formed from the ethnic Germans of Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic alone, not counting a large number of military police units.

The Wehrmacht also did not take into account the losses of auxiliary paramilitary forces: the National Socialist Automobile Corps, the Speer Transport Corps, the Imperial Labor Service and the Todt Organization. Although the personnel of these formations took a direct part in ensuring combat operations, and final stage during the war, units and parts of these auxiliary formations rushed into battle against Soviet troops on German territory. Often, the personnel of these formations were added as reinforcements to the Wehrmacht formations right at the front, but since this was not a reinforcement sent through the Reserve Army, a centralized record of this replenishment was not kept, and the combat losses of these personnel were not taken into account through the official channels of loss accounting.

Separately from the Wehrmacht, records were kept of the losses of the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth, which were widely involved in the fighting in East Prussia, East Pomerania, Silesia, Brandenburg, West Pomerania, Saxony and Berlin. The Volksshurm and the Hitler Youth were under the jurisdiction of the NSDAP. Often, units of both the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth also joined the Wehrmacht units and formations directly at the front as reinforcements, but for the same reason as with other paramilitary formations, personal registration of this reinforcement was not carried out.

The Wehrmacht also did not take into account the losses of the SS military-police units (primarily the Felgendarmerie), which fought the partisan movement, and at the final stage of the war rushed into battle against units of the Red Army.

In addition, included German troops the so-called “voluntary helpers” - Hilfswillige (“hiwi”, Hiwi), but the losses of this category of personnel were also not taken into account in the total combat losses of the Wehrmacht. Special attention should be paid to “voluntary assistants”. These “assistants” were recruited from all countries of Europe and the occupied part of the USSR, in total in 1939-1945. Up to 2 million people joined the Wehrmacht and SS as “voluntary assistants” (including about 500 thousand people from the occupied territories of the USSR). And although most of the Hiwi were service personnel from the rear structures and commandant's offices of the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories, a significant part of them were directly included in the combat units and formations.

Thus, unscrupulous researchers excluded from the total number of irretrievable losses in Germany a large number of lost personnel who directly participated in the hostilities, but were not formally related to the Wehrmacht. Although the auxiliary paramilitary formations, the Volkssturm, and the “voluntary assistants” suffered losses during the battles, these losses can rightfully be attributed to Germany’s combat losses.

Table 2 given here attempts to bring together the numbers of both the Wehrmacht and German paramilitary forces, and to roughly calculate the loss of personnel in the armed forces of Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

The number of German military personnel who were captured by the Allies and capitulated to them may be surprising, despite the fact that 2/3 of the Wehrmacht troops operated on the Eastern Front. The bottom line is that in captivity by the Allies, both the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS military personnel (the designation of the SS field troops operating on the fronts of World War II) and the personnel of all kinds of paramilitary formations, Volkssturm, NSDAP functionaries, employees were taken into account in the general cauldron territorial divisions of the RSHA and police territorial formations, up to firefighters. As a result, the allies counted up to 4032.3 thousand people as prisoners, although the real number of prisoners of war from the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS was significantly lower than the allies indicated in their documents - about 3000.0 thousand people, but in our We will use official data in our calculations. In addition, in April-May 1945, German troops, fearing retribution for the atrocities committed on the territory of the USSR, quickly rolled back to the west, trying to surrender to the Anglo-American troops. Also at the end of April - beginning of May 1945, formations of the Wehrmacht Reserve Army and all kinds of paramilitary formations, as well as police units, surrendered en masse to the Anglo-American troops.

Thus, the table clearly shows that the total losses of the Third Reich on the Eastern Front in killed and died from wounds, missing, and died in captivity reach 6,071 thousand people.

However, as is known, not only German troops, foreign volunteers and German paramilitary forces fought against the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front, but also the troops of their satellites. It is also necessary to take into account the losses of “volunteer helpers - “Hiwi”. Therefore, taking into account the losses of these categories of personnel, the overall picture of losses of Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front takes on the picture shown in Table 3.

Thus, the total irretrievable losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front in 1941-1945. reach 7 million 625 thousand people. If we take losses only on the battlefield, without taking into account those who died in captivity and the losses of “voluntary assistants”, then the losses are: for Germany - about 5620.4 thousand people and for satellite countries - 959 thousand people, in total - about 6579.4 thousands of people. Soviet losses on the battlefield amounted to 6885.1 thousand people. Thus, the losses of Germany and its satellites on the battlefield, taking into account all factors, are only slightly less than the combat losses of the Soviet Armed Forces on the battlefield (about 5%), and there is no ratio of 1:8 or 1:14 to the combat losses of Germany and its satellites there is no question of USSR losses.

The figures given in the tables above are, of course, very approximate and have serious errors, but they give, to a certain approximation, the order of losses of Nazi Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front and during the war in general. Moreover, of course, if not for the inhumane treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Nazis, the total number of losses of Soviet military personnel would have been significantly lower. With an appropriate attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war, at least one and a half to two million people from among those who died in German captivity could have remained alive.

Nevertheless, a detailed and detailed study of the real human losses of Germany during the Second World War does not exist to date, because there is no political order, and many data regarding German losses are still classified under the pretext that they can cause “moral trauma” to the current German society (it would be better to remain in blissful ignorance of how many Germans died during the Second World War). Contrary to the popular picture of the domestic media in Germany, which is actively falsifying history. The main goal of these actions is to introduce into public opinion the idea that in the war with the USSR, Nazi Germany was the defending side, and the Wehrmacht was the “advanced detachment of European civilization” in the fight against “Bolshevik barbarism.” And there they actively praise the “brilliant” German generals, who held back the “Asian hordes of the Bolsheviks” for four years, with minimal losses of German troops, and only the “twenty-fold numerical superiority of the Bolsheviks,” who filled the Wehrmacht with corpses, broke the resistance of the “valiant” Wehrmacht soldiers. And the thesis is constantly being exaggerated that more “civilian” German population died than soldiers at the front, and most of the civilian deaths allegedly occurred in the eastern part of Germany, where Soviet troops allegedly committed atrocities.

In light of the problems discussed above, it is necessary to touch upon the clichés persistently imposed by pseudo-historians that the USSR won by “filling the Germans with the corpses of its soldiers.” The USSR simply did not have such a quantity of human resources. As of June 22, 1941, the population of the USSR was about 190-194 million people. Including the male population was about 48-49% - approximately 91-93 million people, of this number men 1891-1927. births were about 51-53 million people. We exclude approximately 10% of men who are unfit for military service even in wartime - this is about 5 million people. We exclude 18-20% of the “reserved” - highly qualified specialists who are not subject to conscription - this is about another 10 million people. Thus, the conscription resource of the USSR was about 36-38 million people. This is what the USSR actually demonstrated by conscripting 34,476.7 thousand people into the Armed Forces. In addition, it must be taken into account that a significant part of the conscript contingent remained in the occupied territories. And many of these people were either driven to Germany, or died, or took the path of collaboration, and after the liberation by Soviet troops from the territories subject to occupation, much fewer people were drafted into the army (40-45%) than could have been drafted before the occupation. In addition, the economy of the USSR simply could not stand it if almost all men capable of bearing arms - 48-49 million people - were drafted into the army. Then there would be no one to melt steel, produce T-34 and Il-2, or grow grain.

To have an Armed Forces of 11,390.6 thousand people in May 1945, to have 1,046 thousand people being treated in hospitals, to demobilize 3,798.2 thousand people due to wounds and illnesses, to lose 4,600 thousand people. captured and lost 26,400 thousand people killed, exactly 48,632.3 thousand people should have been mobilized into the Armed Forces. That is, with the exception of cripples completely unfit for military service, not a single man from 1891-1927. births should not have remained in the rear! Moreover, taking into account that some men of military age ended up in the occupied territories, and some worked at industrial enterprises, older and younger men inevitably had to be mobilized. However, the mobilization of men older than 1891 was not carried out, nor was the mobilization of conscripts younger than 1927. In general, if Doctor of Philology B. Sokolov had been engaged in analyzing poetry or prose, perhaps he would not have become a laughing stock.

Returning to the losses of the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich as a whole, it should be noted that the issue of accounting for losses there is quite interesting and specific. Thus, the data on losses of armored vehicles given by B. Muller-Hillebrandt are very interesting and noteworthy. For example, in April-June 1943, when there was a lull on the Eastern Front and fighting took place only in North Africa, 1019 tanks and assault guns were counted as irretrievable losses. Despite the fact that by the end of March, Army Africa had barely 200 tanks and assault guns, and in April and May, at most 100 units of armored vehicles were delivered to Tunisia. Those. in North Africa in April and May, the Wehrmacht could have lost at most 300 tanks and assault guns. Where did another 700-750 lost armored vehicles come from? Were there really secret tank battles on the Eastern Front? Or did the Wehrmacht tank army find its end in Yugoslavia these days?

Similar to the losses of armored vehicles in December 1942, when there were fierce tank battles on the Don, or the losses in January 1943, when German troops rolled back from the Caucasus, abandoning their equipment, Müller-Hillebrand cites only 184 and 446 tanks and assault guns. But in February-March 1943, when the Wehrmacht launched a counteroffensive in the Donbass, the losses of the German armored vehicles suddenly reached 2069 units in February and 759 units in March. It must be taken into account that the Wehrmacht was advancing, the battlefield remained with the German troops, and all armored vehicles damaged in the battles were delivered to the Wehrmacht tank repair units. In Africa, the Wehrmacht could not suffer such losses; by the beginning of February, Army Africa consisted of no more than 350-400 tanks and assault guns, and in February-March it received only about 200 units of armored vehicles for replenishment. Those. even with the destruction of all German tanks in Africa, the losses of Army Africa in February-March could not exceed 600 units; the remaining 2,228 tanks and assault guns were lost on the Eastern Front. How could this happen? Why did the Germans lose five times more tanks during the offensive than during the retreat, although war experience shows that the opposite always happens?

The answer is simple: in February 1943, the 6th German Army under Field Marshal Paulus capitulated in Stalingrad. And the Wehrmacht had to transfer to the list of irretrievable losses all the armored vehicles that it had long ago lost in the Don steppes, but which continued to be modestly listed in medium- and long-term repairs in the 6th Army.

It is impossible to explain why, gnawing through the deeply echeloned defenses of Soviet troops near Kursk in July 1943, saturated with anti-tank artillery and tanks, German troops lost fewer tanks than in February 1943, when they launched counterattacks on the lined-up troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts. Even if we assume that in February 1943 German troops lost 50% of their tanks in Africa, it is difficult to admit that in February 1943 in the Donbass the small Soviet troops were able to knock out more than 1000 tanks, and in July near Belgorod and Orel - only 925.

Not by chance for a long time when capturing the documents of the German "panzerdivisions" in the "cauldrons" they stood up serious questions, where did the German equipment go if no one broke through from the encirclement, and the amount of abandoned and broken equipment does not correspond to what is written in the documents. Each time, the Germans had significantly fewer tanks and assault guns than were listed according to the documents. And only by mid-1944 did they realize that the actual composition of German tank divisions must be determined by the “combat ready” column. Situations often arose when in the German tank and tank-grenadier divisions there were more “dead tank souls” than actually available combat-ready tanks and assault guns. And burnt-out tanks, with turrets twisted on their sides, with gaping holes in their armor, stood in the courtyards of tank repair plants, on paper moving from vehicles of one repair category to another, waiting either to be sent for melting down, or to be captured by Soviet troops. But at that time, German industrial corporations were quietly “sawing” the finances allocated for supposedly long-term repairs or repairs “to be sent to Germany.” In addition, if Soviet documents immediately and clearly indicated that an irretrievably lost tank was burned out or broken so that it could not be restored, then German documents indicated only the disabled unit or unit (engine, transmission, chassis), or indicated location of combat damage (hull, turret, bottom, etc.). Moreover, even a tank that was completely burned out by a shell hitting the engine compartment was listed as having engine damage.

If we analyze the same B. Müller-Hillebrandt’s data on the losses of the “Royal Tigers”, an even more striking picture emerges. At the beginning of February 1945, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS had 219 Pz tanks. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II" ("Royal Tiger"). By this time, 417 tanks of this type had been produced. And according to Muller-Hillebrandt, 57 were lost. In total, the difference between produced and lost tanks is 350 units. In stock - 219. Where did 131 cars go? And that is not all. According to the same retired general, in August 1944 there were no lost Royal Tigers at all. And many other researchers of the history of the Panzerwaffe also find themselves in an awkward position when almost everyone points out that German troops admitted the loss of only 6 (six) Pz. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II". But what then to do with the situation when, near the town of Szydłów and the village of Oglendów near Sandomierz, Soviet trophy groups and special groups from the armored department of the 1st Ukrainian Front studied in detail and described, indicating serial numbers, 10 knocked out and burned out and 3 fully operational “Royal Tigers” ? We can only assume that the knocked out and burned out “Royal Tigers”, standing within the direct line of sight of the German troops, were considered by the Wehrmacht to be undergoing long-term repairs under the pretext that, theoretically, these tanks could be repulsed during a counterattack and then returned to service. Original logic, but nothing else comes to mind.

According to B. Müller-Hillebrandt, by February 1, 1945, 5840 Pz heavy tanks were produced. Kpfw. V "Panther" (Panther), lost - 3059 units, 1964 units were available. If we take the difference between the Panthers produced and their losses, the balance is 2781 units. There were, as already indicated, 1964 units. At the same time, Panther tanks were not transferred to Germany’s satellites. Where did the 817 units go?

With Pz tanks. Kpfw. IV is exactly the same picture. According to Müller-Hillebrandt, 8,428 units of these vehicles were produced by February 1, 1945, 6,151 were lost, the difference is 2,277 units, and 1,517 units were available on February 1, 1945. No more than 300 vehicles of this type were transferred to the Allies. Thus, up to 460 vehicles are left unaccounted for and disappeared to God knows where.

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. III. Produced - 5681 units, lost by February 1, 1945 - 4808 units, difference - 873 units, available on the same date - 534 tanks. No more than 100 units were transferred to the satellites, so, who knows where, about 250 tanks disappeared from the register.

In total, more than 1,700 tanks “Royal Tiger”, “Panther”, Pz. Kpfw. IV and Pz. Kpfw. III.

Paradoxically, to date, not a single attempt to deal with the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in technology has been successful. No one has been able to analyze in detail by month and year what real irretrievable losses the Panzerwaffe suffered. And all because of the peculiar method of “accounting” for the losses of military equipment in the German Wehrmacht.

Similarly, in the Luftwaffe, the existing method of accounting for losses made it possible for a long time to list in the “repair” column the aircraft that were shot down but fell on their territory. Sometimes even a plane smashed to smithereens that fell in the disposition of German troops was not immediately included in the lists of irretrievable losses, but was listed as damaged. All this led to the fact that in Luftwaffe squadrons up to 30-40%, and even more, of equipment was constantly listed as not combat-ready, smoothly moving from the category of damaged to the category subject to write-off.

One example: when in July 1943, on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, pilot A. Gorovets shot down 9 Ju-87 dive bombers in one battle, the Soviet infantry examined the crash sites of the Junkers and reported detailed data on the downed aircraft: tactical and serial numbers given on dead crew members, etc. However, the Luftwaffe admitted the loss of only two dive bombers that day. How could this happen? The answer is simple: by the evening of the day of the air battle, the territory where the Luftwaffe bombers fell was occupied by German troops. And the downed planes ended up in territory controlled by the Germans. And out of nine bombers, only two disintegrated in the air, the rest fell, but retained relative integrity, although they were mangled. And the Luftwaffe, with a calm soul, classified the downed planes as those that had only received combat damage. Surprisingly, this is a real fact.

And in general, when considering the issue of losses of Wehrmacht equipment, we must take into account that huge amounts of money were made on repairing equipment. And when it came to the financial interests of the financial-industrial oligarchy, the entire repressive apparatus of the Third Reich stood at attention in front of it. The interests of industrial corporations and banks were looked after sacredly. Moreover, most of the Nazi bosses had their own selfish interests in this.

One more specific point should be noted. Contrary to popular belief about the pedantry, accuracy and scrupulousness of the Germans, the Nazi elite understood perfectly well that a complete and accurate accounting of losses could become a weapon against them. After all, there is always a possibility that information about the true scale of losses will fall into the hands of the enemy and will be used in the propaganda war against the Reich. Therefore, in Nazi Germany they turned a blind eye to the confusion in accounting for losses. At first there was a calculation that the victors would not be judged, then it became a deliberate policy so as not to give the victors, in the event of the complete defeat of the Third Reich, arguments for exposing the scale of the disaster to the German people. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that at the final stage of the war, a special erasure of the archives was carried out so as not to provide the victors with additional arguments in accusing the leaders of the Nazi regime of crimes not only against other nations, but also against their own, German. After all, the death of several million young men in a senseless massacre for the sake of realizing delusional ideas about world domination is a very compelling argument for the prosecution.

Therefore, the true scale of human losses in Germany during the Second World War is still awaiting its scrupulous researchers, and then very interesting facts may be revealed to them. But on condition that these will be conscientious historians, and not all kinds of corned beef, mlechina, Svanidze, Afanasyev, Gavriilpopov and Sokolov. Paradoxically, the commission to combat the falsification of history will find more work to do inside Russia than outside its borders.

Estimates of the losses of Soviet citizens in the Great Patriotic War have a huge range: from 19 to 36 million. The first detailed calculations were made by the Russian emigrant, demographer Timashev in 1948 - he came up with 19 million. The maximum figure was called by B. Sokolov - 46 million. The latest calculations show that the USSR military alone lost 13.5 million people, but the total losses were over 27 million.

At the end of the war, long before any historical and demographic studies, Stalin named the figure: 5.3 million military losses. He also included missing persons (obviously, in most cases, prisoners). In March 1946, in an interview with a correspondent of the Pravda newspaper, the generalissimo estimated the human losses at 7 million. The increase was due to civilians who died in the occupied territory or were deported to Germany.

In the West, this figure was perceived with skepticism. Already at the end of the 1940s, the first calculations of the demographic balance of the USSR during the war years appeared, contradicting Soviet data. An illustrative example is the calculations of the Russian emigrant, demographer N.S. Timashev, published in the New York “New Journal” in 1948. Here is his method:

The All-Union Population Census of the USSR in 1939 determined its population at 170.5 million. The increase in 1937-1940 reached, according to his assumption, almost 2% for each year. Consequently, the population of the USSR by mid-1941 should have reached 178.7 million. But in 1939-1940, Western Ukraine and Belarus, three Baltic states, the Karelian lands of Finland were annexed to the USSR, and Romania returned Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Therefore, excluding the Karelian population who went to Finland, the Poles who fled to the west, and the Germans who were repatriated to Germany, these territorial acquisitions gave a population increase of 20.5 million. Considering that the birth rate in the annexed territories was no more than 1% per year, that is, lower than in the USSR, and also taking into account the short time period between their entry into the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the author determined the population growth for these territories by mid-1941 at 300 thousand. By sequentially adding the above figures, he received 200 .7 million living in the USSR on the eve of June 22, 1941.

Timashev further divided 200 million into three age groups, again relying on data from the 1939 All-Union Census: adults (over 18 years old) -117.2 million, teenagers (from 8 to 18 years old) - 44.5 million, children ( under 8 years old) - 38.8 million. At the same time, he took into account two important circumstances. First: in 1939-1940, two very weak annual streams, born in 1931-1932, moved from childhood to the adolescent group, during the famine that covered large areas of the USSR and negatively affected the size of the adolescent group. Second: in the former Polish lands and Baltic states there were more people over 20 years of age than in the USSR.

Timashev supplemented these three age groups with the number of Soviet prisoners. He did it in the following way. By the time of the elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937, the population of the USSR reached 167 million, of which voters made up 56.36% of the total figure, and the population over 18 years of age, according to the All-Union Census of 1939, reached 58.3%. The resulting difference of 2%, or 3.3 million, in his opinion, was the population of the Gulag (including the number of those executed). This turned out to be close to the truth.

Next, Timashev moved on to post-war figures. The number of voters included in the voting lists for the elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the spring of 1946 was 101.7 million. Adding to this figure the 4 million Gulag prisoners he calculated, he received 106 million adult population in the USSR at the beginning of 1946. When calculating the teenage group, he took as a basis 31.3 million primary and secondary school students in 1947/48 academic year, compared with data from 1939 (31.4 million schoolchildren within the borders of the USSR before September 17, 1939) and received a figure of 39 million. When calculating the children's group, he proceeded from the fact that by the beginning of the war the birth rate in the USSR was approximately 38 per thousand, during in the second quarter of 1942 it decreased by 37.5%, and in 1943-1945 - by half.

Subtracting from each year group the percentage calculated according to the normal mortality table for the USSR, he received 36 million children at the beginning of 1946. Thus, according to his statistical calculations, in the USSR at the beginning of 1946 there were 106 million adults, 39 million adolescents and 36 million children, and a total of 181 million. Timashev’s conclusion is as follows: the population of the USSR in 1946 was 19 million less than in 1941.

Other Western researchers came to approximately the same results. In 1946, under the auspices of the League of Nations, F. Lorimer’s book “The Population of the USSR” was published. According to one of his hypotheses, during the war the population of the USSR decreased by 20 million.

In the article “Human Losses in the Second World War,” published in 1953, the German researcher G. Arntz came to the conclusion that “20 million people is the closest figure to the truth of the total losses of the Soviet Union in the Second World War.” The collection including this article was translated and published in the USSR in 1957 under the title “Results of the Second World War.” Thus, four years after Stalin’s death, Soviet censorship released the figure of 20 million into the open press, thereby indirectly recognizing it as correct and making it available to at least specialists - historians, international affairs experts, etc.

Only in 1961, Khrushchev, in a letter to Swedish Prime Minister Erlander, admitted that the war against fascism “claimed two tens of millions of lives.” Soviet people" Thus, compared to Stalin, Khrushchev increased Soviet casualties by almost 3 times.

In 1965, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Victory, Brezhnev spoke of “more than 20 million” human lives lost by the Soviet people in the war. In the 6th and final volume of the fundamental “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,” published at the same time, it was stated that of the 20 million dead, almost half “were military and civilians killed and tortured by the Nazis in occupied Soviet territory.” In fact, 20 years after the end of the war, the USSR Ministry of Defense recognized the death of 10 million Soviet military personnel.

Four decades later, the head of the Center military history Russian Institute Russian history RAS Professor G. Kumanev, in a line-by-line commentary, told the truth about the calculations that military historians carried out in the early 1960s when preparing the “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union”: “Our losses in the war were then determined at 26 million. But the high authorities turned out to be The accepted figure is “over 20 million.”

As a result, “20 Million” not only took root in historical literature for decades, but also became part of the national consciousness.

In 1990, M. Gorbachev announced a new figure for losses obtained as a result of research by demographers - “almost 27 million people.”

In 1991, B. Sokolov’s book “The Price of Victory” was published. The Great Patriotic War: the unknown about the known.” In it, direct military losses of the USSR were estimated at approximately 30 million, including 14.7 million military personnel, and “actual and potential losses” at 46 million, including 16 million unborn children.”

A little later, Sokolov clarified these figures (he added new losses). He obtained the loss figure as follows. From the size of the Soviet population at the end of June 1941, which he determined to be 209.3 million, he subtracted 166 million who, in his opinion, lived in the USSR on January 1, 1946 and received 43.3 million dead. Then, from the resulting number, I subtracted the irretrievable losses of the armed forces (26.4 million) and received the irretrievable losses of the civilian population - 16.9 million.

“We can name the number of Red Army soldiers killed during the entire war, which is close to reality, if we determine the month of 1942, when the losses of the Red Army in the dead were taken into account most fully and when it had almost no losses in prisoners. For a number of reasons, we chose November 1942 as such a month and extended the ratio of the number of dead and wounded obtained for it to the entire period of the war. As a result, we came to a figure of 22.4 million Soviet military personnel who were killed in battle and died from wounds, illnesses, accidents and executed by the verdict of tribunals.”

To the 22.4 million received in this way, he added 4 million soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died in enemy captivity. And so it turned out that 26.4 million irretrievable losses suffered by the armed forces.

In addition to B. Sokolov, similar calculations were carried out by L. Polyakov, A. Kvasha, V. Kozlov and others. The methodological weakness of this kind of calculations is obvious: the researchers proceeded from the difference in the size of the Soviet population in 1941, which is known very approximately, and the size of the post-war population of the USSR, which is almost impossible to accurately determine. It was this difference that they considered the total human losses.

In 1993, a statistical study was published, “The classification of secrecy has been removed: losses Armed Forces USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts”, prepared by a team of authors headed by General G. Krivosheev. The main source of statistical data was previously secret archival documents, primarily the reporting materials of the General Staff. However, the losses of entire fronts and armies in the first months, and the authors specifically stipulated this, were obtained by calculation. In addition, the reporting of the General Staff did not include the losses of units that were not organizationally part of the Soviet armed forces (army, navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR), but were directly involved in the battles - the people's militia, partisan detachments, groups of underground fighters.

Finally, the number of prisoners of war and missing in action is clearly underestimated: this category of losses, according to the reports of the General Staff, totals 4.5 million, of which 2.8 million remained alive (were repatriated after the end of the war or again drafted into the ranks of the Red Army in the territory liberated from the occupiers), and, accordingly, the total number of those who did not return from captivity, including those who did not want to return to the USSR, amounted to 1.7 million.

As a result, the statistical data in the “Classified as Classified” directory was immediately perceived as requiring clarification and additions. And in 1998, thanks to V. Litovkin’s publication “During the war years, our army lost 11 million 944 thousand 100 people,” these data were replenished by 500 thousand reservists drafted into the army, but not yet included in the lists of military units and who died along the way to the front.

V. Litovkin’s study states that from 1946 to 1968, a special commission of the General Staff, headed by General S. Shtemenko, prepared a statistical reference book on losses in 1941-1945. At the end of the commission’s work, Shtemenko reported to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal A. Grechko: “Taking into account that the statistical collection contains information of national importance, the publication of which in the press (including closed ones) or in any other way is currently not necessary and undesirable, the collection is intended to be kept at the General Staff as a special document, to which a strictly limited circle of persons will be allowed to become familiar.” And the prepared collection was kept under seven seals until the team under the leadership of General G. Krivosheev made its information public.

V. Litovkin’s research sowed even greater doubts about the completeness of the information published in the collection “Classified as Classified”, because a logical question arose: were all the data contained in the “statistics collection of the Shtemenko Commission” declassified?

For example, according to the data given in the article, during the war years, military justice authorities convicted 994 thousand people, of which 422 thousand were sent to penal units, 436 thousand to places of detention. The remaining 136 thousand were apparently shot.

And yet, the reference book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed” significantly expanded and supplemented the ideas not only of historians, but also of the entire Russian society about the cost of the Victory of 1945. It is enough to refer to the statistical calculation: from June to November 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR lost 24 thousand people every day, of which 17 thousand killed and up to 7 thousand wounded, and from January 1944 to May 1945 - 20 thousand people, of which 5.2 thousand were killed and 14.8 thousand wounded.

In 2001, a significantly expanded statistical publication appeared - “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Losses of the armed forces." The authors supplemented the General Staff materials with reports from military headquarters about losses and notifications from military registration and enlistment offices about the dead and missing, which were sent to relatives at their place of residence. And the figure of losses he received increased to 9 million 168 thousand 400 people. These data were reproduced in volume 2 of the collective work of employees of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Population of Russia in the 20th century. Historical essays”, published under the editorship of academician Yu. Polyakov.

In 2004, the second, corrected and expanded, edition of the book by the head of the Center for Military History of Russia at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor G. Kumanev, “Feat and Forgery: Pages of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945,” was published. It provides data on losses: about 27 million Soviet citizens. And in the footnote comments to them, the same addition mentioned above appeared, explaining that the calculations of military historians back in the early 1960s gave a figure of 26 million, but the “high authorities” preferred to accept something else as the “historical truth”: “over 20 million."

Meanwhile, historians and demographers continued to look for new approaches to determining the magnitude of the USSR's losses in the war.

The historian Ilyenkov, who served in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, followed an interesting path. He tried to calculate the irretrievable losses of the Red Army personnel based on the files of irretrievable losses of privates, sergeants and officers. These files began to be created when, on July 9, 1941, a department for recording personal losses was organized as part of the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of the Red Army (GUFKKA). The responsibilities of the department included personal accounting of losses and compiling an alphabetical card index of losses.

The records were kept in the following categories: 1) dead - according to reports from military units, 2) dead - according to reports from military registration and enlistment offices, 3) missing in action - according to reports from military units, 4) missing - according to reports from military registration and enlistment offices, 5) dead in German captivity , 6) those who died from diseases, 7) those who died from wounds - according to reports from military units, those who died from wounds - according to reports from military registration and enlistment offices. At the same time, the following were taken into account: deserters; military personnel sentenced to forced labor camps; those sentenced to capital punishment - execution; removed from the register of irretrievable losses as survivors; those on suspicion of having served with the Germans (the so-called “signals”) and those who were captured but survived. These military personnel were not included in the list of irretrievable losses.

After the war, the card files were deposited in the Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense (now the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation). Since the early 1990s, the archive began counting registration cards by letters of the alphabet and categories of losses. As of November 1, 2000, 20 letters of the alphabet were processed; for the remaining 6 letters that were not counted, a preliminary count was carried out, with fluctuations up or down by 30-40 thousand persons.

The calculated 20 letters for 8 categories of losses of privates and sergeants of the Red Army gave the following figures: 9 million 524 thousand 398 people. At the same time, 116 thousand 513 people were removed from the register of irretrievable losses, as they turned out to be alive according to reports from military registration and enlistment offices.

A preliminary calculation based on 6 uncounted letters gave 2 million 910 thousand people as irretrievable losses. The result of the calculations was as follows: 12 million 434 thousand 398 Red Army soldiers and sergeants were lost by the Red Army in 1941-1945 (Remember that this is without losses Navy, internal and border troops of the NKVD of the USSR.)

Using the same methodology, the alphabetical card index of irretrievable losses of officers of the Red Army was calculated, which is also stored in the TsAMO of the Russian Federation. They amounted to about 1 million 100 thousand people.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost 13 million 534 thousand 398 soldiers and commanders killed, missing, died from wounds, diseases and in captivity.

These data are 4 million 865 thousand 998 people higher than the irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces (payroll) according to the General Staff, which included the Red Army, sailors, border guards, and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR.

Finally, we note another new trend in the study of the demographic results of the Great Patriotic War. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was no need to estimate human losses for individual republics or nationalities. And only at the end of the twentieth century L. Rybakovsky tried to calculate the approximate amount of human losses of the RSFSR within its then borders. According to his estimates, it amounted to approximately 13 million people - slightly less than half of the total losses of the USSR.

(Quotes: S. Golotik and V. Minaev - “Demographic losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: history of calculations”, “New Historical Bulletin”, No. 16, 2007)

At first, after the end of the Second World War, it was impossible to count losses. Scientists tried to keep accurate statistics of those killed in World War II by nationality, but information became truly accessible only after the collapse of the USSR. Many believed that victory over the Nazis was achieved thanks to a large number dead. No one seriously kept statistics on the Second World War.

The Soviet government deliberately manipulated the numbers. Initially, the number of deaths during the war was about 50 million people. But by the end of the 90s the figure increased to 72 million.

The table provides a comparison of the losses of the two major 20th centuries:

Briefly about the beginning of hostilities

The USSR entered the war without a single ally (1941–1942). Initially, the battles were defeated. Statistics of victims of the Second World War in those years demonstrate a huge number of irretrievably lost soldiers and military equipment. The main destructive factor was the seizure of territories by the enemy, rich in the defense industry.

The SS authorities assumed a possible attack on the country. But there were no visible preparations for war. Effect surprise attack played into the hands of the aggressor. The seizure of USSR territories was carried out with enormous speed. There was enough military equipment and weapons in Germany for a large-scale military campaign.

Number of deaths during the Second World War

The statistics of losses in the Second World War are only approximate. Each researcher has his own data and calculations. 61 states took part in this battle, and military operations took place on the territory of 40 countries. The war affected about 1.7 billion people. Bear the brunt of the blow Soviet Union. According to historians, the losses of the USSR amounted to about 26 million people.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union was very weak in terms of production of equipment and military weapons. However, statistics of deaths in the Second World War show that the number of deaths by year by the end of the battle had decreased significantly. The reason is the sharp development of the economy. The country learned to produce high-quality defensive equipment against the aggressor, and the technology had multiple advantages over fascist industrial blocs.

As for prisoners of war, most of them were from the USSR. In 1941, the prisoner camps were overcrowded. Later the Germans began to release them. At the end of this year, about 320 thousand prisoners of war were released. The bulk of them were Ukrainians, Belarusians and Balts.

Official statistics of deaths in the Second World War indicates colossal losses among Ukrainians. Their number is much greater than the French, Americans and British combined. As statistics from the Second World War show, Ukraine lost about 8–10 million people. This includes all participants in hostilities (killed, deceased, captured, evacuated).

The cost of the victory of the Soviet authorities over the aggressor could have been much less. The main reason is the unpreparedness of the USSR for a sudden invasion of German troops. Stocks of ammunition and equipment did not correspond to the scale of the ongoing war.

About 3% of men born in 1923 are still alive. The reason is the lack of military training. The boys were taken to the front straight from school. Those with secondary education were sent to fast pilot courses or training for platoon commanders.

German losses

The Germans very carefully hid the statistics of those killed in the Second World War. It is somehow strange that in the battle of the century the number of military units lost by the aggressor was only 4.5 million. The statistics of the Second World War regarding those killed, wounded or captured were downplayed by the Germans several times. The remains of the dead are still being excavated in the battle areas.

However, the German one was strong and persistent. Hitler at the end of 1941 was ready to celebrate the victory over the Soviet people. Thanks to the allies, the SS was prepared both in terms of food and logistics. SS factories produced many high-quality weapons. However, losses in the Second World War began to increase significantly.

After a while, the Germans' fervor began to diminish. The soldiers understood that they could not withstand the people's fury. Soviet command began to correctly build military plans and tactics. The statistics of the Second World War in terms of deaths began to change.

During wartime around the world, the population died not only from hostilities on the part of the enemy, but also from the spread of various types of hunger. China's losses were especially noticeable in World War II. The death toll statistics are in second place after the USSR. More than 11 million Chinese died. Although the Chinese have their own statistics of those killed in the Second World War. It does not correspond to numerous opinions of historians.

Results of the Second World War

Considering the scale of the fighting, as well as the lack of desire to reduce losses, affected the number of casualties. It was not possible to prevent the losses of countries in the Second World War, the statistics of which were studied by various historians.

The statistics of the Second World War (infographics) would have been different if not for the many mistakes made by the commanders-in-chief, who initially did not attach importance to the production and preparation of military equipment and technology.

Results of the Second World War according to statistics more than cruel, not only in terms of bloodshed, but also in the destructive scale of cities and villages. World War II statistics (losses by country):

1. Soviet Union - about 26 million people.
2. China – more than 11 million.
3. Germany – more than 7 million
4. Poland – about 7 million.
5. Japan – 1.8 million
6. Yugoslavia – 1.7 million
7. Romania – about 1 million.
8. France - more than 800 thousand.
9. Hungary – 750 thousand
10. Austria – more than 500 thousand.

Some countries or individual groups of people fought on principle on the side of the Germans, since they did not like Soviet policies and Stalin’s approach to leading the country. But, despite this, the military campaign ended in the victory of Soviet power over the Nazis. The Second World War served as a good lesson for politicians of that time. Such casualties could have been avoided in the Second World War under one condition - preparation for invasion, regardless of whether the country was threatened with attack.

The main factor that contributed to the victory of the USSR in the fight against fascism was the unity of the nation and the desire to defend the honor of their Motherland.

The Soviet Union suffered the most significant losses in World War II - about 27 million people. At the same time, dividing the dead along ethnic lines has never been welcomed. Nevertheless, such statistics exist.

Counting history

For the first time, the total number of victims among Soviet citizens in World War II was named by the Bolshevik magazine, which published the figure of 7 million people in February 1946. A month later, Stalin cited the same figure in an interview with the Pravda newspaper.

In 1961, at the end of the post-war population census, Khrushchev announced the corrected data. “Can we sit with our hands folded and wait for a repeat of 1941, when the German militarists launched a war against the Soviet Union, which claimed two tens of millions of lives of Soviet people?” wrote the Soviet Secretary General to Swedish Prime Minister Fridtjof Erlander.

In 1965, on the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the new head of the USSR, Brezhnev, stated: “Such a brutal war that the Soviet Union endured has never befallen any nation. The war claimed more than twenty million lives of Soviet people.”

However, all these calculations were approximate. Only at the end of the 1980s, a group of Soviet historians under the leadership of Colonel General Grigory Krivosheev was allowed to access the materials of the General Staff, as well as the main headquarters of all branches of the Armed Forces. The result of the work was the figure of 8 million 668 thousand 400 people, reflecting the losses of the security forces of the USSR during the entire war.

The final data on all human losses of the USSR for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War was published by a state commission working on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee. 26.6 million people: this figure was announced at the ceremonial meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990. This figure remained unchanged, despite the fact that the methods for calculating the commission were repeatedly called incorrect. In particular, it was noted that the final figure included collaborators, “Hiwis” and other Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Nazi regime.

By nationality

For a long time, no one was counting those killed in the Great Patriotic War by nationality. Such an attempt was made by historian Mikhail Filimoshin in the book “Human Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR.” The author noted that the work was significantly complicated by the lack of a personal list of the dead, dead or missing, indicating nationality. Such a practice was simply not provided for in the Table of Urgent Reports.

Filimoshin substantiated his data using proportionality coefficients, which were calculated on the basis of reports on the number of military personnel of the Red Army according to socio-demographic characteristics for 1943, 1944 and 1945. At the same time, the researcher was unable to establish the nationality of approximately 500 thousand conscripts who were called up for mobilization in the first months of the war and went missing along the way to their units.

1. Russians – 5 million 756 thousand (66.402% of the total number of irretrievable losses);

2. Ukrainians – 1 million 377 thousand (15.890%);

3. Belarusians – 252 thousand (2.917%);

4. Tatars – 187 thousand (2.165%);

5. Jews – 142 thousand (1.644%);

6. Kazakhs – 125 thousand (1.448%);

7. Uzbeks – 117 thousand (1.360%);

8. Armenians – 83 thousand (0.966%);

9. Georgians – 79 thousand (0.917%)

10. Mordovians and Chuvashs – 63 thousand each (0.730%)

Demographer and sociologist Leonid Rybakovsky, in his book “Human Losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War,” separately counts civilian casualties using the ethnodemographic method. This method includes three components:

1. Death of civilians in combat areas (bombing, artillery shelling, punitive operations, etc.).

2. Failure to return part of the ostarbeiters and other population who served the occupiers voluntarily or under duress;

3. an increase in population mortality above the normal level from hunger and other deprivations.

According to Rybakovsky, the Russians lost 6.9 million civilians in this way, the Ukrainians - 6.5 million, and the Belarusians - 1.7 million.

Alternative estimates

Historians of Ukraine present their methods of calculation, which relate primarily to the losses of Ukrainians in the Great Patriotic War. Researchers on Square refer to the fact that Russian historians adhere to certain stereotypes when counting victims; in particular, they do not take into account the contingent of correctional labor institutions, where a significant part of the dispossessed Ukrainians were located, for whom the serving of their sentences was replaced by being sent to penal companies.

Head of the research department of the Kyiv “National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.” Lyudmila Rybchenko refers to the fact that Ukrainian researchers have collected a unique fund of documentary materials on recording the human military losses of Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War - funerals, lists of missing persons, correspondence on the search for the dead, loss accounting books.

In total, according to Rybchenko, more than 8.5 thousand archival files were collected, in which about 3 million personal certificates about dead and missing soldiers called up from the territory of Ukraine. However, the museum worker does not pay attention to the fact that representatives of other nationalities also lived in Ukraine, who could well have been included in the number of 3 million victims.

Belarusian experts also provide estimates of the number of losses during the Second World War, independent of Moscow. Some believe that every third resident of the 9 million population of Belarus became a victim of Hitler's aggression. One of the most authoritative researchers on this topic is considered to be Professor of the State Pedagogical University, Doctor of Historical Sciences Emmanuel Ioffe.

The historian believes that in total in 1941-1944, 1 million 845 thousand 400 inhabitants of Belarus died. From this figure he subtracts 715 thousand Belarusian Jews who became victims of the Holocaust. Among the remaining 1 million 130 thousand 155 people, in his opinion, about 80% or 904 thousand people are ethnic Belarusians.